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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association; 
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as 
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44477 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE SAMUEL A.HOAGLAND 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 






Location: Ada County District Court 
Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel 


























Clark & Associates PLLC 
Clark, Eric R 
Fuhrman, William 
Graham, Christopher 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE C0t:RT 
New Case Filed Other Claims 






Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
Affidavit of Service 
(3) Affidavit Of Service (3/14/16) 
Notice of Appearance 
Filed on: 03/10/2016 
AA- All Initial District Court 
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI) 
Lead Attorneys 
Clark, Eric Robert 
Retained 
208-830-8084(W) 
Clark, Eric Robert 
Retained 
208-830-8084(W) 
Brailsford, Amanda Kathleen 
Retained 
208-342-441 l(W) 
Brailsford, Amanda Kathleen 
Retained 
208-342-441 l(W) 




Notice Of Appearance of Counsel (Andersen Brailsford and Murphy for Defendants) 





















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 05/11/2016 02:00 PM) 
Memorandum 
Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint 
Motion 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint 
Notice 
Three Day Notice of Intent to Take Default 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 05/20/2016 02:30 PM) 
Notice 
Notice of Scheduling Conference 
Declaration 
Declaration of Eric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Reply 
Defendant's Reply In Support of Motion To Dismiss 
Motion 
Former Clients' Motion To Seal Documents Containing Informaiton Protected By Attorney-
Client Privilege or Work Product Doctrine 
Memorandum 
Memorandum In Support Of Former Clients' Motion To Seal Documents Containing 
Informaiton Protected By Attorney-Client Privilege or Work Product Doctrine 
Affidavit 
Affidavit Of Amanda K Brailsford In Support Of Former Client's Motion To Seal Documents 
Motion 
Motion To Shorten Time On Motion To Strike And Motion To Seal 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 05/11/2016 02:00 PM) Motion To Strike, Motion To 
Seal 
Motion 
- Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation of Facts 
Motion 
Plaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And Oppositon To Defendants "Motion To Dismiss To 
Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal 
Documents Containing Information Protected By Attorney-Client Privileged Or Work Product 
Doctrine 
Declaration 


















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 
Declaration Of Eric R Clark Filed In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And 
Opposition To Defendants Motion To Dismiss To Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of 
Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected By 
Attorney-Client Privileged Of Work Product Doctrine 
Amended 
Amended Notice Of Hearing (6/3/16@10A. M) 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 05/11/2016 02:00 PM· Hearing Vacated 
Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 05/11/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/03/2016 10:00 AM) Motion To Dismiss, Motion To Strike, 
Motion To Seal, Motion To Shorten Time, 
CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 
05/11/2016 02:00 PM- Hearing Vacated 
Continued 
Continued (Scheduling Conference 06/03/2016 10:00 AM) 
Notice 
Notice Of Firm Name Change 
Notice 
Notice Of Firm Name Change 
Reply 
Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Strike and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Judicial Notice 
Reply 
Former Clients' Reply in Support of Motion to Seal Information Protected by the Attorney-
Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine 
Notice 
Notice of Opportunity to Recuse Judge Hoagland 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/03/201610:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/03/201610:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
CANCELED Scheduling Conference (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Motion To Dismiss, Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal, Motion To Shorten Time, Hearing 
result for Motion scheduled on 06/03/2016 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 

















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek 
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Motion 
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider 
Motion 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
Memorandum 
Plaintiffs Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend 
Complaint 
Declaration 
Declaration of Eric R Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Amend Complaint 
Notice of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint 
Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/15/2016 l l:30AM) Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Amend Complaint 
Memorandum 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal and Motion to 
Dismiss and Denying Motion/or Judicial Notice 
Order 
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 07/15/2016 l l:30AM: Hearing Vacated Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint 
Civil Disposition Entered 
Civil Disposition entered/or: Fuhrman, William, Defendant; Graham, Christopher, 
Defendant; Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A, Defendant; Clark & Associates PLLC, 
Plaintiff; Clark, Eric R, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/28/2016 
Status Changed 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
Dismissed 
Party (Clark & Associates PLLC) 
Party (Clark, Eric R) 
Party (Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan Gourley P.A) 
Party (Fuhnnan, William) 
Party (Graham, Christopher) 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (11 :30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Vacated 
Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint Hearing result for Motion scheduled 
on 07/15/201611:30AM: Hearing Vacated 
Transcript Filed 
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings Filed 
Judgment 
Judgment 



















ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 
Motion 
Defendant's Motion/or Fees and Costs 
Memorandum of Costs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Fees and Costs 
Affidavit 
Affidavit of Amanda K Brailsford in Support of Defendants' Motion/or Attorney Fees and 
Costs 
Objection 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion/or Fees and Costs 
Declaration 
of Eric R Clark Filed Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Costs and Attorney Fees 
Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion/or Fees and Costs 
Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
Notice of Hearing 
RE Plaintiffs Objection To Defendants Motion For Costs And Attorney Fees (9/14/16 at 4pm) 
fflReply 
in Support of Motion/or Fees and Costs 
ffl BriefFiled 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES 
Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs (4:01 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
ffl Court Minutes 
ffl Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion/or Costs and Attorney Fees 
ffl Amended Judgment 
$26,386.00 
Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel) 
Monetary/Property Award 
In Favor Of: Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A; Fuhrman, William; Graham, 
Christopher 
Against: Clark & Associates PLLC; Clark, Eric R 
Entered Date: 10/21/2016 
Current Judgment Status: 
Status: Active 




Amended Notice of Appeal 




ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633 
fflRequest 
for Additional Record 
Defendant Fuhrman, William 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 11/18/2016 
Defendant Graham, Christopher 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 11/18/2016 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
Defendant Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 11/18/2016 
Plaintiff Clark, Eric R 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 


















ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
NO~•?;,::-
AM y\ • a\) FILED . ·-------~-~M ___ _ 
MAR 1 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Sy SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
O~PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN 
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional 
Association; William Fuhrman, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and 
Christopher Graham, i~dividually, and 
as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
CV OC 160463:3 
Case No. CV OC-· ------
COMPLAINT 
AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A.A. $221.00 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
000009
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel and hereby complain 
and allege as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This is an attorney lien case; and in particular a failure to protect 
settlement funds notwithstanding notice of the attorney's lien. 
PARTIES 
2. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., was an Idaho Professional Association, conducting business as a 
law firm, with its principle place of business in Boise, Idaho. 
3. At all times relevant to these proceedings, William Fuhrman, was an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the State ofldalio, and was employed as an 
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
4. At all times relevant to these proceedings, Christopher Graham, was 
an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, and was employed as an 
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
5. At all times relevant to these proceedings Defendants represented 
Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakken who were defendants in Forbush, 
et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325. 
("Forbush case") 
6. At all times relevant to these proceedings Plaintiff, Eric R. Clark, was 
an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, who was operating the law firm of 
Clark & Associates, PLLC, in Eagle, Idaho. 1 
1 Clark and Clark & Associates; PLLC are hereinafter referred collectively as "Clark." 
COMPLAINT AND DEMANP FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. Jurisdiction in the District Court is proper as the amounts sought for 
fit .. 
damages in this litigation exceed $10,000.00, the jurisdictional limit of the court. 
FACTS 
8. Private First Class McQuen Forbush died the morning ofNovember 
10, 2012 in an apartment at the Sagecrest Apartments in Meridian, Idaho. The 
cause of death was subsequently determined.to be carbon monoxide poisoning. 
9. The water heaters installed at Sagecrest were manufactured using new 
technology called "Flammable Vapor Ignition Resistant" or "FVIR." 
10. The water heater manufacturer describes "FVIR" in its Service 
handbook: 
Thi.s class of residential. gas water heaters meet the new ANSI 
standards and testing protocols (ANSI 221.10.1) established to deal 
. with the accidental or unintended ignition of flammable vapors, such 
as those emitted by gasoline. YirtU:ally all gas-fired, atmospherically 
vented, residential water heaters manufactured in 'the United States 
with BTU ratings of75,000 or less are required to meet this new 
ANSI standard effectiv~_Ju\r 1_,. ?003. 
11. As of July 1, 2003, the Federal Government had mandated that 
all of water heaters manufactured had.to have thiS'technology. 
12. In April 2009, dming a service call, Bakken, then an Anfinson 
Plumbing employee, removed a safety feature; what the manufacturer called a 
"thermal cut off switch" or "TCO," from the water heater in the apartment where 
McQuen died. This safety feature was designed to prevent the continued 
production of carbon monox~de. 
13. When deposed in 2014, Peter Anfinson, owner of Anfinson Plumbing, 
testified that he did not even know of or ~nderstand the "FVIR" technology. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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14. During Anfinson's deposition, Anfinson testified that notwithstanding 
"FVIR" type water heaters had been mandatory since mid-2003, Anfinson 
Plumbing had no type of training or education for its employees regarding this 
technology. Anfinson testified he "assumed" licensed plumbers were trained to 
service water heaters using the "FVIR" technology. 
15. Bakken, although employed by Anfinson Plumbing, was untrained 
and unqualified to service "FVIR" technology water heaters, yet Anfinson 
Plumbing sent Bakken on service calls, including to the apartment where McQuen 
died, to work on water heaters capable of producing lethal levels of carbon 
monoxide if not serviced properly. 
' 
16. When finding the water heater manufacture had no liability, the 
district court ruled that the plumber and his employer's conduct in removing a 
safety device designed to prevent carbon monoxide production was extreme and 
reckless to such a degree that the manufacturer could not reasonably have foreseen 
such conduct. 2 
17. Clark init~ally represented McQuen's family and his girlfriend who 
was also suffered carbon monoxide poisoning but survived. 
18. Subsequently, the Spence Law Firm from Jackson, Wyoming joined 
Clark as co-counsel in the Forbush case. 
19. Ultimately, due to the Spence Law Firm's malpractice and 
incompetence, Clark withdrew from the case. One of several issues in contention 
2 The Plaintiffs in Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325, believed the 
District Court erred in its findings because there was compelling evidence A.O. Smith was aware as early as July 
2004, that plumbers were mistakenly replacing the A.O. Smith specific thermocouple that contained a proprietary 
safety device with a standard thermocouple, thereby rendering the WO without a safety device designed to prevent 
the production of lethal carbon monoxide. However, inexplicably The Spence Firm representing the Plaintiffs in 
Forbush v. Sagecrest failed to timely present this compelling evidence to the Court. It is unclear why, with the 
compelling evidence that the manufacturer knew the danger but failed to warn plumbers or to put any warning signs 
on the water heaters, that Anfinson Plumbing and Daniel Bakken failed to cross-claim against A.O. Smith in this 
case. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
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was the Spence Firm's malpractice in failing to pursue a claim for punitive 
damages against Anfinson Plumbing, although Clark had obtained an expert 
witness who had opined that Anfinson Plumbing's conduct was an "extreme 
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," and although the district court in 
dismissing the manufacturer had ruled Anfinson Plumbing's conduct in removing a 
safety device was so outrageous and reckless that it was not foreseeable. 
20. Upon withdrawing, on September 23, 2015, Clark notified the 
Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. that 
Clark was asserting an attorney lien "according to LC. § 3-205," and requested that 
the Defendants protect Clark's lien by putting Clark's name on any payments to 
the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case related to settlement of verdict. A true and 
correct copy of Clark's letter is attached as Exhibit 1. 
21. In January 2016, Anfinson Plumbing and Bakken settled with the 
Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for $1,000,090,00 and sent a check to the Spence 
Firm. 
22. Even before.delivery to The Spence Firm, Clark's lien attached to the 
settlement funds in the hands of the Defendants. 
23. Notwithstanding the actual kno.wledge that Clark had represented the 
Plaintiffs in the Forbush case and despite Clark/s written request that Defendants 
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. protect Clark's lien 
by listing Clark as a payee on any settlement check, Defendants Fuhrman, Graham 
and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. provided the $1,000,000.00 settlement 
funds to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark's lien. 
24. Thereafter, The Spence Firm and/or the Forbush Plaintiffs converted 
Clark's fees. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
( 
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25. As the Defendants had constructive and actual knowledge of Clark's 
attorney lien, the Defendants owed Clark a duty to protect his lien. 
' . . . ' . . . 
26. This duty included protecting Clark's lien by complying with Clark's 
request and placing Clark's name as a payee on the $1,000,000.00 Anfinson 
Plumbing settlement check. 
27. The Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A. breached their duty to protect Clark's lien when the Defendants 
delivered the settlement check to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark lien 
interest. 
28. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants 
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., Clark has suffered 
damages of at least $140,000.00, plus accumulating interest, costs and attorney 
fees. 
29. In the _alternative, t4e Defendants are required to compensate Clark for 
Clark's time and costs expended in recovering his attorney fees from The Spence 
Law Firm and/or his former clients in an amount to be proven at trial. 
. . 
ATTORNEY FEES 
30. The Plaintiffs hereby request an award of attorney fees according to 
Idaho Code§ 121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
31. The Plaintiffs hereby requests a trial by jury on all contested issue in 
this case. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for j_udgment against all Defendants 
jointly and severally as follows: 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
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1. For Judgment against all Defendants for specific damages in the 
amount of $140,000.00, plus accumulating pre-judgment interest; 
2. For Judgment in the alternative for Clark's damages incurred to 
recover his attorney fees from The Spence Law Firm and/or his former clients. 
3. For Judgment requiring the Defendants to pay attorney fees and 
litigation costs to the Plaintiffs of not less than $10,000.00 in the event default is 
obtained and default judgment is entered, and the actual amount of attorney fees 
and litigation costs the Plaintiffs inc~r if this matter is contested; and, 
4. For such other relief the Court determines is appropriate and proper 
under the circumstances. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiffs 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7 
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9/23/2015 9:42 AM FROM: 2 9-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW TC Jl-1529 PAGE: 001 OF 001 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 




MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
PO Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Fax: (208) 336-7031 
September 23, 2015 
William A Fuhrman 
Christopher Graham 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529 
Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice 
of Attorney Lien 
Dear Counsel: 
This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205, 
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks 
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you. 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Sincerely, 
Eric R. Clark 
(208) 830-8084 




** INBOUND NOTIFICATION: FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY *R .. 







Received March 21, 2016 12:19:25 PM MDT 
I 
I 
3/21/2016 12:14 PM FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK ....,ASSOCIATES, A!TORNEYS AT LAW TO: 2876919 PAGE: 001 OF 008 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
' 
' i 
NO FILED ~ • ~ 
A.M. ____ P.M----
MAR 2 1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARAIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN 1HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN 
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional 
Association; William Fuhrman, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and 
Christopher Graham, individually, and 




Case No. CV OC-1604633 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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. l 
i 
COl\,IB NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel and hereby complain 
I 





1. This is an attorney lien case; and in particular a failure to protect 




2. At all times relevant to these procJedings, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
I 
Gourley, P.A., was an Idaho Professional Association, conducting business as a 
l 
law firm, with its principle place of business in. Boise, Idaho. 
3. At all times relevant to these proc~edings, William Fuhrman, was an 
I 
attorney licensed to practice law in the State o~Idaho, and was employed as an 
I 
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley; P.A. 
4. At all times relevant to these proc~edings, Christopher Graham, was 
/ 
an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, and was employed as an 
. ! 
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A . . 
5. At all times relevant to these proceedings Defendants represented 
I 
Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakker who were defendants in Forbush, 
et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No: Case No. CV PI 1304325. 
("Forbush case") 
I 
6. At all times relevant to these proce~dings Plaintiff, Eric R. Clark, was 
' 
an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, ~ho was operating the law firm of 





1 Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC are hereinafter referred co~ectively as "Clark." 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
' 
I 
7. Jurisdiction in the District Court is proper as the amounts sought for 
! 




8. Private First Class McQuen Forbu,sh died the morning of November 
i 
10, 2012 in an apartment at the Sagecrest Apartments in Meridian, Idaho. The 
I 
I 
cause of death was subsequently determined to be carbon monoxide poisoning. 
! 
9. The water heaters installed at SagJcrest were manufactured using new 
! 
1 
technology called "Flammable Vapor Ignition Resistant" or "FVIR." 
· 10. The water heater manufacturer deJcribes "FVIR" in its Service 
handbook: 
This class of residential gas water heaterk meet the new ANSI 
standards and testing protocols (ANSI Z21.10.l) established to deal 
with the accidental or unintended ignition of flammable vapors, such 
as those emitted by gasoline. Virtually al). gas-fired, atmospherically 
. vented, residential water heaters manufa~tured in the United States 
with BTU ratings of 75,000 or less are r~quired to meet this new 
ANSI standard effective July 1, 2003. I 
i 
I · 11. As of July 1, 2003, the Federal G~vernment had mandated that 
I 
all of water heaters manufactured had to have this technology. 
t 
12. In April 2009, during a service call, Bakken, then an Anfinson 
I 
Plumbing employee, removed a safety feature; !what the manufacturer called a 
"thermal cut off switch" or "TCO," from the wkter heater in the apartment where 
I 
McQuen died. This safety feature was designed to prevent the continued 
j 
production of carbon monoxide. ! 
l 
13. When deposed in 2014, Peter Anfinson, owner of Anfinson Plumbing, 
I 
testified that he did not even know of or understand the "FVIR" technology. 
I 
I 
' AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
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I 
3/21/2016 12:14 PM FROM: 939-7136 CLARK ....ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 2876919 PAGE: 004 OF 008 
i 
14. During Anfinson's deposition, Anfmson testified that notwithstanding 
I 
"FVIR" type water heaters had been mandatory since mid-2003, Anfinson 
j 
Plumbing had no type of training or education for its employees regarding this 
I 
technology. Anfmson testified he "assumed" licensed plumbers were trained to 
' 
service water heaters using the "FVIR" technology. 
I 
! 
15. Bakken, although employed by N?fmson Plumbing, was untrained 
l 
and unqualified to service ''FVIR" technology ~ater heaters, yet Anfmson 
I 
Plumbing sent Bakken on service calls, includ~g to the apartment where McQuen 
I 
died, to work on water heaters capable of producing lethal levels of carbon 
I 
monoxide if not s~rviced properly. I 
I 
I 
16. When finding the water heater manufacture had no liability, the 
! 
district court ruled that the plumber and his employer's conduct in removing a 
I 
safety device designed to prevent carbon monokde production was extreme and 
. ' 
. i 
reckless to such a degree that the manufacturer'.could not reasonably have foreseen 
I 
such conduct. 2 I 
! 
17. Clark initially represented McQuen's family and his girlfriend who 
I 
was also suffered carbon monoxide poisoning but sUIVived. 
I 
18. Subsequently, the Spence Law F~ from Jackson, Wyoming joined 
Clark as co-counsel in the Forbush case. / 
19. Ultimately, due to the Spence Lair Firm's malpractice and 
l 
One of several issues in contention incompetence, Clark withdrew from the case. 
I 
2 The Plaintiffs in Forbush, et aL vs. Sagecres~ et aL Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325, believed the 
District Cotnt erred in its findings because there was compelling evidence A.O. Smith was aware as early as July 
2004, that plumbers were mistakenly replacing the AO. Smith specific thermocouple that contained a proprietary 
safety device with a standard thermocouple, thereby rendering the.WO without a safety device designed to prevent 
the production of lethal carbon monoxide. However, inexplicably' The Spence Firm representing the Plaintiffs in 
Forbush v. Sagecrest failed to timely present this compelling evidence to the Cotnt. It is unclear why, with the 
compelling evidence that the manufacturer knew the danger but failed to warn plumbers or to put any warning signs 
on the water heaters, that Anfinson Plumbing and Daniel Balck.en failed to cross-claim against AO. Smith in this 
case. i 
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was the Spence Firm's malpractice in failing t~ pursue a claim for punitive 
i 
damages against Anfinson Plumbing, although,Clark had obtained an expert 
' 
witness who had opined that Anfinson Plumbirig' s conduct was an "extreme 
i 
deviation from reasonable standards of conduc~," and although the district court in 
: 
dismissing the manufacturer had ruled Anfinson Plumbing's conduct in removing a 
i 
safety device was so outrageous and reckless that it was not foreseeable. 
l 
I 
20. Upon withdrawing, on September 23, 2015, Clark notified the 
i 
Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. that 
I 
Clark was asserting an attorney lien "according to LC. § 3-205," and requested that 
i 
the Defendants protect Clark's lien by putting Clark's name on any payments to 
t 
I 
the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case related to settlement of verdict. A true and 
I 
correct copy of Clark's letter is attached as Ex~ibit l. 
21. In January 2016, Anfinson Plumb~ and Bakken settled with the 
i 
Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for $1,000,000.00 and sent a check to the Spence 
I 
F. . l ~. I 
I 
22. Even before delivery to The Spence Firm, Clark's lien attached to the 
I 
settlement funds in the hands of the Defendant~. 
I 
. 23. Notwithstanding the actual knowledge that Clark had represented the 
Plaintiffs in the Forbush case and despite ClarJ's written request that Defendants 
I 
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman'. Gourley, P.A. protect Clark's lien 
! 
by listing Clark as a payee on any settlement check, Defendants Fuhrman, Graham 
I 
and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. provided the $1,000,000.00 settlement 
I 
funds to the Spence Firm without protecting Cl~k's lien. 
i 
24. Thereafter, The Spence Firm and/<;>r the Forbush Plaintiffs converted 
I 
Clark's fees. ' 










25. As the Defendants had constructi-Je and actual knowledge of Clark's 
I 
attorney lien, the Defendants owed Clark a duty to protect his lien. 
I 
26. This duty included protecting Clark's lien by complying with Clark's 
! 
request and placing Clark's name as a payee on the $1,000,000.00 Anfinson 
I 
Plum~ing settlement check. j 
27. The Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
l 
i 
Gourley, P.A. breached their duty to protect Clark's lien when the Defendants 
I 
! 
delivered the settlement check to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark lien 
! interest. , 
' 
l 
28. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants 
' I 
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., Clark has suffered 
I 





29. In the alternative, the Defendants are required to compensate Clark for 
r 
I 
Clark's time and costs expended in recovering pis attorney fees from The Spence 
' r




30. The Plaintiffs hereby request an aiard of attorney fees according to 
I 
Idaho Code§ 121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
! 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
! 
31. The Plaintiffs hereby requests a trial by jury on all contested issue in 
I 
this case. i ' 
I 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for j~gment against all Defendants 
I 
j 
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1. For Judgment against all Defendants for specific damages in the 
! 
amount of $500,000.00, plus accumulating pre~judgment interest; 
2. For Judgment in the alternative foi Clark's damages incurred to 
i 
recover his attorney fees from The Spence Law Firm and/or his former clients. 
I 
3. For Judgment requiring the Defen~ants to pay attorney fees and 
litigation costs to the Plaintiffs of not less than :$10 ,000 .00 in the event default is 
l 
obtained and default judgment is entered, and the actual amount of attorney fees 
I 
I 
and litigation costs the Plaintiffs incur if this matter is contested; and, 
I 
4. For such other relief the Court det~rmines is appropriate and proper 
under the circumstances. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2016. 
! 
CLARK' & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
Eric R. Clark 
For the Plaintiffs 
! 
! 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of Marc~ 2016, I served the 
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy 'delivered via facsimile or e-mail 
• • I 
transm1ss1on to: l 
; 
i 
William A. Fuhrman, bfuhnnan@idalaw.com 
Christopher Graham, cgraham@i~alaw.com 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A. 
I 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 l 
Post Office Box 1097 i 
Boise, Idaho 83701 ! 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529 i 
Eric R. Clark 
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StevenB. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@andersenbanducci.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
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Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@andersenbanducci.com 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
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Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher 
Graham ( collectively, the "Jones Gledhill Attorneys") hereby submit this memorandum in support 
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of their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed against them by Plaintiffs Eric. R. Clark 
and Clark & Associates, PLLC (collectively, "Clark"), for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should dismiss Clark's Amended Complaint attempting to collect attorney's 
fees relating to his representation of Travis Forbush, Gretchen Hymas, and Breanna Halowell 
(collectively, the "Forbush Clients") from the Jones Gledhill Attorneys. The Jones Gledhill 
Attorneys' only relationship to Clark is that they opposed Clark when they represented two 
defendants, Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakken (collectively, the "Anfinson 
Defendants"), who settled a lawsuit with the Forbush Clients after Clark's representation of the 
Forbush Clients had terminated. Although Clark has not identified the causes of action he 
purports to bring against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys, it appears that he is attempting to enforce 
an attorney's lien against them, seeking damages for their purported negligent failure to protect 
his attorney's lien, or both. Either way, Clark's Amended Complaint fails. 
First, Clark's claims against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys are barred by the litigation 
privilege because they arise out of the Jones Gledhill Attorneys' representation of the Anfinson 
Defendants. The litigation privilege alone requires dismissal of Clark's entire Amended 
Complaint. Moreover, even setting aside the privilege, Clark cannot state a claim against the 
Jones Gledhill Attorneys for an attorney's lien because (1) the Idaho attorney's lien statute does 
not authorize an attorney's lien against an opponent; (2) Clark has not yet reduced his attorney's 
lien to a judgment; and (3) the Jones Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which his lien 
might attach. Furthermore, Clark cannot state a claim against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys for 
negligence because they owed no duty of reasonable care to their adversary, nor did they owe 
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him any duty to prevent purely economic loss. For all of these reasons, the Amended Complaint 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
BACKGROUND 
The Amended Complaint alleges the following relevant facts: 
Clark represented the Forbush Clients in an action against the Anfinson Defendants, 
among others. (Amended Complaint 115, 17.) The Jones Gledhill Attorneys represented the 
Anfinson Defendants in that litigation. (Id. 15.) After Clark initiated the litigation, the Forbush 
Clients engaged The Spence Law Firm PLLC ("Spence") as counsel. (Id. 118.) Clark's 
representation of the Forbush Clients thereafter terminated. (Id. 119.) Upon his termination, 
Clark told the Jones Gledhill Attorneys that he was asserting an attorney's lien on any settlement 
between the Anfinson Defendants and the Forbush Clients and asked that his name be put on any 
settlement check. (Id. 120.) The Anfinson Defendants subsequently settled with the Forbush 
Clients and sent the settlement check to Spence. (Id. 121.) The settlement check did not list 
Clark as a payee, and Spence has not paid Clark any portion of the settlement. (Id. 1123, 29.) 
Clark brought this action against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys to enforce an attorney's lien for 
fees relating to his representation of the Forbush Clients or to recover tort damages for the Jones 
Gledhill Attorneys' purported negligent failure to protect his attorney's lien. (Id. 1125-29.)1 
The only injury Clark identifies is the loss of his attorney's fees. (Id. 128.) 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice because the litigation 
privilege protects the Jones Gledhill Attorneys from suit arising out of their representation of the 
1 Clark also has filed a complaint against his former clients, the Forbush Clients, for breach of 
contract, attorney's lien, conversion, and tortious interference with contract See Clark v. 
Forbush, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1604217 (filed March 3, 2016). 
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Anfinson Defendants, and in any event, Clark cannot state a claim against the Jones Gledhill 
Attorneys for an attorney's lien or negligence. 
I. Standard of Review on Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 
complaint "must allege all essential elements of the claims presented." Johnson v. Boundary Sch. 
Dist.# 101, 138 Idaho 331,334, 63 P.3d 457,460 (2003). Where, as here, "the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts upon which the court could grant relief, the complaint should be dismissed." 
Id. In this context, "it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations. Although 
the non-movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as true, this privilege does not 
extend to the conclusions oflaw the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts." 
Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005) (internal citation 
omitted). 
II. The Litigation Privilege Bars Clark's Suit Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys. 
Clark's suit against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys is barred in its entirety by the litigation 
privilege. "[T]he litigation privilege shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions 
which arise as a result of their conduct or communications in the representation of a client, 
related to a judicial proceeding." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,839,243 P.3d 642,655 
(2010). "[W]here an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary of his client, as a result 
of actions or communications that the attorney has taken or made in the course of his 
representation of his client in the course of litigation, the action is presumed to be barred by the 
litigation privilege." Id The only exceptions "occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to 
show that the attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of his 
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representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests and not his 
client's." Id. at 841,243 P.3d at 657. 
Applying this rule in Taylor, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a 
corporate shareholder's claims for civil conspiracy and tortious interference with contract against 
his opponents' attorneys. Id. at 844,243 P.3d at 660. The Court considered the plaintiffs 
allegations that the attorneys wrongfully "assisted" their clients in breaching a stock agreement 
and obtaining an injunction against him, but determined that the alleged conduct fell within the 
scope of the attorneys' representative function. Id. Because the plaintiff"fail[ed] to allege that 
[the attorneys] were acting outside the scope of their employment or solely for their own 
benefit," his claims were "barred by the litigation privilege." Id. at 844-45, 243 P.3d at 660-61. 
As in Taylor, Clark's allegations seeking to hold the Jones Gledhill Attorneys liable for 
an attorney's lien or in negligence fall squarely within the litigation privilege. Clark's claims 
against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys arise from their representation of the Anfinson Defendants 
in the course of settling litigation in which Clark represented the Anfinson Defendants' 
adversary. (Amended Complaint~~ 20-21, 23, 25-28.) Accordingly, Clark's suit "is presumed 
to be barred by the litigation privilege." Taylor, 149 Idaho at 839, 243 P.3d at 655. Further, the 
Amended Complaint contains no allegations that the Jones Gledhill Attorneys were acting 
outside the scope of their representative function or solely for their own benefit. See id. at 841, 
844-45, 243 P.3d at 657, 660-61. The Amended Complaint therefore should be dismissed as 
barred by the litigation privilege. 
III. Clark Cannot State a Claim Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys for an Attorney's 
Lien or Negligence. 
The Amended Complaint also fails for the independent reason that it does not state a 
claim for an attorney's lien or negligence. 
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A. Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney's Lien Against His Opposing Counsel. 
To start, Clark's apparent attempt to enforce an attorney's lien against the Jones Gledhill 
Attorneys fails because the Idaho attorney's lien statute does not authorize a lien against an 
opponent. Additionally, Clark has not reduced his attorney's lien to a judgment, and the Jones 
Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which the lien might attach. For all of these 
reasons, to the extent Clark is trying to bring an attorney's lien claim against the Jones Gledhill 
Attorneys, it must be dismissed. 
"[T]he only type of attorney's charging lien provided under Idaho law is that defined in 
LC.§ 3-205." Kenneth F. White, Chtd. v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 136 Idaho 238,242, 31 
P.3d 926,930 (Ct. App. 2001). That statute provides: 
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the 
agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law. From the 
commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the 
attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or 
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's 
favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be 
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. 
Idaho Code§ 3-205. An attorney seeking to establish an attorney's lien under this section must 
prove: 
(1) (T)hat there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on equitable 
principles, (2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to 
secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid, (3) that it was agreed that counsel look 
to the fund rather than the client for his compensation, ( 4) that the lien claimed is 
limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund 
was raised and (5) that there are equitable considerations which necessitate the 
recognition and application of the charging lien. 
Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079 (1981) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kinghorn v. Clay, 153 Idaho 462,283 P.3d 779 (2012). 
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. ' 
"The plain language of this section allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that 
lawyer's own client. There is nothing in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in 
favor of an opponent's lawyer." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) 
(emphasis in original) (citing Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,465,660 P.2d 928, 930 (1983)). 
Indeed, in Frazee, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the very claim Clark attempts to advance 
here, holding that an attorney's lien asserted by a wife's divorce attorney could not be levied 
"against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to the contract under which 
[the attorney] claims money." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465,660 P.2d at 930, overruling Renfro v. 
Nixon, 55 Idaho 532, 45 P.2d 595 (1935). For the same reason, the court in Goldberg held that 
an attorney's lien asserted by the wife's divorce attorney against her former husband's 
bankruptcy estate was "improper." 235 B.R. at 484. Thus, as a matter oflaw, Clark cannot 
assert an attorney's lien against his opposing counsel. 
Not only are the Jones Gledhill Attorneys improper parties, Clark's claim fails for the 
additional reasons that he has not (1) reduced his lien to a judgment or (2) established the 
existence of any fund within the Jones Gledhill Attorneys' control to which his lien might attach. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court elucidated in Frazee, "the equitable source of the charging lien 
necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to perfect and 
reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court." 104 Idaho at 466, 660 P .2d at 931. Clark 
may not claim any sum in fees without first "proving the reasonableness of such fees in an 
adjudicative process." Id. at 465, 660 P.2d at 930. Here, Clark has not taken this necessary step. 
Instead, he has attempted to deprive interested parties, including Spence, of the opportunity to 
challenge the validity or amount of his claimed attorney's fees by bringing a claim against the 
Jones Gledhill Attorneys, who have no knowledge of or interest in Clark's underlying 
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entitlement to fees. See id. at 466, 660 P .2d at 931 ( due process requires that interested parties 
have an opportunity to challenge lien). For that reason as well, Clark's claim must be dismissed. 
Finally, the Jones Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which Clark's attorney's 
lien could attach. As stated in Frazee, no "fund" exists within the meaning of section 3-205 
where the moneys obtained by the attorney for the client have "already been paid to the client." 
104 Idaho at 466, 660 P .2d at 931. According to Clark's own allegations, the Anfinson 
Defendants have already "sent a check to the Spence Firm," thereby relinquishing control over 
the settlement funds. (Amended Complaint ,r 21.) Thus, in addition to the other reasons just 
given, because the Jones Gledhill Attorneys hold no fund to which Clark's lien could attach, his 
attorney's lien claim against them must be dismissed. 
B. Clark Cannot State a Negligence Claim Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys 
Because They Owed Him No Duty of Reasonable Care. 
Likewise, to the extent Clark is attempting to assert a negligence claim against the Jones 
Gledhill Attorneys, such claim fails not only because of the litigation privilege discussed above 
but also because the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owed no duty of reasonable care to their adversary 
nor did they have a duty to prevent purely economic loss. "The elements of common law 
negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to 
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." 
Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 28,244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010). 
Here, Clark's negligence claim fails for want of any duty. 
To start, the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owed no duty to Clark to refrain from acting 
negligently toward him in the course of their representation of the Anfinson Defendants. "As a 
general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and not to 
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' ' 
someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). Because Clark never had an attorney-
client relationship with the Jones Gledhill Attorneys, he cannot hold them liable for any 
negligence relating to their performance of legal services. 
Nor did the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owe Clark a duty to prevent purely economic loss. 
"Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic 
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another." 
Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 153 Idaho 735,742,291 P.3d 418,425 
(2012). The only exceptions to this rule are where: (1) the economic loss is "parasitic to an 
injury to person or property"; (2) "the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a different 
allocation of the risk"; or (3) a "special relationship" exists between the parties. Duffin v. Idaho 
Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995). 
Here, Clark's only alleged injury is the loss of his attorney's fees, a purely economic loss. 
(Amended Complaint ,r,r 28, 29.) Clark has not and cannot allege physical or property damage 
which can be attributed to the Jones Gledhill Attorneys; any "unique circumstance" justifying 
allocating the risk to the Jones Gledhill Attorneys; or any "special relationship" between Clark 
and the Jones Gledhill Attorneys. On the contrary, as counsel for Clark's adversaries, the Jones 
Gledhill Attorneys owed Clark no duty of reasonable care at all. Clark's negligence claim 
therefore must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, this Court should grant Defendants' motion and dismiss the 
Amended Complaint with prejudice. 
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,: I 
DATED THIS 4th day of April 2016. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
By~ 
A~ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of April 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83 816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
D Hand Delivery 
D FedEx Overnight Delivery 
D Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com 
• 
~
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Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@andersenbanducci.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@andersenbanducci.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@andersenbanducci.com 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
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P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
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Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham hereby move to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint filed against them on March 21, 2016, by Plaintiffs Eric. R. Clark and Clark & 
Associates, PLLC, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum filed separately herewith. 
DATED THIS 4th day of April 2016. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
By~ AmandaILl3rails 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of April 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
~ U.S.Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
D Hand Delivery 
D FedEx Overnight Delivery 
D Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com 
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JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher 
Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") reply in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint 
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of Plaintiffs, Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC ( collectively "Clark") for failure to 
state a claim under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
Drawing all inferences in Clark's favor, it is beyond a doubt that Clark can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claims for negligence against Jones Gledhill or for an attorney's lien 
under Idaho Code§ 3-205. Section 3-205 does not provide for an attorney's lien against Clark's 
opponent, Jones Gledhill. Further, Jones Gledhill has no duty of care to protect Clark's interest 
in his attorney fees. Accordingly, Clark's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim. 
A. Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney's Lien for a Fee Not Yet Adjudicated. 
Clark's overly simplistic interpretation of§ 3-205 ignores the statute's plain language and 
binding Idaho case law. Clark argues that the statute's phrase "in whosoever hands they may 
come" means he has an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill simply because it transmitted 
settlement proceeds between its client, Anfinson, and Clark's former clients. (See Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiffs' Memo") at p. 8 
("That protection [of§ 3-205] extends to anyone holding funds to which an attorney has an 
interest, such as when a settlement is reached but the Defendants still possess the funds.").) This 
argument is without merit. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079 
(1981), interpreted§ 3-205 and recognized five prerequisites for determining and enforcing an 
attorney's lien. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a 'fund' created by the 
efforts of the attorney, so long as the elements set forth in Skelton fl are satisfied." In re 
Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (D. Idaho 1999) (emphasis added). Both Clark's complaint and his 
opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss ignore the five requirements set forth in Skelton. 
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Most notably, Clark's argument ignores that the requirements for an attorney's lien 
include determining that "the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to 
secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid," and that "the lien claimed is limited to costs, 
fees or other disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund was raised." Id. Along 
. 
these lines, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that an attorney may not "claim any sum in fees 
without the necessity of proving the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process." 
Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,465,660 P.2d 928,930 (1983). 
In this case, the sum of fees to which Clark is entitled is undeniably in dispute. The most 
obvious indication of this dispute is that Clark has also sued his former clients for the very same 
fees that he contends Jones Gledhill owes him. See Clark v. Forbush, Ada County Case No. CV-
OC-1604217, Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment (filed May 5, 2016). 
In Clark's separate action against his former clients, Clark seeks his purported share of the 
Anfison settlement, additional fees in the wrongful death action, and yet other legal fees in an 
entirely separate action against the Meridian Police Department. Id. Clark has not yet 
adjudicated his right, if any, to a portion of the Anfinson settlement. Accordingly, under Idaho 
law, there can be no attorney's lien for a disputed fee. 
Moreover, Jones Gledhill has never had and does not now have any legitimate means of 
participating in and resolving a fee dispute between Clark and his former clients. It does not 
know the fee arrangement between Clark and his former clients. It does not know what, if any, 
work Clark performed that may have operated to secure a settlement with Anfinson. It does not 
know about other extenuating circumstances, such as ethical breaches or malpractice, giving rise 
to Clark's discharge and adversely impacting his entitlement to share in settlement proceeds 
acquired after his former clients discharged him. Because Clark's right to attorney fees against 
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his former clients, including fees from the Anfinson settlement, are disputed, no attorney's lien 
exists against Jones Gledhill or otherwise. 
B. Clark may not assert an attorney's lien against his opponent. 
An independent basis to dismiss Clark's claim for an attorney's lien against Jones 
Gledhill is that "[t]he plain language of [§3-205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer 
against that lawyer's own client. There is nothing in §3-205 or case law that authorizes an 
attorney's lien in favor of an opponent's lawyer. Frazee ... expressly rejected the attempted 
assertion of a charging lien against the property of the opposing party." In re Goldberg, 235 
B.R. at 484 ( emphasis added). 
Clark attempts to avoid this rule by arguing his claim is different because the source of 
the fund at issue is a settlement. (Plaintiffs' Memo at pp. 9-10.) This attempt fails. In In re 
Goldberg, the source of the fund was the Debtor's proceeds from the sale of real property. 235 
B.R. at 480. Both the Debtor's attorney and the opposing attorney sought to enforce a lien 
against these proceeds. Id. at 478-480. Regarding the opposing attorney's lien, the court held 
simply that the plain language of the statute did not provide for a lien in favor of the lawyer of 
the Debtor's opponent. Id. at 484. This ruling was not premised upon the nature or source of the 
fund at issue but rather on the plain language of the statute. 
Similarly, the Court in Frazee held that an attorney did not have a lien against the 
property of his client's former husband, whom the attorney had opposed in a divorce. The Court 
rejected the attorney's claim that "he may have any sum in fees without the necessity of proving 
the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465, 660 P .2d 
at 930. Again, the source of the fund was not the basis for the Court's decision in Frazee. 
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Under the plain language of§ 3-205, Clark may not assert an attorney's lien against his 
opponent, Jones Gledhill. No authority supports Clark's assertion that the statute means 
something different depending on the source of the fund to which the lien might attach. The crux 
of the problem here, as in Frazee, is that Clark seeks to enforce his lien against his opponent 
without first establishing he is entitled to any fees from the Anfinson settlement. Clark has not 
established in an adjudicative process his right to any such fees, and he cannot do so in an action 
vis-a-vis Jones Gledhill. 
C. Jones Gledhill Owed No Duty of Care to Clark. 
Finally, Clark fails to establish that Jones Gledhill owed Clark a duty of care to protect 
his potential interest in proceeds from the Anfinson settlement, whatever that interest might be. 
Clark cites no authority, in Idaho or otherwise, recognizing that an attorney's opposing counsel 
has a duty of care to protect that attorney's interests in recovering his fees against his client, and 
indeed, no such authority exists. 
Clark's argument that Jones Gledhill has such a duty is based solely on the phrase "in 
whosoever hands they may come" in § 3-205 and his assertion that this phrase creates a statutory 
duty on behalf of Jones Gledhill to protect Clark. This argument fails for the same reasons 
Clark's argument that he has an enforceable attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill fails-§ 3-205 
does not allow for an attorney's lien against Clark's opponent and whether Clark has any 
entitlement to fees after his discharge for cause is disputed and that dispute cannot be resolved by 
Jones Gledhill. 
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D. Jones Gledhill's Litigation Privilege Protects It from Clark's Action. 
Even if Jones Gledhill owed Clark a duty to protect his interests in fees, which it does 
not, the litigation privilege protects Jones Gledhill against such liability. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010): 
[A]s a general rule, where an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary 
of his client, as a result of actions or communications that the attorney has taken 
or made in the course of his representation of his client in the course of litigation, 
the action is presumed to be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to 
this general rule would occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show 
that the attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the 
scope of his representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own 
interests and not his client's. 
Id. at 841,243 P.2d at 658. 
Clark does not and cannot allege the Jones Gledhill was acting outside the scope of its 
representation in transmitting the settlement check from Anfinson to Clark's former clients. 
Jones Gledhill's purpose in doing so was to comply with a settlement agreement and obtain a 
dismissal of the action against Anfinson. Jones Gledhill took this action within the scope of its 
representation of Anfinson, not for its own interests. Accordingly, Clark's action is barred by the 
litigation privilege. Contrary to Clark's suggestion, the litigation privilege is consistent with 
§ 3-205 in that neither the privilege nor the statute allows for an action such as Clark's against 
his opposing counsel. 
E. The Court Should Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation of Facts. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides this Court discretion to strike "any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Such information includes "[f]acts 
which are wholly foreign to the issues [or] needless repetition of immaterial averments;" 
"[ m] atter having no essential or important relationship to the averments or unnecessary 
particulars, history and description ... ;" [s]tatements which do not pertain and are not necessary 
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to the issues in question;" and "[u]necessary matter or facts derogatory to a person referred to in 
the pleading." Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 526, 530, n. l, n.2, n.3, n.4, 
446 P.2d 895,899, n.1, n.2, n.3, n.4 (1968). 
In this case, Clark has submitted the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, attaching numerous documents immaterial to Clark's claims and 
his opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss. Neither the commentary in Clark's 
declaration nor the attachments thereto have any relationship at all to his averments. At best, this 
information is unnecessary particulars, history and description. But more concerning is the 
privileged and protected nature of the information Clark discloses in the public record. Much of 
the information is undisputedly protected under the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 
Likewise, pages two through five of Clark's brief also recite purported facts that have no 
relationship to his claims for negligence or an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill and appear 
to contain privileged information. Accordingly, both these pages of Clark's brief and his entire 
declaration should be stricken under Rule 12(f). 
Pages two through five of Clark's brief should likewise be stricken under Rule 12(b )(6). 
Rule 12(b)(6) expressly grants this discretion: "If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered 
( 6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 .... " Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added). "[C]ourts have complete discretion to determine whether or not to 
accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it." SC Wright & Miller Federal Practice & Procedure 
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. " 
§ 1366 (3d ed.). 
Courts generally reject plaintiffs' attempts to avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b )(6) by 
endeavoring to create disputed factual issues. "[W]hen one party moves to dismiss solely upon 
the pleadings ... [,] it is inappropriate for the responding party to introduce extraneous materials 
in an attempt to convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56." 
Alexander Assocs., Inc. v. FCMP, Inc., No. 10-12355, 2012 WL 1033464, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 
March 27, 2012) (citing Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333,334 (D. Nev. 1993) (emphasis 
added)). 
Clark offers no justification for submitting extraneous materials in response to Jones 
Gledhill' s Rule 12(b )( 6) motion. That motion can be resolved under the Rule 12(b )( 6) standard 
and should result in the dismissal of Clark's complaint in its entirety for his failures to state any 
. viable claims for relief. To avoid any suggestion in the record that the Court considered Clark's 
extraneous, immaterial submissions, the Court should strike those submissions from the record. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests the Court to grant its motion 
to dismiss Clark's complaint with prejudice and strike both his declaration in its entirety and 
pages two through five of his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
DATED TIDS 6th day of May 2016. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
By~ 
Amanda K~d 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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to Dismiss and also to strike "Facts" section in pages two through five of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Filed in support of this motion 
is Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, with argument related to the motion to 
strike appearing in Section E of that Reply. 
DATED THIS 6th day of May 2016. 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS TO STRIKE CLARK'S DECLARATION AND 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of May 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
D U.S.Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
D Hand Delivery 
D FedEx Overnight Delivery 
IZI Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com 
Oztt-l!lli74 if£2 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS TO STRIKE CLARK'S DECLARATION AND 
RECITATION OF FACTS - 3 
000048
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
NCJ,---~Pl~LE,:-0 -a"':",q:s~--
AM, ___ _p,_ .M . .,\,:~::...-..---
MAY O 9 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN 
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional 
Association; William Fuhrman, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and 
Christopher Graham, individually, and 




Case No. CV OC-1604633 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S "MOTION TO 
DISMISS TO STRIKE CLARK'S 
ECLARATION AND RECITATION OF 
FACTS;" AND "FORMER CLIENT'S 
MOTION TO SEAL DOCUMENTS 
CONTAINING INFORMATION 
PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGED OR WORK PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs (Collectively "Clark") and hereby file their 
Motion for Judicial Notice, and Opposition to Defendant's "Motion To Dismiss 
[sic] To Strike Clark's Declaration And Recitation of Facts;" And "Former Client's 
Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected By Attorney-Client 
Privileged Or Work Product Doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 
must GRANT the Plaintiffs Motion for Judicial Notice and DENY the Defendants' 
respective motions. 
FACTS 
Clark and his former clients are embroiled in litigation related to Clark's 
representation of the clients in Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County 
Case No. CV PI 1304325. Notwithstanding all of Clark's hard work for the 
. Clients in that case, the Clients although having recovered substantial settlement 
funds refuse to pay Clark his fees. All of the facts, allegations and documents 
Clark has stated or filed in defense of this Motion to Dismiss, he had previously 
stated and filed in Clarkv. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, the suit 
involving Clark's pursuit of payment of his attorney fees. Clark filed two 
declarations in Clarkv. Forbush; one on March 30, 2016, and the second on April 
4, 2016. Clark also filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on April 22, 2016. 
"Former Clients"' Motion is premised on the erroneous conclusion that all 
attorney-client communications are privileged. However, that contention is simply 
is not true. 
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. ' 
ARGUMENT- JUDICIAL NOTICE 
First, Clark asks the Court to take judicial notice of the two Declarations and 
a Memorandum filed in Clarkv. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, in 
opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which contain the same 
documents and facts Clark have presented here.· 
IRE, 201 requires a court to take judicial notice of "records, exhibits, or 
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, .... "1 Here, Clark has 
filed documents and stated facts in argument that he had previously filed in a 
separate case, without objection. Accordingly, as this information is already of 
record in Clark v. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, there is no basis 
to strike these pleadings or seal any records. As this information is in the record in 
another matter, it is already in the public record; so there is no basis to strike or 
seal these records in this case. 
ARGUMENT- CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
"Former Clients"' blanket contention that all communications between 
counsel and "former clients" is absolutely privileged ignores the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. While the "former clients" baselessly assert Clark is 
somehow acting in "bad faith," the "former clients" fail to even acknowledge the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, or the specific rule that prevents clients from 
hiding the ball behind a claim of privilege and work product in litigation with their 
former attorney. To the contrary, Rule 1.6 prevents the very thing counsel for 
"former clients" is attempting here; to claim a privileged in order to gain an 
advantage in litigation brought against them by their former attorney. 
1 Clark has attached copies of these documents as exhibits to his Declaration Filed in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial notice. 
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RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of 
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer' in 
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish 
a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of a client; .... 
Here, notwithstanding the "former clients" have directly benefited from 
Clark's hard work, they have refused to pay Clark his attorney fees. This rule 
allows c;:1ark and similarly situated attorneys the right to disclose communications 
that otherwise would be confidential in order to pursue compensation due. The 
Court must deny the "former client's" motion as nothing in Rule 1.6 prevents an 
attorney like Clark from disclosing confidential information in support of the 
Attorney's claims. 
CONCLUSION 
As the information "former clients" seek to strike is already in the record in 
another case, there is no basis to strike that information here. Moreover, Clark is 
entitled to "reveal" the information presented according to IRPC 1.6., so there is no 
basis to seal any information; either in this case or in Clark v. Forbush. Clark 
therefore respectfully requests the Court GRANT his Request for Judicial Notice 
' . . 
and DENY all of the "former clients"' motions. 
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DATED this 9th day of May, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of May, 2016, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
individual, via facsimile or e-mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@andersenbanducci.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@andersenbanducci.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Eric R. Clark 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S "MOTION TO 
DISMISS TO STRIKE CLARK'S DECLARATION AND RECITATION OF FACTS;" AND "FORMER CLIENT'S 
MOTION TO SEAL DOCUMENTS CONTAINING INFORMATION PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT 








Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 




A.M, ____ F,..r-LE •• ~ y (":) 
MAY 2 7 2016 
CHRISTOPHE:R o. RICH, Clerk 
By TYLER ATKINSON 
DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
DEFENDANtS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AND RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1 
000054
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman and Christopher 
Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") file this reply in support of Defendants' Motion to Strike1 
the entire Declaration of Eric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on 
May 4, 2016; pages two through five of the factual recitation of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, also filed on May 4, 2016; and now additionally 
the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed 
on May 9, 2016. Further, Defendants respond herein to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Under Rule 12(b)(6), Clark's Improper Submission of "Matters Outside the 
Pleadings" Should Be Stricken. 
Clark's declaration and factual recitation should be stricken under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b )( 6) provides that: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added). 
Clark's submissions are "matters outside the pleadings" and are entirely unnecessary to 
the resolution of Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint of 
Plaintiffs Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC ("Clark"). Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion raises three discrete legal issues regarding the allegations in Clark's Amended 
Complaint: (1) Clark cannot assert an attorney's lien under Idaho Code§ 3-205 against his 
opposing counsel, Jones Gledhill; (2) Jones Gledhill, did not have a duty to protect Clark's 
1 The argument in support of Defendants' Motion to Strike appears in section E of Defendants' 
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (filed on May 6, 2016) at pages 6 through 8. 
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interest, if any, in his clients' recovery against Jones Gledhill's clients; and (3) Jones Gledhill is 
protected from any liability under the litigation privilege for conveying a check from Jones 
Gledhill's clients to Clark's co-counsel, The Spence Law Firm ("Spence"). 
Clark does not contend that Jones Gledhill's legal arguments raise factual questions that 
must be resolved through discovery or under Rule 56. To the contrary, Clark's arguments in 
opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion are, likewise, purely legal in nature and include statutory 
construction arguments regarding (1) the meaning of the phrase "in whosoever hands they may 
come" in the attorney lien statute, § 3-205, (2) whether the litigation privilege can apply despite 
the attorney lien statute, (3) whether the statute requires the lien to be reduced to a judgment 
before attaching, (4) whether the statute requires an attorney-client relationship, and (5) whether 
the statute creates a duty of care on behalf of Jones Gledhill. 
The extraneous materials Clark submits in his declaration opposing Jones Gledhill's 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion do not have any bearing on either parties' legal arguments. Clark's 
submissions include his co-counsel agreement with Spence; privileged communications between 
Spence and its clients; Clark's correspondence with Spence about his purported lien; a Rule 408 
offer from Spence in an attempt to resolve Clark's claim for fees; correspondence between Jones 
Gledhill and Spence; and correspondence between Clark and Spence and his former clients. 
Similarly, Clark's factual recitation purportedly recounts Spence's internal legal strategy, 
Spence's legal advice to its clients, Clark's disagreement with Spence's advice and the clients' 
decisions, and Clark's view of the culpability of Jones Gledhill's client. 
Clark offers no explanation why he submits his former clients' attorney-client privileged 
information, protected work product and otherwise highly confidential information in opposition 
to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. While he points to Rule 1.6 of the Idaho Rules of 
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Professional Conduct, that rule does not permit but rather prohibits Clark's disclosure. Rule 1.6 
provides generally that, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client. ... " 1.R.P.C. l.6(a) (emphasis added). The exception to this rule upon which Clark relies 
does not authorize his disclosure. That exception is that "A lawyer may reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary 
... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer 
and the client." I.R.P.C. l.6(b) (emphasis added). 
This exception has no application in this case. Obviously, this case is not a controversy 
between Clark and his former clients. Rather, it is a controversy between Clark and Jones 
Gledhill-his former clients' opponent. Furthermore, the nature of Clark's disclosure is neither 
reasonable nor necessary. As discussed above, the purely legal questions posed by Jones 
Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not turn on any advice Spence gave to its clients, on Clark's 
disagreement with that advice or on any of the other irrelevant, confidential information Clark 
has submitted in the record. None of this information or Clark's conjecture about it is necessary 
to the Court's resolution of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
At best, Clark's extraneous submissions and unrelated factual assertions suggest he is 
attempting to convert-improperly-Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into one 
for summary judgment under Rule 56. Such an attempt is both inappropriate and futile because 
there is no basis for the Court to consider Clark's extraneous materials. See, e.g., Alexander 
Assocs., Inc. v. FCMP, Inc., No. 10-12355, 2012 WL 1033464, at *7 (E.D. Mich. March 27, 
2012 ("[W]hen one party moves to dismiss solely upon the pleadings ... [,] it is inappropriate to 
introduce extraneous materials in an attempt to convert the dismissal into one for summary 
judgment under Rule 56."). Because Clark has presented "matters outside the pleading" that do 
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not bear on Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should exclude those extraneous 
materials by striking them. 
B. Under Rule 12(f), Clark's Submission of Matters Immaterial to the Action Should 
Be Stricken. 
Rule 12(£) of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure provides an independent basis to strike 
Clark's declaration and factual recitation in opposition to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
Rule 12(£) grants the Court discretion to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter." Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(£). Such information includes facts, like those Clark 
unnecessarily offers, that are "wholly foreign to the issues," have "no essential or important 
relationship to the averments," and are "facts derogatory" to Spence, Clark's former clients, and 
Jones Gledhill. See Stewart v. Arrington Cons tr. Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 526, 530, n.1-4, 446 P .2d 
895, 899, n. 1-4 (1968). 
There can be no dispute that the attorney-client privileged communications involving 
Clark's former clients, protected work product and other highly confidential information that 
Clark has filed in the record are immaterial, unimportant, not essential and have no relationship 
to the substantive averments of Clark's claims against Jones Gledhill. See id. The only issues 
currently before the Court are whether Clark may assert a valid attorney lien against Jones 
Gledhill and whether that statute creates a duty on behalf of counsel to protect its opposing 
counsel's interest in recovering attorney fees. What the fee arrangement may have been among 
Jones Gledhill's opponents, what strategic decisions were made in the underlying case, and the 
nature of Clark's disagreement with those decisions are all entirely immaterial and irrelevant to 
these legal issues. 
Clark's failure to explain why it is necessary that he submit his former clients' highly 
confidential factual materials in opposition to a purely legal motion suggests that Clark's 
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submissions are nothing more than an effort to taint the record with immaterial and impertinent 
matters. Or worse, they are intended to jeopardize his former clients' pending appeal in their 
wrongful death action by including otherwise privileged and protected information in the record. 
Accordingly, Clark's declaration and factual recitation should also be stricken under Rule 12(f). 
C. Judicial Notice is Inappropriate. 
In response to his former clients' objections to Clark's disclosure of their confidential 
information in the public record, Clark compounds the problem by filing yet more confidential 
information in the record in this case. Clark has now filed a declaration in this action attaching 
two additional declarations and another memorandum previously filed in his action against his 
former clients, Clark v. Forbush, et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217 ("Forbush"). 2 (See 
Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on 
May 9, 2016, at Exs. 1-3.) Each of these papers contains his former clients' confidential 
information and are riddled with Clark's factual conjecture. 
Relying on Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Clark requests the Court to take 
judicial notice of his two declarations and memorandum in Forbush and the confidential 
information contained therein. Rule 201 does not support his request, however, but rather 
highlights the inappropriateness of Clark's request. 
Rule 201 provides that: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it 
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
2 Clark inaccurately asserts that he filed these papers in Forbush without objection. As set forth 
in the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford in Support of Memorandum in Support of Former 
Clients' Motion to Seal Documents, filed on May 6, 2016, Clark's former clients have repeatedly 
warned him that he is not authorized to disclose their confidential information. Indeed, Clark has 
stipulated on the record to enter into a protective order in Forbush to protect confidential 
information from public disclosure. 
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(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources who accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. 
Idaho R. Evid. 201 (b) ( emphasis added). Rule 201 is limited to "notice of adjudicative facts." 
Id. at 201(a). Black's Law Dictionary defines an adjudicative fact as "a controlling or operative 
fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative 
proceeding and that helps the court or agency determine how the law applies to those parties." 
Black's Law Dictionary 610 (th ed. 1999). 
Clark's declarations and memorandum in Forbush-all of which set forth Clark's version 
of the "facts" related to his relationship with his former clients and Spence-do not meet any of 
the requirements of Rule 201. Clark's arguments and conjecture about these facts are reasonably 
subject to dispute-Clark has placed at issues these facts by suing his clients.3 The contents of 
Clark's declarations and memorandum are not generally known in the jurisdiction. They are not 
capable of accurate and ready determination through sources whose accuracy cannot be 
reasonably questioned. 
Further, the information will not aid the Court in determining the legal issues in this case 
as required for judicial notice. Clark's version of the facts are not controlling or operative facts 
related to the legal issues before the Court. Rather, they are extraneous, immaterial and 
irrelevant conjecture by Clark. Accordingly, there is no justification or basis for the Court to 
take judicial notice of the additional information Clark has filed in response to Jones Gledhill's 
motion to strike. Rather, this additional information should also be stricken for the reasons 
discussed above. 
3 Clark is also currently seeking leave in Forbush to amend his complaint to add Spence and its 
attorneys are defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests this Court to strike in its 
entirety the Declaration of Eric R. Clark filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
filed on May 4, 2016; pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, also filed on May 4, 2016; and the Declaration of Eric R. Clark 
filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on May 9, 2016. 
DATED THIS 27th day of May 2016. 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN WOODARD 
BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
By~ AmandaIU3railsf 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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RECONSIDER 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Motion to Reconsider the 
Court's recent dismissal according to Rule 12(b )(6). 
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The Plaintiffs bring this motion under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B), which is timely as 
the Court has not entered judgment or 14 days have not passed since judgment has 
been entered. 
The Plaintiffs have filed a declaration and memorandum in support of this 
motion. 
The Plaintiffs request oral argument. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
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Fuhrman, individually, and as an agent of 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and 
Christopher Graham, individually, and as an 
agent ofJones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2016-04633 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE, 
MOTION TO SEAL, AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed April 4, 2016. 
Plaintiffs seek to enforce an alleged attorney's lien from the settlement funds distributed through 
Defendants from an underlying wrongful death action. Because Plaintiffs never took affirmative 
adjudicative actions to perfect the alleged attorney's lien, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of an underlying wrongful death case. 1 Eric R. Clark and Clark and 
Associates, PLLC ( collectively "Clark") represented the plaintiffs in that case and Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., through William Fuhrman and Christopher Graham (collectively "Jones 
Gledhill") represented the defendants. In the early stages of litigation in the underlying case, 
Clark enlisted the assistance of The Spence Law Firm ("Spence") of Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as 
co-counsel. Ultimately, after some three years, the two firms developed irreconcilable 
1 Forbush, et al, v. Sagecrest, et al. Ada County Case No. CV-PI-2013-0004325. 
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differences as to litigation strategies and Clark withdrew from the case. 
Upon withdrawal, Clark sent an e-mail to Jones Gledhill asserting an attorney's lien against the 
proceeds from any settlement in the underlying case and asked to be named as a payee on any 
settlement check.2 In January 2016, the parties settled the case, and the defendants, through 
Jones Gledhill, sent the settlement check to Spence. The check did not list Clark as payee.3 
Clark now claims over $500,000 for attorney fees from that case.4 Clark has also sued his 
former clients and former co-counsel in another action for the same attorney fees. 5 
I 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Clark filed this suit on March 3, 2016, and an Amended Complaint on March 21, 2016. Jones 
Gledhill appeared through counsel and filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 4, 2016. 
On May 4, 2016, Clark filed "Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss" ("Response Brief') which included four additional pages of facts, and the 
Declaration of Eric R. Clark ("May 4th Declaration"), which included nine exhibits.6 Jones 
Gledhill filed a Motion to Strike and a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss 
on May 6, 2016. Clark's former clients sought to intervene and filed a Motion to Seal 
Documents on May 6, 2016. On May 9, 2016, Clark filed a Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Strike and the Motion to Seal, and a Motion for Judicial Notice. Clark also filed the Declaration 
of Eric R. Clark on May 9, 2016 ("May 9th Declaration"), which included three more exhibits. 
Jones Gledhill filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike and Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice on May 27, 2016. Clark's former clients also filed a Reply 
2 See Amended Compl. at 5. 
3 Id. 
4 See Amended Compl. (filed March 21, 2016). 
5 Clarkv. Forbush et al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2016-0004217. 
6 See Pls. Mem. Filed in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (filed May 4, 2016); See also, Deel. of Eric R. Clark (filed 
May 4, 2016). 
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brief on May 27, 2016 in support of their Motion to Seal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only 
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 
1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to 
dismiss must be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record 
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243 
P.3d 642, 648-49 (2010). 
To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need 
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct. 
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of 
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical 
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which 
the plaintiff includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there is some 
insurmountable bar to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536,835 P.2d at 1347. 
(1) MOTION TO STRIKE 
Jones Gledhill contends pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, the Declaration of Eric Clark, and the accompanying exhibits should be stricken or 
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disregarded because this is purely a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the Court has no right to consider 
outside material. Further, Jones Gledhill asserts the material is irrelevant and extraneous to the 
instant case. Clark contends the Court has discretion to consider material outside the pleading, 
which converts the motion to one for summary judgment. 
The Court may consider outside evidence on a Rule 12(b )( 6) motion so long as the Court 
converts it into a motion for summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 12(b). However, it is within the 
Court's discretion to exclude such evidence and treat the motion as purely a Motion to Dismiss. 
See Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). In this case, the Court 
declines to convert the motion to one of summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the Court has discretion to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter." I.R.C.P. 12(f). Such information includes "[f]acts which are wholly foreign 
to the issues [or] needless repetition of immaterial averments," "[m]atters having no essential or 
important relationship to the averments or unnecessary particulars, history and description or 
allegations which have previously been eliminated by way of summary judgment," "[s]tatements 
which do not pertain and are not necessary to the issues in questions," and [u]nnecessary matter 
or facts derogatory to a person referred to in the pleading." Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92 
Idaho 526, 529-30, 446 P.2d 895, 898-99 (1968). 
The material contained within pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Response Brief, the 
Declaration of Eric R. Clark, and the attached exhibits are irrelevant to the instant motion. The 
material has no bearing on the legal arguments and is irrelevant, immaterial, and extraneous. 
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED and pages two through five of 
Plaintiffs' Response, Clark's May 4th and May 9th Declarations, and the attached exhibits will 
not be considered. 
(2) MOTION TO SEAL 
The former clients intervened and assert the material contained in pages two through five of 
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Plaintiffs' Response Brief to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Declaration of Eric R. Clark, 
and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 are extraneous to Clark's claims and do not address Jones 
Gledhill's Motion to Dismiss. 
Clark contends that material of this nature may be revealed when reasonably necessary pursuant 
to Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct l.6(b)(5), which provides "[a] lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary ... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
lawyer and the client." This argument fails because this case is not between Clark and his client 
or former client. That is another case. 7 This case is between Clark and counsel for the opposing 
party of his former client. Accordingly, Rule 1.6 does not allow disclosure in this case. 
Clark contends the material is already within the public record because the material was 
previously filed in another case and therefore sealing is unnecessary. But Clark has stipulated to 
a protection order regarding this same material in that other case. 8 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(a) provides "[t]he public has a right to ... examine and 
copy the records of all proceedings open to the public." Rule 32(d) states that "[a] court record 
that has been offered or admitted into evidence in a judicial action" is subject to examination, 
inspection and copying "unless the custodian judge expressly orders otherwise" ( e.g. by sealing 
the record). Rule 32(i) states that "[p]hysical and electronic records, may be disclosed, or 
temporarily or permanently sealed or redacted by order of the court on a case-by-case basis .... 
[ a ]ny person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, redact, seal or unseal a part or 
all of the records in any judicial proceeding." I.C.A.R. 32(i). "In ruling on whether specific 
records should be disclosed . . ., the court shall determine and make a finding of fact as to 
whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates." Id. In making its 
determination, trial courts are "referred to the traditional legal concepts in the law of the right to 
a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and invasion of proprietary business records as well 
7 See Clark v. Forbush et al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2016-0004217. 
8 Aff. Of Amanda K. Brailsford ,r 5 (filed May 6, 2016). 
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as common sense respect for shielding highly intimate or financially sensitive material about 
persons." Id. 
Initially, the Court notes the somewhat unusual procedural posture and other particulars of this 
motion. First, the requesting persons are not a party to this case, but the former clients of Clark. 
Second, the exhibits requested to be sealed were previously filed court documents. Finally, the 
Court notes the requested material to be stricken includes the same documents requested to be 
sealed.9 
As required by Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), the Court makes the following findings of 
fact and conclusions of law: The former clients' interest in privacy of the confidential material 
predominates, given the privileged and confidential nature of the material. The material sought to 
be sealed relates to sensitive, if not attorney-client privileged, conversations between co-counsel, 
and clients, during Clark's representation of the former clients in the underlying case. Also, 
Clark had stipulated to a protection order regarding this same material in the other case where he 
sued his former clients and Spence.10 The Court finds the materials sought to be sealed contain 
facts and statements that could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's 
former clients. The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary and proper to seal 
the requested material. 
Accordingly, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED and pages two through five of Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 of 
Eric R. Clark's Declaration filed May 4, 2016 shall be sealed. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Eric R. 
Clark's March 30 Declaration, attached to Exhibit 1 of the May 9th Declaration shall also be 
sealed. Finally, Exhibits 1 and 2 of Eric R. Clark's Second Declaration, attached as Exhibit 2 to 
the May 9th Declaration shall be sealed. 
9 More material was requested to be stricken than to be sealed. Compare Former Clients' Reply in Support of Mot. 
to Seal Information Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, p. 5-6 (filed May 27, 
2016) with "Defendants' Reply in Support of Mot. to Strike and Response to Pis.' Mot. for Judicial Notice, p. 8 
(filed May 27, 2016). 
10 Aff. Of Amanda K. Brailsford ,r 5 (filed May 6, 2016). 
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(3) MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Clark contends Idaho Rules of Evidence 201 requires this Court to take judicial notice of records, 
exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case. Nothing in the language 
of the rule requires a Court to take judicial notice. Instead, the Court may take judicial notice, if 
the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. I.RE. 201. A fact is not subject to reasonable 
dispute if it is either (1) "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or 
(2) "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably questioned." I.RE. 201 (b ). 
"A trial court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence, 
and since judicial notice is merely a substitute for the conventional method of taking evidence to 
establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial notice of anything, with the possible 
exception of facts of common knowledge which controvert averments of the complaint." Taylor 
v. Nichols, 149 Idaho 826, 649, 243 P.3d 833 (2010). The requirement that the facts be 
adjudicative, accurate, and/or generally known is a prerequisite to judicial notice. 
While the documents at issue were previously filed in another case, the material does not contain 
facts of common knowledge. Judicial notice cannot be used to establish adjudicative facts, but is 
appropriate once those facts are particularly reliable and accurate. Here, the information 
contained within the documents is not generally known, nor have any indication of being 
participle reliable or accurate. The accuracy can be readily questioned. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Judicial Notice is DENIED. 
( 4) MOTION TO DISMISS 
Clark seeks to enforce an alleged attorney's lien from the settlement funds distributed last 
January by Jones Gledhill to Spence in the underlying wrongful death action. Clark contends he 
effectively created an enforceable attorney's lien under Idaho Code§ 3-205 by simply e-mailing 
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Jones Gledhill. Clark then contends he can collect his lien amount from any person who came 
into contact with the settlement check. 
There are two types of attorney liens in Idaho: possessory liens and charging liens. LC.§ 3-205, 
LC. § 3-205; Frazee v. Frazee, 1983, 104 Idaho 463, 660 P.2d 928 (1983). A possessory or 
retaining lien is passive. Frazee, at 931, 104 Idaho at 466. Affirmative action is not needed to 
"perfect" the possessory lien because the attorney asserting the lien already has "possession" of 
the case or file and the client cannot recover the proceeds of a settlement or judgment until the 
attorney fees are paid. Possession thus effects perfection without further action. But when an 
attorney withdraws from a case, and ceases representing a client, they lose all "possessory" lien 
rights. 
An attorney's charging lien is not passive, and some affirmative adjudicatory action must be 
taken to perfect the lien. "A charging lien is only brought about by some affirmative act of the 
party asserting the lien in reducing it to a judgment or order of the court." Id. "[T]he equitable 
source of the charging lien necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative 
process to perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court." Id. at 931; In re 
Harris, 258 B.R. 8 (Bkrcy. D. Idaho 2000). Without affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect 
his lien by "reducing it to a judgment or order of the court," no authority exists to pay Clark any 
amount of money on behalf of his former clients. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660 
P.2d 928, 931 (1983); In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 14 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2000). The law requires 
these affirmative adjudicative actions to strike a proper balance between potential economic 
coercion and equity. 
Had Clark taken some affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would 
have been reduced to an amount certain, taken the form of a court order or judgment, which 
would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel. Violation of that order could 
have been enforced by contempt and/or by a damage action against the parties and attorneys. 
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But Clark took no such affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his claimed lien. Neither was 
there a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill. Consequently there was no order or contract 
that these Defendants violated. They owed no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect 
his interests. It was Clark's duty to protect his own interests, which he failed to do. 
Perhaps Clark seeks to perfect the claimed lien in the other case against the former clients and 
Spence, but the settlement check and proceeds have already gone through the hands of these 
Defendants, never to return. Thus, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that 
would entitle him to relief against these Defendants. 
Based on the above and foregoing, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against 
the Defendants upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED. The intervenors 
Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice is DENIED. Finally, 
because Clark failed to take affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect his lien by reducing it to a 
judgment or court order, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 
Defendants' shall submit a Rule 54(a)-compliant proposed Judgment of Dismissal for the Court's 
signature. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this i,'{r' day of June, 2016. 
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By STEPHANIE HARDY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERIC R. CLARK, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., et al., 
Defendants. 
C,\} 
Case No. eR-OC-2016-04633 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
THIS MATTER comes before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Motion to 
Amend filed June 13, 2016. Various Motions were previously argued and heard on June 3, 2016, 
wherein.the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence or 
authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. 
Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. 
First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a 
motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When 
deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of 
review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other 
words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision 
to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different 
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 
153 Idaho 266, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g denied (Aug. 1, 2012). 
Order Denying Motion To Reconsider And Motion To Amend Complaint - I 
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While a· Court should liberally allow for leave to amend complaints, there are limits. "The 
purpose behind allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on their 
merits and to provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. 
Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003). "The grant or denial 
of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the 
discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that 
discretion." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 
175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). 
The proposed Second Amended Complaint was filed ten days after the hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Dismiss. It does not add new facts that speak to the merits of the case, it merely adds 
new Defendants. 
The Court has reviewed the briefs, relevant statutes, case law, and the record. In doing so, the 
Court reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, the Proposed Amended Complaint, Memoranda, 
and Declaration. These filings do not add any new facts or authorities that bear on the 
correctness of the judgment of the court. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to add new 
Defend8:11ts to this case, those new Defendant would have no liability to Plaintiffs for the same 
reasons that the existing Defendants have no liability. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Motion to Reconsider are both DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 'Z-f~y of June, 2016. 
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JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an_ Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill! Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT JS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 
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I hereby certify that on th is 8th day of July 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
JUDGMENT-3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Objection to Defendants' Motion For 
Fees and Costs. The Plaintiffs file their Opposition according to IRCP 54(d)(5) and (e)(6), LC. § 
120(3), LC. § 121, and I.C. § 123. 
1. The Plaintiffs object to costs claimed other than those as a matter of right 
normally awarded to the prevailing party. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS -1 
\ ORIGINAL 
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2. Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 120(3). This 
case does not involve a "commercial transaction" between the parties and therefore LC. § 120(3) 
does not apply. 
3. Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 121. Clark did 
not pursue this case frivolously or without foundation. The Plaintiffs filed this case in good faith 
arguing the scope of LC. § 3-205, and that liability attached under these circumstances, as 
Defendants had received actual notice Clark was asserting an attorney lien on the proceeds of the 
Forbush Settlement, yet failed to inform Clark of any settlement. While the Court was critical of 
Clark for not taking judicial action to perfect his lien, the Court disregarded the critical fact that 
Jones Gledhill purposefully and intentionally withheld information from Clark that prevented 
Clark from timely perfecting his lien. 
4. Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 123. 
Defendants have not established frivolous conduct as defined in LC. § 12-123. Moreover, this 
section requires the Court to schedule and conduct an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees, 
but no such hearing was scheduled. 
5. Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees as unreasonable pursuant to IRCP 
54(e)(l). Defendants' claim for fees is outrageous and punitive. This case involved a one-count 
claim for negligence and was decided on a 12(b), motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, however, 
Defendants seek attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Assuming an average billing rate at $220. 00 
per hour, the attorneys would have worked exclusively on this case for an amazing twenty full 
eight-hour days, (Four full work weeks.). Then, the Defendants billed over 56 hours (7 
complete eight hour days), just to prepare its memorandum of costs. Approximately one-third of 
the total billing was charged to pursue costs and attorney fees. 
The Plaintiffs request oral argument only if the Court so directs. 
The Plaintiffs intend to file a Memorandum in Support of this Objection pursuant to 
IRCP 7(b)(3)(D.), and will do so within 14 days. 
The Plaintiffs have filed a Declaration in support of this Objection which is served 
contemporaneously herewith. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
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DATED this 15th day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or e-
mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@andersenbanducci.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@andersenbanducci.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Eric R. Clark 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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AUG 1 5 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
I, Eric R. Clark, declare and state as follows: 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
DECLARATION OF 
ERIC R. CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Judge Hoagland 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this case and I have personal knowledge of the facts 
as stated herein. 
2. On September 23, 2015, I sent a letter to the Defendants in which I asserted my 
attorney lien on any proceeds from settlement with Defendants' clients and I requested that the 
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS 
ORIGINAL 
. AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
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Defendants include my name on any settlement check. See Exhibit 1 to the Amended 
Complaint. 
3. The Jones Gledhill Defendants never responded to my September 23, 2015 letter 
nor denied my right to an attorney lien. The Defendants did not inform me they did not intend to 
comply with my request to protect my lien. 
4. My experience as counsel in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case and other personal 
injury cases that it takes anywhere from 30 to 60 days from the date settlement was agreed to 
before we received a check. 
5. While the Court was critical that I did not take "some adjudicatory action to 
perfect his lien," at no time from the date that the Spence Firm and Jones Gledhill reached a 
settlement until Jones Gledhill transferred settlement funds to the Spence Firm in December 
2015, or January or February 2016, did either the Spence Firm or Jones Gledhill inform me of 
any settlement. 
6. On January 28, 2016 I sent an e-mail to Christopher Graham where I indicated I 
believed there was a settlement and requested that Jones Gledhill protect my lien. A true and 
correct copy of that e-mail and attached letter is attached as Exhibit 1. 
7. Jones Gledhill did not respond to my January 28, 2016 e-mail. 
8. Attached as Exhibit 2 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill in response to the letter attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit 
of Amanda Brailsford in support of Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs. 
9. Attached as Exhibit 3 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill which included a copy of a letter I had received from Counsel 
for the Spence Firm. 
10. Chris Graham contacted me and stated he was out of town and wanted an 
additional 24 hours to discuss the matter before I filed suit. I allowed the additional 24 hours and 
actually several more days before filing suit. 
11. Attached as Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016, in which I stated my belief that Jones 
Gledhill was indemnified by the settlement agreement with the Forbush clients in Forbush v. 
Sagecrest, and that they should tender the defense to the Spence Firm. As Brailsford represents 
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS 
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the Forbush defendants and the Spence Finn in Clark v. Forbush, Canyon Count Case No. CV-
2016-06347-c, it appears that happened, and Brailsford appeared for Jones Gledhill. 
12. I did not file this case frivolously or without foundation. Jones Gledhill had 
notice of my lien in September 2015, was aware of the amount of the settlement in Forbush v. 
Sagecrest, and processed and delivered the settlement funds without notifying me of the 
settlement or the amount. By withholding necessary and critical information, Jones Gledhill 
interfered with my ability to perfect my attorney lien. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the 
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or e-
mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@ aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Eric R. Clark 
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Forbush Settlement 
From: ERIC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com) 
Sent: Thu 1/28/16 1:46 PM 
To: Christopher Graham ( cgraham@idalaw.com) 
1 attachment 
Attorney Lien Letter.pdf (28.6 KB) 
Chris: 
I understand from the Spence Firm's Counsel that there has been a settlement with Anfinson and Bakken. I 
have attached a copy of a letter I sent via facsimile on September 23, 2015, in which I asserted an attorney's 
lien on the proceeds of any settlement or verdict. Once again, as you have notice of my lien, please ensure 
my firm is listed as one of the payees on any settlement check. Thank you. 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named 
as recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure 
under applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product 
doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by 
telephone. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in 
reliance on the information it contains. 
EXHIBIT 1 
2/19/2016 8:52 PM 
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MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
PO Box 6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Fax: (208) 336-7031 
September 23, 2015 
William A. Fuhrman 
Christopher Graham 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A. 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529 
Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice 
of Attorney Lien 
Dear Counsel: 
This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205, 
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks 
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you. 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Sincerely, 
Eric R. Clark 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
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Clark v Jones Gledhill 
ERIC CLARK 
Tue 2/23/2016 6:33 PM 
To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>; Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrn1an@idalaw.co111>; 
Cc:Brad Andrews <bandrews@isb.idaho.gov>; 
Bill and Chris: 
Thank you for your letter dated today. However, I disagree as your interpretation of the lien statute does not 
follow the clear language. 
3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and 
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained 
by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a 
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action 
or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor 
and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any 
settlement between the parties before or after judgment. 
The logical reading of this statue addresses money that belongs to the client, like settlement funds, which 
someone else may possess. If "bar counsel" says otherwise, then I would like to see that opinion. If you have 
such an opinion from bar counsel in writing, please send it to me. (Since you have mentioned Bar Counsel, I 
am cc'ing him on my response.) 
We have not placed a lien "in favor of opponent's lawyer," as you claim, but specifically on the settlement 
funds. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a "fund" created by the efforts of the attorney, so 
long as the five specific elements set forth in Skelton v. Spencer. 102 Idaho 69, 625 P.2d 1072 (1981), are 
satisfied.~ See also, In re Secaur, 83 I.B.C.R. 175, 176-7 (Bankr.D.ldaho 1983). The function of the statute is 
to give an attorney an interest in the fruits of his labors. Skelton, 102 Idaho at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. But 
here, as was the case in Fitzgerald v. Colonial Savings & Loan (In re Karterman), 97.4 I.B.C.R. 115 
(Bankr.D.Idaho 1997), there was no "fund" created by the efforts of Daugherty." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476 
(Bankr.ldaho, 1999). 
The attorney lien is not limited to the "lawyer's own client" as you claim, but on the "fund." As you possessed 
settlement proceeds which constitute the client's money, and which certainly resulted from my work, then you 
had a duty to safeguard those funds. Both Frazee and Goldberg are factually distinguishable. It is ridiculous 
and contrary to the very purpose of a lien that a lien only applies AFTER the client receives the money, which 
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Additionally, the record speaks for itself. Judge Copsey dismissed A.O. Smith because she claimed they could 
not reasonably anticipate a plumber removing a safety device as that would be outrageous and reckless. (I 
think we both agree that was an impermissible finding of fact as summary judgment) You are correct that Judge 
Copsey initially denied our motion to amend against Anfinson. However, the proper course for competent 
counsel would have been to file a motion to reconsider as we had Copsey's A.O. Smith ruling and Anfinson's 
deposition which proved his employees were untrained. I think it is a reasonable argument to assert that 
sending untrained employees to work on water heaters that could kill people if not serviced correctly is "an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," as Kenny Calkins opined about Anfinson. Perhaps 
someday at a deposition, we will understand why the Spence Firm's failed to pursue what would have appeared 
to be a "slam dunk" motion to amend after Judge Copsey's comments on January 15, 2015. 
Finally, Logan's letter exemplifies just why you should have honored by lien. He claims we have a "dispute" 
about the "amount owed." However, The Spence Firm has withheld every penny, not just any disputed 
amount, and did not even inform me there was a settlement. As Jones Gledhill failed to honor my lien, the 
Spence Firm has the ability to use these funds to try to extort a settlement with me. I consider that as your 
fault, and intend to pursue my claim. 
Will you accept service of my complaint? Thanks! 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
information it contains. 
8/10/2016 ll:50AM 
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Extortion letter from Spence Firm 
ERIC CLARK 
Wed 2/24/2016 8:06 AM 
To:Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrtnan@idalaw.com>; Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>; 
Cc:Amanda K. Brailsford <akb@andersenbanducci.com>; 
1 attachment (45 KB) 
Ex 2 - LT Clark reg Spence Finn Offer.pdf; 
Bill and Chris: 
Here is the extortion letter I received from the Spence Firm when I demanded payment of my entitled fees after 
finding out on my own there was a settlement with Anfinson Plumbing. Notice that the Spence Firm denies it 
owes me any fees, which is contrary to Logan's letter to you. The Spence Firm is now able to use these funds 
to extort a settlement because you failed to protect my lien. If the Spence Firm misled you by representing they 
would protect my lien in order for you to release those funds, then I would like those facts in a declaration or if 
the representations were in writing, then a copy of that writing from the Spence Firm. If not, then I am going to 
proceed and file my complaint. Thanks. 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
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Via Email and Regular Mail: 
Mr. Eric R. Clark 
~l~wK@~i:i~R{;J;).tk;}JL®JiY,,,9t)m.: 
Clark & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Re: Clark, et al. v. The Spence Law Firm, et al. 
Eric, 
876919 PAGE: 009 OF 010 
I have confinned that the Anfinson settlement was for policy limits of $1,000,000. 
The Spence Finn's position is that you are not entitled to payment of $140,000 that you contend 
you are owed under the co-counsel agreement as a result of the Anfinson settlement. The clients 
discharged you months before they reached this settlement; the settlement was not in existence 
when you were discharged. Nonetheless. The Spence Firm is offering you $140,000. This offer 
is unconditional with the exception of a full and complete release of any and all of your claims 
related to the Forbush matter against The Spence Firm, its attomeys, and your former clients. 
AKB/ajg 
This offer is open until Monday, February 29, 2016 at 5:00 p.m. 
Thank you. 
. . • 1 . 
Sincerely,. -~,· ~- . j7 
./ .. ·. ),-. ,·t --t_:, .. f' rfe'd;U.tk/4,,11Jlyf < ~ 
Amanda K. Brailsford 
1 
ANDERSEN BAt~DUCCI PLLC 
101 S CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 1600 BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TEI. \208\ 342-4411 FAX \2081 342-4455 
www.andersenbandut:ci com 
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cla~k v. Jones Gledhill - ERIC CLARK https://outlook.live.com /?viewmodel=ReadMessageltem&ItemID ... 
1 of 1 
Clark v. Jones Gledhill 
ERIC CLARK 
Thu 3/10/2016 7:56 AM 
To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>; 
Chris: 
Sorry for the delay. We are filing the lien claim lawsuit this morning. Will you accept service? 
I would imagine that the settlement agreement has indemnity and hold hannless language potentially 
addressing this lawsuit. Accordingly, please let me know if you are tendering the defense to the Spence Firm 
or the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case. Thanks! 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
information it contains. 
EXHIBIT4 
8/10/2016 12:30 PM 
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** INBOUND NOTIFICATION: FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY** 
REMOTE CSID 
208-939-7136 
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NO FILED ~~e>r,_ 
AM·-----iP,M. ___ ~__,;;;:;.. 
ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
AUG _1 8 2016 
CHAISiOPHER D. FIICH, Clork 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
Judge Hoagland 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Memorandum in support of their 
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involved a single-count complaint for negligence that was decided on a Motion 
to Dismiss. Notwithstanding the minimal proceedings in this matter, the Defendants claim 
:MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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attorney fees of in excess of $35,000.00, with nearly one-third of this amount charged for 
preparing a motion for costs and fees. 
The Court found that the Plaintiffs ( collectively hereafter as "Clark") had not ''taken 
some adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would have been reduced to an 
amount certain," but agreed with Clark that the Defendants had Clark perfected his lien, 1 then 
such order or judgment, ''would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel." 2 
1. The Def end ants are not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 120(3). 
It is unclear from the Defendants tortured argument how they arrived at the ultimate 
conclusion that a negligence case involves a commercial transaction, but that apparently is the 
argument. These Defendants argue in reference to the Forbush v. Sagecrest case that their 
"respective clients, who later settled, for commercial purposes, ... ," somehow establish that 
negligence case involved a "commercial transaction." Do the Defendants really believe the 
Forbush v. Sagecrest case; alleging claims for negligence and wrongful death involved a 
commercial transaction? 
The reality, the gravamen of this case as pied is negligence for disregarding an attorney 
lien. The issues presented involved the scope and enforceability of that lien. However, the 
Defendants failed to cite to any case that states the gravamen of a negligence case gives rise to a 
commercial transaction. Even if the Court were to construe this as a lien foreclosure case, a lien 
foreclosure does not involve a commercial transaction. Sims v. Jacobson, _ Idaho _, 342 
P.3d 907, 912 (2015). 
As there was no "commercial traction" as the gravamen of any claim in this case by any 
stretch of the imagination, I.C. § 120(3) does not apply. 
2. The Case was not brought frivolously or without foundation. 
The Court must have an "abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and without 
foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees 'when it is 
left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, 
1 Clark respectfully notes that it was impossible under the circumstances for Clark to have proceeded to 
perfect his lien without lmowledge of the settlement or the amount thereof; information known only to the 
Defendants here and the Spence Law Firm. 
2 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss 
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8. 
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unreasonably, or without foundation.' C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 'when a party pursues an action which 
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without 
foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes 
it fails as a matter oflaw. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 
894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the law, or of one's 
interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position 
adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Sc halo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P .2d 262, 265 
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)." Garner v. Povey, 
151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case involves a novel 
legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under I.C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew, 
141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005), citing Graham v. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
138 Idaho 611, 614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003). 
This case involved the the scope and enforceability ofldaho's Attorney Lien statute, and 
Clark presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability under this statute. 
Clark prevailed on this issue as the Court ultimately ruled that a perfected lien under the 
circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their counsel. "3 Accordingly, the 
Court has rejected the Defendants arguments in their Motion to Dismiss that any "litigation 
privilege" applied; that counsel cannot enforce an attorney lien against opposing counsel; and 
that defendants owed no duty of reasonable care. 4 
There certainly is not much decisional law of record regarding the scope of the attorney 
lien statute. Clark raised genuine issues in this litigation including the liability for opposing 
counsel; an issue which Clark prevailed. Moreover, Clark asserted the legitimate claim for 
liability of opposing counsel when counsel withheld critical information which prevented Clark 
from timely perfecting his lien. If opposing counsel would have been liable had Clark perfected 
his lien, why then would opposing counsel escape liability when they interfered with Clark's 
3 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss 
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8. 
4 Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, pp, 4, 5, and 8. 
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ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? As the Supreme Court noted in Frazee v. 
Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983), a "charging lien of an attorney is 
equitable in nature .... " Accordingly, all equitable defenses apply, including "unclean hands" 
and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because the Defendants, 
who knew Clark was asserting a lien, purposefully and intentionally withheld information from 
Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent the Defendants from raising the lack of a perfected 
lien as a defense. 
Lien statutes are by nature remedial. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. SUMP ER, 139 Idaho 
846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960, (2004). As remedial legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must 
be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. 
Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on 
this point is to allow the attorney an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures 
his right to compensation for obtaining the recovery or 'fund' for his client." Skelton v. Spencer, 
102 Idaho 69, 77, 625 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1981). Consequently, a reasonable interpretation of l.C. 
§ 3-205 is that an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a security interest in the proceeds of the 
lawsuit. Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a "perfected" lien, 
liability attached according to the statute, based on the undisputed facts that the Defendants had 
knowledge of Clark's lien claim and because Defendants possessed the funds to which Clark's 
lien attached. Clark also argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is 
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and Clark was seeking to perfect the lien, at best the case 
was not yet ripe and any dismissal should have been without prejudice. 
Additionally, the Court has discretion whether or not to consider evidence outside of the 
record submitted in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is a sound tactic to present 
additional evidence in opposition to a motion to dismiss, in case the Court exercises its 
discretion. Here Clark presented evidence related to the creation of his lien and background facts 
in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case. Just because the Court decided not to consider this evidence 
does not support any claim that offering the evidence in the first place was in any manner 
frivolous. 
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Under the circumstances presented here, the Court must conclude that Clark pursued this 
case in good faith and not frivolously and without foundation, notwithstanding the Court's 
ultimate ruling. 
3. The Defendants failed to establish "frivolous conduct" as defined by I.C. § 123. 
Clark incorporates the same argument in opposition to Defendants' claim for attorney 
fees pursuantto J.C. § 12-121, and argues if the Court denies attorney fees according to J.C. § 
12-121, it must also deny attorney fees under J.C. § 12-123 as this statute has a more stringent 
standard. If the Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees according to J.C. § 12-121, they 
certainly are not entitled to attorney fees based on a more stringent standard of conduct. 
First, as clearly stated in this statute; an award of attorney fees according to J.C. § 12-123 
is a "sanction." Clark presented evidence by way of declaration concerning his attempts to 
resolve this case without litigation and presented reasoned interpretation of case law in response 
to the Defendants' letter dated February 23, 2016.5 Clark also requested confirmation of 
Defendant's assertion that they had allegedly obtained an opinion from "Bar Counsel," who 
coincidentally used to be a partner at Jones Gledhill. However, the Defendants never responded 
to Clark's request for additional information or corroborated any alleged opinion from Bar 
Counsel notwithstanding Clark afforded the Defendants' extra time to respond before Clark filed 
suit. 6 Clark did not believe that simply because the funds allegedly were now in Wyoming, that 
the Defendants lacked liability and proceeded accordingly. Moreover, as discussed above, this 
Court has rejected the Defendants' arguments in their February 23, 2016 letter that Clark's lien 
was limited to a claim against his clients and not against opposing counsel. 
I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to find, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that 
Clark's conduct in the case was ''frivolous," as defined in that statute. The Defendants must 
prove that Clark asserted a claim which was "not supported in fact or warranted under existing 
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law." Here Clark presented reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds 
from the Anfinson settlement, regardless of whether his lien was ultimately perfected. That 
5 See Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford In Support of Defendants' Motion For 
Attorney Fees And Costs. 
6 See Exhibit 2, 3, and 4, attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition To Defendants' 
Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees. 
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position is supported by the clear language of LC. § 3-205. "From the commencement of an 
action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a 
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands 
they may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after 
judgment. (Emphasis added.) 
While the Court apparently placed the burden on Clark to perfect his lien, the Court 
apparently did not consider the fact that only the Defendants and the Spence firm had 
information necessary for Clark to perfect his lien. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d 
813, (Idaho App., 1986), requires knowledge of the amount of the attorney lien as a prerequisite 
to perfection of an attorney lien. As Clark argued in good faith in support of his motion to 
reconsider; "Here, Clark had no idea what the judgment amount was; first because when he was 
discharged there was no settlement or "fund," and second, because his former clients and the 
Defendants here refused to inform Clark when they settled." The reality, only the Defendants 
and the Spence firm knew there was a settlement and the terms of that settlement and they also 
each knew Clark was asserting a lien on the proceeds of those funds. Under these circumstances 
Clark could not perfect his lien until he obtained information only the Defendants possessed but 
did not release to Clark. 
Moreover, the Court's ruling that even if Clark had perfected his lien, the money is 
already gone, so "no harm no foul," appears to conflict with J.C. § 3-205. There are no 
provisions in this statute that terminate liability just because a liable party no longer has the 
money. With all due respect, such a contention would seem to undermine the very purpose of 
the statute. 
Finally, as a "sanction" J.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to determine whether or not "any 
party was adversely affected by the conduct if found to be frivolous." J.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii). 
(Emphasis Added.) In this case, it appears that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case 
to the Spence Firm and Former Clients, pursuant to an indemnity and hold harmless clause in the 
settlement documents. Accordingly, Spence's counsel appeared in this case for Jones Gledhill 
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and the Spence Firm likely is paying attorney fees. 7 If Jones Gledhill is not responsible for any 
attorney fees and therefor is not a "party adversely affected" by any alleged frivolous conduct, 
then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to any attorney fees. These facts need to be addressed in the 
evidentiary hearing required by I.C. § 12-123 if in fact the Court elects to conduct such a 
hearing. 
4. The attorney fees claimed are not in any stretch of the imagination 
"reasonable;" the fee claimed are outrageous and punitive. 
Defendants bear the burden of proving their claim for attorney fees is reasonable. 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008). Pursuant to 54(e)(3), the 
two criteria relevant here are; (A) Time and labor required; and (B) Novelty and Difficulty of the 
Questions. 
a. Time and labor. This was a single count negligence claim decided on an IR.CP 
12(b) motion. There was no discovery exchanged, nor depositions taken. Nor were there any 
other pleadings or motions. The Defendants did not even file an Answer. Notwithstanding, 
Defendants claimed attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Defendants' counsel billed in excess of 
159 hours on this case; 56 of which was billed for time for preparing the motion for costs and 
attorney fees. 8 Other than their exorbitant billing records, the Defendants offer no explanation as 
to how billing over 159 hours under the circumstance of this case was in any way reasonable. 
The Defendants double billed for the same work performed by two or more attorneys. (See, e.g. 
on March 14, 2016, March 15, 2016, March 22, 2016, and March 23, 2016). The Defendants 
billed 14.8 hours just for legal research in support of motion to dismiss. "RAM" billed 18.8 
hours related to research and drafting just the motion to dismiss. This case reeks of the situation 
where attorneys drastically increases their hours well above what they actually billed just 
because their party won. The Court should not condone such conduct and deny the motion for 
fees outright. 
7 Curiously, in her brief, Brailsford claims "Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its 
counsel of record, who in tum had to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the underlying 
case."(Memo, p. 14.) However, Brailsford already represented the Spence Firm and the Fonner Clients 
in the ''underlying case." It is therefore unclear why Brailsford now had to "familiarize" herself with a 
case in which she was already involved? 
8 Brailsford's Affidavit, Exhibit C. 
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b. Novelty and Difficulty. This case involved the scope ofldaho's attorney fee 
statute, not the interpretation of the tax code. The case did present the novel issue of whether an 
attorney lien attaches to proceeds held by opposing counsel thereby subjecting opposing counsel 
to liability, but ultimately, the Court rejected the Defendants' arguments on this issue. 
c. Billing for Attorney Fees. The Defendants billed in excess of 56 hours just to 
assert a claim for attorney fees. The amount billed for attorney fees is a glaring example of 
"padding" the bills well above that counsel actually charged for their services. Again, the Court 
cannot condone such conduct and must deny these fees as patently unreasonable. 
Considering the nature of the minimal proceedings, charging in excess of 159 hours is not 
in any way reasonable. Accordingly, the Court must deny the motion for attorney fees in its 
entirety as unreasonable under the circumstances. 
5. Costs. 
As the prevailing party, the Defendants are entitled to recover their costs as a matter or 
right, which is limited to their filing fee. The Defendants have not established any basis for this 
Court to award any of the discretionary costs claimed. 
CONCLUSION 
Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants' Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees for the following reasons; 1) The Case does not involve a "commercial 
transaction, and therefor I.C. § 12-120 does not apply; 2) The Case was not brought or pursued 
frivolously or without foundation and presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's 
liability pursuant to an attorney lien; 3) The Defendants failed to establish any conduct was 
frivolous as defined by LC. § 12-123; and 4) The Defendants failed to establish its attorney fees 
demanded were reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants are entitled to recover their 
filing fee, and nothing more. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or e-
mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Eric R. Clark 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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AUG 3 1 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clark 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
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P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Grahmµ, individually,_ 




Case No. CV OC-1604633 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., AN IDAHO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM FUHRMAN, 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A.; AND CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES 
GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A., AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. . 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Plaintiffs appeal against the above-named Defendants to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Judgment entered July 20, 2016, _a copy of which is attached. 
2. Appellants hereby appeal as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
above-referenced Judgment according to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
(i) Whether the District Court erred when it ruled it was "beyond doubt" that the 
Plaintiffs. could prove no set of facts entitling the Plaintiffs to any relief and granted the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss? 
(ii) Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal? 
4: The Appellants have a right to appeal since the Judgment described in paragraph 1 
above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
5. Appellants do not request the preparation of any transcript. 
6. Appellants request a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the ONLY the 
following documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28: 
03/10/2016 Complaint Filed 
03/21/2016 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
0410412016 
Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Amended 
Complaint 




Declaration of Eric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss 
Defendant's Reply In Support of Motion To Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And Opposition To Defendants 
"Motion To Dismiss To Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of 
05/09/2016 Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing 
Information Protected By Attorney-Client Privileged Or Work Product 
Doctrine 
Declaration Of Eric R Clark Filed In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For 
Judicial Notice And Opposition To Defendants Motion To Dismiss To 
05/09/2016 Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of Facts;" And "Former 
Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected 
By Attorney-Client Privileged Of Work Producf Doctrine 
05/27/2016 Defen.dants' Reply in Support of Motion to Strike and Response to 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice 
06/13/2016 Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider 
06/13/2016 Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint 
06/13/2016 
06/13/2016 
Plaintiffs Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration and Motion to Amend Complaint 
Declaration of Eric R Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint 
0612812016 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion 
to Seal and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice 
06/28/2016 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint 
07/20/2016 Judgment 
08/15/2016 Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs and Attorney fees 
08/15/2016 
08/18/2016 
Declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs and Attorney 
fees 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' 
Motion for Fees and Costs 
7. No Exhibits are requested. 
8. I hereby certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporters ifrequired, 
(b) the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript of the hearings noted 
above has been paid; 
(c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
( d) the appellate filing has been paid; and 
( e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 or 20.1. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via US Mail, and 
addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen 
Amanda K. Brailsford 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Eric R.. Clark 
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NO., ___ --=::-=-----
FJLEO A.M, ____ . ..r.M, ___ _ 
JUL ~ 0 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
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JONES GLEDHILL PUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an ldaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an · 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Glcclhilll Fuhrman 
Gourley, ,p .A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC- I 604633 
JUDGMENT 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiffs' claims againsl Defendants are dismissed with prejud~cc. 
DATED this / ~1J> day of July 2016. 
JUDGMENT- I 
SAMUELA. HOAGLAND 




~ ' . 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereb.y certify that on this ~day of J', ~ 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: ~ · 
Mr. Eric Clark, Esq. 
Clark & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq. 
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC 
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
JUDGMENT-2 
Christopher Rich 
Clerk of the District Court 
gref>Hfl..N\Wr,rv::!'I 
By------•-.-=-------






Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
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C~FUSTOPHE::'t n. RICH, C!cr!, 
C, DARAH TA'!LOFl 
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Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES 
AND COSTS 
Pursuant to Rule 54( d) and ( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code 
§§12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William 
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Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham moves this Court for an award of fees and costs. This motion 
is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
and the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees 
and Costs, both of which are filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED THIS 2nd day of August 2016. 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
D U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
D Hand Delivery 
D FedEx Overnight Delivery 
IZ! Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com 
~~ 










Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.342.4411 
Facsimile: 208.342.4455 
-,.~. ----fl~,~ t\U 
A.M. 
AUG O 2 2016 
CHRISTOPHER r). RICH, Cieri< 
By SARAH TAYLOR 
DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-1604633 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher 
Graham (together, "Jones Gledhill") by and through their counsel ofrecord, hereby submit this 
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memorandum in support of their motion for fees and costs. Filed in support of the motion is the 
Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford ("Brailsford Aff. "). 
INTRODUCTION 
This lawsuit, filed by Eric R. Clark and his law firm, Clark & Associates, PLLC 
(together, "Clark"), was frivolous. Clark incredulously alleged that anyone who touched 
settlement money arising from a case on which he formerly worked could be liable to him if they 
did not proactively protect his purported charging lien. Under this frivolous legal analysis, Clark 
alleged that his opposing counsel, Jones Gledhill, William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
were liable to him in the amount of $500,000. Clark has now acknowledged (in support of his 
motion for reconsideration) that Idaho law and the facts known to him all along would not allow 
him to enforce his alleged, unperfected lien. That is, he has acknowledged that neither the facts 
nor the law warrant the lawsuit he brought. 
In this case, Clark also inexplicably chose to file in the public record confidential and 
privileged information obtained through his representation of his former clients, thereby 
attempting to make that information available both to the general public and also to Jones 
Gledhill-the very lawyers who opposed his former clients. Rather than rectifying this error 
upon request, Clark forced Jones Gledhill to strike the impertinent information. Ultimately, 
Clark's frivolous allegations failed, and this Court should award Jones Gledhill costs and 
attorney fees as a result. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 21, 2016, Clark filed his Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Amended Complaint"), alleging that Jones Gledhill failed to protect his interest in a purported 
attorney's lien. On April 4, Jones Gledhill moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint because 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
000113
Clark had no claim against Jones Gledhill under Idaho law. Before Clark filed his lawsuit, Jones 
Gledhill expressly warned him that any such action would be frivolous, and it provided Clark with 
supporting authority, including the very same authority upon which this Court relied to dismiss 
Clark's Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim, Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 
928 (1983). (See Brailsford Aff. at Ex. A (attaching letter from Graham to Clark dated February 23, 
2016).) 
On May 4, Clark opposed Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss. Without explanation or 
purpose, Clark included in his opposition certain information that was subject to his Former Clients' 
attorney-client privilege or was otherwise protectable, confidential information. On May 6, Clark's 
Former Clients specially appeared under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32 and moved to seal 
their confidential information, and Jones Gledhill moved to strike the confidential information and 
Clark's other irrelevant submissions. On May 9, Clark opposed the motions to seal and strike and 
exacerbated his wrongful disclosures by filing additional confidential information in the public 
record, which in tum required Jones Gledhill and the Former Clients to seek relief from these 
disclosures. 1 
The Court heard the motions to dismiss, seal and strike on June 3, at which time the Court 
ruled from the bench that it would grant Jones Gledhill's and the Former Clients' motions. The 
Comi also indicated it would issue a written order in conformity with that ruling. Ten days after the 
hearing, on June 13-before the Court issued its written order-Clark filed a motion for 
1 Clark also sought judicial notice of filings made in Clark v. Forbush et al, Ada County Case 
No. CV-OC-1604217. Defendants responded that judicial notice was not appropriate. This issue 
was heard at the same time as the motions to dismiss, seal and strike. The Court denied Clark's 
motion because, on their face, the documents to be noticed did not meet the requirements of Rule 
201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3 
000114
reconsideration and a motion to amend his complaint. Clark sought to amend his complaint by 
adding Anfinson Plumbing and its insurance carrier as defendants. 
Significantly, Clark argued that his motion to amend his complaint was based on an 
argument purportedly made by Jones Gledhill's counsel concerning Clark's failure to name all 
appropriate defendants. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
and Motion to Amend Complaint (hereafter Motion for Reconsideration) at p. 6 ("During oral 
argument ... counsel for the Defendants argued that others had handled the settlement funds and 
therefore the pleadings were deficient because these other parties were not named.").) In fact, 
counsel's argument was the opposite-namely, the argument was that Clark's interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 3-205 was absurd and could lead to the inclusion of many inappropriate defendants. 
(Brailsford Aff. at Ex. B, pp. 24-25 (6/3/16 Hearing Transcript); id. at pp. 30-31 ("I hope the court 
understands and I think that it does that my argument is not that Anfinson Plumbing and the 
insurance company should be added to this case. They had no notice of the lien and my argument is 
the ridiculousness of the interpretation of the statute such that ["Jin whosoever's hand the proceeds 
may come["] can suddenly be a defendant. ... ").) Upon receipt of Clark's motions for 
reconsideration and amendment, Jones Gledhill' s counsel began work on responses. 
On June 28, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to 
Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice (the 
"Order"). The Court dismissed Clark's Amended Complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because Clark failed to take any steps to adjudicate and perfect 
his alleged lien. It granted the motion to strike because Clark presented immaterial and irrelevant 
information beyond the pleadings, and it granted the motion to seal because Clark had disclosed the 
F01mer Clients' confidential information. Additionally, the Court denied Clark's motions for 
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reconsideration and amendment, noting that Clark's motion for reconsideration did not add any new 
facts or authorities that had any bearing on the correctness of the Court's Order. 
The Court entered judgment on July 19, dismissing all of Clark's claims with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its fees and costs incurred in this matter because 
(1) Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party; (2) this action was frivolously filed and pursued; and (3) a 
commercial transaction is integral to this action and is the basis for recovery in Clark's Amended 
Complaint. 
A. Jones Gledhill is the Prevailing Party. 
"In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial 
court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to 
the relief sought by the respective parties." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). "[T]he issue ... is not who 
succeeded on more individual claims, but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action." 
Hobson Fabricating C01p. v. SEIZ Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012). In 
that regard, "[b ]oth a party's successes in bringing claims and in defending against them are 
important to the prevailing party analysis." Id at 50. A successful defense can make a defendant a 
prevailing party. See, e.g., Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 
Idal10 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) (reversing trial court's failure to find a successful 
defendant as prevailing party as an abuse of discretion). "A voiding liability is a significant benefit 
to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more 
exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is 
for a plaintiff." Id. 
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Here, Clark filed an action seeking to recover on an alleged attorney's lien. Jones Gledhill 
moved to dismiss Clark's claim on the basis that Clark failed to state a claim as a matter oflaw. 
This Court agreed with Jones Gledhill and granted its motion to dismiss in its entirety.2 
Consequently, Jones Gledhill avoided all liability, which is the "most favorable outcome that could 
possibly be achieved." Id Clark's Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Therefore, 
Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party. 
B. Clark Brought This Lawsuit Frivolously, Unreasonably and Without Foundation. 
Clark brought and pursued this lawsuit frivolously and without foundation. Therefore, fees 
and costs may be awarded to Jones Gledhill pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Additionally, Clark 
should have known his suit was frivolous upon a reasonable inquiry into the law, and he has offered 
no legitimate argument for a good faith extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
Accordingly, Jones Gledhill can also recover its fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123. 
See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 11. 
1. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-121. 
Attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to§ 12-121 if the action was 
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Akers v. Mortensen, 160 Idaho 
286,371 P.3d 340,343 (2016). Although courts previously construed this authorization narrowly 
by finding that it did not authorize fees when there was any legitimate triable issue of fact, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has since rejected that "overly strict application," thereby allowing courts to 
apportion fee awards among frivolous and non-frivolous claims. See Idaho Military Historical 
Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,632,329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014), reh'g denied (Aug. 6, 
2014) (upholding fee award where "litigation ... should never have been necessary."). In Idaho 
2 Moreover, although the proper inquiry is whether Jones Gledhill succeeded on the main issue of 
this action, which it did, Jones Gledhill also succeeded on every other motion in this case. 
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Military Historical Society, the Court concluded that an attempt to recover on a meritless assertion 
of a lien is frivolous, foundationless conduct. Id. 
In that case, the parties disputed the ownership and possession of an aircraft. Id. at 627-30. 
After the defendants stored and maintained the aircraft for months, they refused to release it to the 
plaintiff and asse1ied a lien on the aircraft for the value of services provided. Id. The plaintiff sued 
for damages and possession of the aircraft, and the defendants counterclaimed asserting their 
alleged lien. Id. Ultimately, the plaintiff failed to prove its damages but defeated the defendants' 
lien assertion. Id. The trial court found the plaintiff was the prevailing patiy and awarded $73,675 
in attorney's fees pursuant to§ 12-121. Id. The Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, noting 
that successfully defeating the lien was a significant portion of the underlying suit and explaining 
that the defendants' assertion of the lien was "without foundation" because there was no evidence 
the defendants were entitled to receive payment for the services they performed on the aircraft. Id. 
at 631. Indeed, the Court stated that litigation to obtain possession of the aircraft should never have 
been necessary because there was no factual dispute that the defendants voluntarily stored and 
serviced the aircraft, and thus, there was no factual basis for their assertion of a lien. Id. at 632. 
Here, there is no factual basis for Clark to enforce his purported lien against Jones Gledhill. 
Clark alleged that Jones Gledhill was obligated to protect his alleged (but admittedly unperfected) 
lien on settlement funds. Indeed, the entirety of Clark's Amended Complaint was premised on his 
assertion of an attorney's lien and the allegation that Jones Gledhill failed to protect or honor it. 
(See Order at 7 ("Clark seeks to enforce ai1 alleged attorney's lien .... "); see also Exhibit 1 to the 
Amended Complaint.) Idaho law is clear, however, that a "charging lien is only brought about by 
some affi.1mative act of the party asserting the lien in reducing it to a judgment or order of the 
court." (Order at 8 citing Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466 660 P.2d 928,931 (1983).) There 
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was never any dispute that Clark had not taken adjudicatory action to perfect his alleged charging 
lien. Accordingly, "no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of money on behalf of his former 
clients." Id. ( citation omitted). Moreover, this Court further noted that, while Clark may be 
attempting to perfect his lien in other litigation against the Former Clients, that attempt has no effect 
on Jones Gledhill because "the settlement check and proceeds have already gone through the hands 
of' Jones Gledhill. Id. at 9. 
Importantly, Clark never took the position that his alleged charging lien was perfected; he 
did not do so either in his written opposition to Jones Gledhill's Motion to Dismiss or at oral 
argument. Instead, Clark conceded in his motion for reconsideration that unperfected liens cannot 
be enforced: "A lien is not enforceable or collectable until such time it is ultimately reduced to 
judgment, because the actual damages are not yet dete1mined." (Motion to Reconsider at p. 3.) 
Clark further conceded that he "had no idea what the judgment amount was" and that his suit 
purportedly filed to "perfect his lien" is ongoing. (Id. at p. 4.) Based upon these concessions, Clark 
essentially acknowledges that his effort to enforce an unperfected lien against Jones Gledhill was 
not warranted by either law or fact. 
Accordingly, Clark's decision to file suit against Jones Gledhill-who, as the Court has 
aptly noted, can never be the subject of any action by Clark to enforce his lien because the subject 
funds have passed through their hands, never to return-was by his own assessment frivolous and 
without foundation thereby warranting an award of fees and costs under § 12-121. 
2. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-123. 
Similarly, attorney's fees may be awarded to a party adversely affected by the frivolous 
filing of a civil action, an assertion of a frivolous claim, or even the taking of a frivolous position in 
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a civil action under § 12-123 ;3 see also Rule 11 ( c) ( allowing this Court to assess sanctions, sua 
sponte, for frivolous filings) and Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87, 95, 803 P.2d 993, 1001 (1991) (a party is required to make a reasonable inquiry under the 
circumstances into the validity of the facts and law underlying a claim made).4 Under§ 12-123, 
frivolous conduct includes that which is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and 
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law. Idaho Code§ 12-123(1)(b)(ii). 
For example, in Ackerman v. Bonneville County, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's sanctions against the plaintiff for failing to make a statutory interpretation argument not 
founded in good faith. In that case, the plaintiff petitioned for a "Writ of Mandate, and/or 
Prohibition to be issued against the City ofldaho Falls, Bonneville County, and [the honorable] 
William P. Hollerich prohibiting [him] from presiding over cases in Bonneville County .... " 140 
Idaho 307, 310, 92 P.3d 557, 560 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).5 The plaintiff 
argued that Judge Hollerich, a Clark County magistrate judge, was a "de facto" Bonneville County 
magistrate judge due to the number of cases he heard in Bonneville County and, thus, was required 
by statute to be retained by Bonneville County voters. Id. The Ackerman court explained that, for a 
3 While similar to an award of fees under § 12-121, § 12-123 can provide for fees in situations 
where the former cannot. Namely, it does not require that Jones Gledhill be a prevailing party, 
as it allows an award of fees to any party adversely affected by the frivolous conduct. Also, 
notably, in addition to finding that an act was without foundation in fact or law,§ 12-123 is 
phrased in the conjunctive, indicating that there must also be no good faith argument for an 
extension of the law. 
4 Clark failed to conduct a reasonably inquiry, despite that Jones Gledhill voluntarily provided 
Clark with the dispositive authority before Clark filed his lawsuit and informed him that filing his 
Complaint would not meet Rule 11 's standards. (Brailsford Aff. at Ex. A.) 
5 The plaintiff in Ackerman essentially sought to disqualify Judge Hollerich from presiding over the 
plaintiff's DUI case by filing for a writ on statutory grounds. See id at 309-10. While factually 
distinguishable from this case, Ackerman is instructional on the baseless nature of Clark's claims. 
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writ to issue, the petitioner must establish a "clear right to the relief sought." Id. at 311. The 
plaintiff cited Idaho Code§ 1-2220 to support his argument that Judge Hollerich's service in 
Bom1eville County was improper. Id. The court, however, disagreed and explained that the statute 
was unambiguous, requiring Judge Hollerich to be elected in the county in which he was appointed, 
not in the county in which he hears cases. That the plaintiff had advanced an alternate interpretation 
of that statute did not change its unambiguous nature. Id. at 312. Notably, the court stated that the 
plaintiff had provided no authority under which the court could transform a magistrate elected in 
one county into a magistrate for another county, and no authority regarding "de facto" magistrate 
judges. Id. 
Here, Clark argues that plain language of the attorney lien statute, Idaho Code§ 3-205, 
allowed him to bring this action (as in Ackerman). (See Clark's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 6-8.) Clark's argument fails for numerous reasons. First, 
Clark's reliance on that statute as the basis of his claim is misplaced altogether as it does not address 
when an attorney's lien can be enforced. Second, the fact that Clark has put forth an "alternate" 
interpretation of that statute does not mean he has put forth a good faith argument for an extension 
or modification of the law. See Ackerman, 140 Idaho at 312, 92 P.3d at 562. Finally, even if 
Clark's interpretation of§ 3-205 is considered, this action is still frivolous because his interpretation 
does not cure the fatal deficiency in this action: he cam1ot enforce his purported (but in any event 
unperfected) lien. Indeed, in his Motion for Reconsideration Clark admits that: (1) Frazee v. 
Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 923 (1983), requires an attorney to take affirmative steps to perfect 
a charging lien; (2) he has not done so; and (3) as a result, his alleged lien is not enforceable at this 
point. (Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 2-5.) Simply put, Clark does not offer any authority 
suggesting that he can enforce his lien against Jones Gledhill prior to perfecting it, let alone when 
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Jones Gledhill no longer possesses the subject funds. Thus, as in Ackerman, Clark's position is 
unsupported by the facts and not subject to any reasonable extension or modification of the law. As 
a result, Jones Gledhill should be awarded its fees and costs under§ 12-123. 
3. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-120(3). 
Finally, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) authorizes an award of fees to any prevailing party if a 
commercial transaction is the gravamen of, or integral to, the lawsuit and the commercial 
transaction constitutes the basis for which a party is trying to recover. Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 
Idaho 866, 873-74, 303 P.3d 225, 232-33 (2013). A commercial transaction is anything other than a 
transaction "for personal or household purposes." Idaho Code § 12-120(3); Goodspeed, 154 Idaho 
at 874,303 P.3d at 233. Section 12-120(3) "does not require that there be a contract between the 
parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires that there be a commercial 
transaction. In other contexts, this Court has given a broad meaning to the word transaction." In 
re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 
(1997) (finding that attorneys, while not literal parties to a settlement "transaction," were "so 
intimately intertwined" with it that a malpractice claim against them arose out of that 
transaction). "Each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial 
purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co. Inc., 152 Idaho at 756,274 P.3d at 1271 (citations omitted). 
Attorneys enter into representation agreements for commercial purposes. See Reynolds v. Trout 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idal10 21, 27,293 P.3d 645,651 (2013). While actions based 
on statutory provisions are not typically commercial transactions, see, e.g., Kelly v. Silverwood 
Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P .2d 1321, 1328 (1995) (not a commercial transaction when a 
party is attempting to enforce a purely statutory right), the proper inquiry in that regard is 
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whether the claim asserted depends on a commercial transaction in order to exist at all. See, e.g., 
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495,501,272 P.3d 467,473 (2012) (addressing a 
proper statute of limitation, explaining that "even though statutes provide a critical element for 
recovery, the action is primarily a contract action instead of an action authorized by a specific 
statutory provision .... Both cases depended on a contractual relationship in order for the 
plaintiff to have any claim .... "). 
In this case, both Clark and Jones Gledhill-each being attorneys and law firms-
engaged in their representation of their respective clients, who later settled, for commercial 
purposes, giving rise to the "fund" upon which Clark attempted to recover by way of this lawsuit. 
Although Clark and Jones Gledhill were not themselves party to the ultimate underlying 
transaction (the settlement of a lawsuit) they were so intimately intertwined with that lawsuit that 
it suffices as the commercial "transaction" underlying the instant action. Moreover, although 
Clark enantly relied on a statute in bringing his claim, this action was in fact his attempt to 
recover on an alleged charging lien that only (allegedly) exists by virtue of the underlying 
commercial transaction. Because Jones Gledhill prevailed in this action and Clark based his 
Amended Complaint on an underlying commercial transaction, Jones Gledhill is entitled to 
recover its fees and costs. 
C. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover the Following Fees and Costs. 
1. Rule 54 Awards Costs to a Prevailing Party. 
Prevailing parties are entitled to certain costs as a matter of right. Idaho R. Civ. P. 
54(d)(l)(A), (C). Included in those costs are court filing fees. Id. at (d)(l)(C)(i). This Court can 
also award other costs that were necessary and exceptional so long as reasonably incuned. Id. at 
( d)(l )(D). When the nature of a case itself is exceptional, the costs incU1Ted are recoverable. 
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Hayden Lake Fire Port. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). 
Discretionary costs can include print and copy expenses. Richard J & Esther E. Wooley Trust v. 
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 187,983. P.2d 834, 841 (1999). 
In this case, Jones Gledhill incurred and paid a $136.00 filing fee which is recoverable as 
a matter of right. (Brailsford Aff. at Ex. C.) Additionally, given the above-described frivolous 
nature of this case, it is exceptional and Jones Gledhill should be awarded its discretionary fees. 
In that regard, Jones Gledhill incurred $93.20 in print and copy expenses and $148.75 for a 
transcript of the Court's June 3 hearing. (Id) That hearing was the basis upon which (prior to 
any written order being issued) Clark: (1) moved for reconsideration; and (2) moved to amend in 
light of comments purportedly (but not actually) made by Jones Gledhill 's counsel during that 
hearing. Consequently, ordering the transcript of that hearing was reasonable and necessary. 
In total, Jones Gledhill's costs amount to $499.95, of which $136 is awardable as a matter 
of right. 
2. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover the Following Attorney's Fees. 
As described above, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its attorney's fees under§§ 12-
121, 12-123, 12-120(3), and Rule 11. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(l). This Court, in awarding 
fees to Jones Gledhill, can consider the following factors: 
(A) the time and labor required; 
(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability 
of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(D) the prevailing charges for like work; 
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; 
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(H) the undesirability of the case; 
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(J) awards in similar cases; 
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(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), 
if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; 
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
See id. at ( e )(3 ). 
Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its counsel of record, who in turn had 
to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the case underlying case. This matter-in 
which Clark alleged damages of over $500,000-was resolved quickly and efficiently on a 
reasonable hourly basis. Jones Gledhill also had to oppose Clark's request for judicial notice and 
to strike impertinent, immaterial information that Clark inexplicably filed in the public record. 
Moreover, this case was relatively undesirable as Clark brought suit alleging wrongdoing by 
fellow members of the bar and a well-regarded local firm. 
The bios of attorneys employed by Jones Gledhill' s counsel of record are provided for the 
Court's review. (See Brailsford Aff. at Exs. D, E, F, and G.) The hourly rates assessed by such 
counsel are reasonable and commensurate with market rates in the area for the level and type of 
service provided. Finally, although minimal, legal expenses related to automated legal research 
were incurred (and are awardable under Rule 54(e)(K)) in the amount of$193.14. 
Accordingly, attorney's fees, including electronic research, in the amount of $35,416.50 
are properly awardable to Jones Gledhill. (See Brailsford Aff. at Ex. C.) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill's instant motion should be granted for fees and 
costs in the total amount of $35,987.59. 
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DATED this 2nd day of August 2016. 
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Amanda K. Brailsford, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows: 
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1. I am one of the attorneys representing Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A., William Fuhrman, and Chris Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") in this action. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a letter that Chris Graham and Bill 
Fuhrman sent to Eric Clark on Febmary 23, 2016. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the Court Reporter's transcript for the 
hearing held on June 3, 2016 in this case. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a tme and accurate accounting of the fees and costs 
incurred by Jones Gledhill in this case, including the hours expended, the billing rate associated 
with those hours, the description of services provided, and the date that they were provided. The 
attorneys who provided services are identified on Exhibit C by their initials: 
Steven B. Andersen SBA 
Amanda K. Brailsford AKB 
Rachel A. Murphy RAM 
Zach S. Zollinger zsz 
5. The fees and costs reflected in Exhibit C were necessarily, reasonably, and actually 
incurred by Jones Gledhill in this proceeding. Such costs are awardable as a matter of right 
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and in the Court's discretion 
under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the same. Such fees are warranted and awardable as costs pursuant to 
Rule 54( e ). Further, the hourly rates for the identified attorneys are reasonable for the market and 
experience of the identified timekeepers, and are comparable to rates charged by other professionals 
providing comparable litigation services in the region. 
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6. Attached hereto as Exhibits D, E, F, and Gare brief summaries of the attorneys 
who worked on this case as identified in Exhibit C. 
DATED this 2nd day of August 2016. 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
A~ 
Attorneys for Jones Gledhill Furhman Gourley, P.A. 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of August 2016. 
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I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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D Hand Delivery 
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[:g] Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com 
~~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 






JONES • GLED.HILL • FUHRl\tIAN • GOURLEY, P.A. 
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William A. Fuhrman 
Christopher P. Graham 
February 23, 2016 
Via Facsimile Only 939" 7136 
Eric R. Clark, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
1402 N. Echo Creek Place 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616-4088 
Re: Your Threatened Lllwsuir 
Dear Eric: 
We are in receipt of your draft Complaint. Please take a look at cases such as In re 
Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476, 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) and Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 465, 
660 P.2d 928,930 (1983), both of which state that the plain language of the attorney lien statute 
"only allows for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that lawyer's own client." There is absolutely 
nothing written in Idaho Code § 3"205 or the caselaw interpreting that statute that authorizes an 
attorney lien "in favor of an opponent's lawyer." The Complaint you sent us is factually 1 and 
legally baseless and, if filed, will likely result in attorney fees and possibly Rule I I sanctions being 
assessed against you. 
Prior to settling the lawsuit with your former clients, we discussed the matter of your 
attorney lien with Bar Counsel and were likewise told that, regardless of being placed on "notice" 
of your attorney lien, we had no obligation to include your name on the settlement check issued to 
your former clients. 
1 Paragraph 19 in particular is grossly inaccurate. As you recall, prior to the time The Spence Law Firm became 
involved in the case, Judge Copsey denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to include a prayer for punitive 
damages againsl Anfinson Plumbing, despite the "extreme deviation" affidavit from Kenny Calkins. It is highly 
doubtful that Judge Copsey would have reversed her prior decision, particularly after Mr. Calkins testified in his 
deposition that he had changed his mind since signing the affidavit and believed Daniel Bukken's conduct did not 
even rise to the level of recklessness. 
The 91b & Idaho Center + 225 North 9,h Street, Suite 820 
P. 0. Box 1097 + Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone (208) 331-1170 + Facsimile (208) 331-1529 







That being said, our understanding is that the money you allege you are owed pursuant to 
your attorney lien is being held in trust by The Spence Law Finn.2 Consequently, there is no need 
whatsoever for you to file a Complaint against us or our law firm. Your dispute is with your former 
clients and The Spence Law Firm, and we strongly encourage you to refrain from making any 
further threats. 
Very truly yours, 
:/,_ ,()/) /) ~ 
~:nnan 
WAF/CPG/pu 
2 Please sec the attached letter from Tyson Logan. 
Very truly yours, 
~ 
Christopher P. Graham 
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Chris Graham 
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. 
cgraham@idalaw.com 
Dear Chris, 
February 23, 2016 
Thank you for your February 23 email. We reviewed Mr. Clark's draft complaint against Jones 
Gledhill. Mr. Clark should not have a claim against Jones Gledhill. He previously asserted an 
attorney's lien against us in an August 25, 2015 letter. We have communicated with Mr. Clark 
about his claimed lien, but we disagree with the amount he has asserted he is owed. This letter 
is to confirm that The Spence Law Firm, LLC, is holding the full amount of Mr. Clark's claimed 
lien, $140,000.00 - proceeds from the settlement paid by Anfinson's insurer - in trust, and will 
continue to do so until the issue of that attorney's lien is resolved. Please feel free to share this 
email with Mr. Clark, as it should resolve his threats against Jones Gledhill. 
Sincerely, 
Tyson E. Logan 
THE SPENCE LAW FIRM, LLC • 15 S.JACKSON ST.• P.O. BOXS48 • JACKSON, l\lY 83001 • 307·733·7290 • 307·733-5248 FAX• SPENCELAWYERS.COM 
C.ERRY LSrENCE,l'C• t;[l,T\\' SPENCE,l'C. ROBEKT A.1:RAUSE,rc • It. IIANIELFLECl(,l'C•C.BRYANUL\IERIJl,rc •MELC ORCIL\RJllll,PC• EMIL\'R RANI.IN.re. ~1.1:IIJSTELN IL\Nll.l'C •T\'SON E LOGAN.PC 
J. IIOUGLASMCCALI.A,rC • llOY A JACUnSONJR.PC• OFCllUNSEL• LARISSAA.MCCALLA • MAIU-T..ARON0\\1n • CRA."IT ll. LAWSON• ELIZl\6£TIIA RIC:IL\RO~ • SOAll I\' IIREI\'• MICIL\ELF LUT7.·MSOC/Ar£.f 
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02/23/2016 TUE 15:14 FAX 31 1529 JONES G LL . 
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J . 
William A. ruhrman 
Christopher P. Graham 
.:\ITQRNEYS AT L,;\\V/ 
February 23, 2016 
Via Facsimile Only 939-7136 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
1402 N. Echo Creek Place 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616-4088 
Re: Your Threatened Lawsuit 
Dear Eric: 
We are in receipt of your draft Complaint. Please take a look at cases such as In re 
Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) and Frazee v. Frazee, 104 ldaho 463,465, 
660 P .2d 928, 930 (1983), both of which state that the plain language of the attorney lien statute 
"only allows for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that lawyer's own client." There is absolutely 
nothing written in Idaho Code § 3-205 or the caselaw interpreting that statute that authorizes an 
attorney lien "in favor of an opponent's lawyer." The Complaint you sent us is factually1 and 
legally baseless and, if filed, will likely result in attorney fees and possibly Rule 11 sanctions being 
assessed against you. 
Prior to settling the lawsuit with your former clients, we discussed the matter of your 
attorney lien with Bar Counsel and were likewise told that, regardless of being placed on "notice" 
of your attorney lien, we had no obligation to include your name on the settlement check issued to 
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JONES GLEDHILL, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
12 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
13 Motion to Dismiss hearing held on June 3, 2016 













CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
1 







June 3, 2016 
10:00 a.m. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
APPEARANCES: 
THE PLAINTIFF, MR. ERIC CLARK, WAS IN PRO SE. 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, MS. AMANDA BRAILSFORD. 
2 
6 THE COURT: All right. Good morning, 
7 everybody. This is the case of Eric R. Clark versus Jones 
8 Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., etcetera. Eric Clark is 
9 present representing himself. And we've got Ms. 
10 Brailsford for the defense. 
We're here on a 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
Before we do that, just for the record, once I opened the 
file, I realized that I had had a prior professional 
relationship with Mr. Clark. I sent out a notice. We 
received no information that either party would like me to 
recuse myself. I just want to confirm for the record at 
this point in time that's correct because really it's 
speak now or forever hold your peace. 
1 
3 
THE COURT: Eric represented the parents of 
2 a decedent and I represented the driver in a motor vehicle 
3 collision in Gooding County, and we tried that case for 
4 ten days, I think, in Gooding. And so that we were 
5 roughly on the same side of the case. And so there were 
6 lots of depositions and things of that nature and, 
7 frankly, strategizing in that case. 
8 Subsequent to that time, Mr. Clark moved his 
9 office to the Treasure Valley area and we talked back and 
10 forth at various times about various cases and matters of 
11 that nature. And then at one point in time, he hired me 
12 to testify as a pharmacist in a -- turns out it was a 
13 legal malpractice case and it did result in actual trial 
14 testimony. Though it was a legal malpractice case, I only 
15 testified as to pharmacy-type issues. 
16 MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you for the 
17 explanation, Your Honor. We have no objection. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, I 
19 suppose what we ought to do is take up arguments on the 
20 
21 
motions to strike and motion to seal before we actually 
















So either party wants me to -- wants me to 
recuse myself, I would do so. If not, I'm ready to 
proceed. 22 
But 23 MS. BRAILSFORD: We don't, Your Honor. 
So let's address those first and I think 
probably the motions to strike and seal should come first 
I have had one repeat question and I wonder if I could 
inquire. What the meaning of a common professional 
relationship is? 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
1 So rather than the customary process, I 
2 think, Ms. Brailsford, I'll let you kind of argue those 
4 
3 two motions and Mr. Clark can kind of argue his motion for 
4 judicial notice. We'll just address those in a single 
5 back and forth and then go straight to the Motion to 
6 Dismiss. 
7 MS. BRAILSFORD: Certainly, Your Honor. I 
8 think once the court hears the Motion to Dismiss, it will 
9 become evident why the Motion to Strike and the motion to 
10 seal need to be granted because of the nature of the 
11 merits of the Motion to Dismiss and the facts that Mr. 
12 Clark has submitted into the record do not fairly relate 
13 to the Motion to Dismiss and are extraneous. 
14 The reason, Your Honor, for both the motion 
15 to strike and the motion to seal is that I'm appearing 
16 today on behalf of the law firm of Jones Gledhill, Mr. 
17 Fuhrman and Mr. Grant, who are all defendants. They're 
18 opposing the complaint in a Motion to Dismiss under 
19 12(6)(6). 
20 Rule 26 -- or I'm sorry. Rule 12(B)(6) 
21 provides, Your Honor, that if a motion -- if on motion 
22 asserting the defense number six to dismiss for failure of 
23 a pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
24 granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented to 
25 and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
24 and then maybe the motion for judicial notice second, I 
25 suppose. And then we can address the Motion to Dismiss. 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
5 
1 as one for summary judgement and disposed of as provided 
2 under Rule 56. 
3 Mr. Clark in opposition to the Rule 12(6)(6) 
4 motion has put numerous documents into the record that 
5 have absolutely no relationship to the question of whether 
6 he can assert an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill. 
7 Whether that is a claim that is afforded under Idaho law, 
8 which we submit is not and is contrary to Idaho law. But 
9 what we want to make clear in the record is that we --
10 that this is not a motion for summary judgement. The fact 
11 that Mr. Clark has submitted these numerous different 
12 records in -- or numerous different documents into the 
13 record, which include things such as attorney/client 
14 privileged communications between Mr. Clark, his former 
15 clients and the Spence Law Firm, letters related to his 
16 fee arrangement with the Spence Law Firm, different 
17 comments on the strategy and Mr. Clark's belief about the 
18 Anfinson defendants. 
19 And none of those from the perspective of 
20 the Jones Gledhill defendants, Your Honor, none of those 
21 documents address the Motion to Dismiss. They're 
22 extraneous and improper in the record and for that reason 
23 we request that the court strike them so that the record 
24 is clear that the court is not considering them under the 
25 Rule 12(B)(6) motion. And those documents would include 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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6 
1 the declaration of Eric Clark filed in opposition to the 
2 defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on May 4th 
3 of this year. Pages 2 through 5 of the plaintiff's 
4 memorandum filed in opposition to the defendant's Motion 
5 to Dismiss, which was also filed on May 4th. And then 
6 subsequently the declaration of Eric Clark filed in 
7 support of the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice, 
8 which was also filed -- was filed this year on May 9th. 
9 None of those documents, none of that 
10 commentary has any relationship to the question about 
11 whether Mr. Clark can assert an attorney's lien under the 
12 Idaho Code Section 3 - 205. It's completely extraneous. 
13 For that reason, it's proper for the court to exclude it 
14 under Rule 12(6)(6). 
15 There's an additional basis to strike it and 
16 that, Your Honor, is Rule 12(F), which provides the court 
17 discretion to strike any redundant, immaterial, 
18 impertinent or scandalous matters. We submit that all of 
19 the information that we've identified here that Mr. Clark 
20 has submitted is immaterial to the question before the 
21 court, which is purely a legal question, based upon both 
22 Jones Gledhill's argument as well as Mr. Clark's opposing 
23 argument on the 12(8)(6) motion. 
24 In addition, Your Honor, I appear on a 
25 limited capacity today on behalf of Mr. Clark's former 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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1 former clients settled against the Anfinson defendants. 
2 But the Forebush versus Sage Crest wrongful death case is 
3 currently before the Idaho Supreme Court. And there are 
4 two remaining defendants. In the event that appeal is 
5 successful, there will be a remand for trial. 
6 The former clients of Mr. Clark are very 
7 concerned about Mr. Clark's possession of confidential 
8 information that he has an obligation to maintain as 
9 confidential, and that information includes just simply 
10 information about their representation under the Idaho 
11 Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6(A). The attorney/client 
12 privilege under Idaho Rule of Evidence 502. And the Work 
13 Product Doctrine under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
14 26(6)(3). 
15 Of course, as a representative of the former 
16 clients in the currently pending Forebush versus Sage 
17 Crest action, Mr. Clark possesses information that is 
18 confidential and highly sensitive to the former clients 
19 and their right to ultimately recover against the 
20 remaining defendants. 
21 And in this case Mr. Clark, for reasons 
22 unknown to me and without explanation, has submitted a 
23 plethora of documents that contain privileged information, 
24 which are now in the record, could be discovered by the 
25 remaining active defendants in that case. And to prevent 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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1 clients; Travis Forebush, Gretchen Heimus and Brianna 
2 Holloway. 
3 Mr. Clark has filed a separate lawsuit down 
4 the hall in Judge Hippler's courtroom against those 
5 clients and also he's proposing an amendment to add the 
6 Spence Law Firm to that lawsuit. 
7 The former clients appear in this action, 
8 Your Honor, under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32, 
9 which allows any party to appear in any action to protect 
10 their confidential information from public disclosure. 
7 
11 The documents that the former clients seek 
12 to have sealed are identified specifically in pages five 
13 and six of their reply in support of the motion to seal 
14 information protected by the attorney/client privilege and 
15 the work product doctrine. 
16 The basis for the client's motion, Your 
17 Honor, is that Mr. Clark represented the former clients --
18 and I call them former clients because they were his 
19 former clients not because they're my former clients 
20 obviously. He represented the former clients in a 
21 wrongful death action called Forebush versus Sage Crest. 
22 Mr. Fuhrman and Mr. Graham of Jones Gledhill represented a 
23 defendant in that case. The one I mentioned earlier, 
24 Anfinson. 
25 The case remains pending. So ultimately the 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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1 that, the clients are appearing under the Idaho Court 
2 Administrative Rule 32 to ask the court to seal certain 
3 documents. 
4 Now, Your Honor, the Motion to Strike is 
5 general and relates to all documents that we've identified 
6 that don't bear on having a relationship to are immaterial 
7 to the Rule 12(6)(6). And the reason we have a motion to 
8 seal, which is different, is that, you know, I guess, 
9 frankly, I'm not sure how it work in the Clerk's Office. 
10 I think if there's a Motion to Strike, the records remain 
11 in the records such that they can be reviewed on appeal. 
12 And so then it requires the motion to seal to make sure 
13 that nobody can go into the Clerk's Office and review 
14 whatever remains in the record. 
15 Now, we're mindful of the court's obligation 
16 to give public access to records in a public proceeding, 
17 and for that reason we have tried to limit what the former 
18 clients are requesting be sealed such that it merely 
19 protects the confidential information about their legal 
20 representation, about their attorney/client communications 
21 and about work product related to their pending action. 
22 So the court will see when we identify in 
23 our briefing what is to be sealed and what is to be 
24 stricken. They're a little bit different for that reason. 
25 They're two reasons, Your Honor, that the 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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court has the ability to seal these records. One is under 
the Administrative Rule 3(G)(1). It very clearly states 
that the documents and records to which access is 
otherwise restricted by law are confidential and exempt 
from disclosure. 
6 So it's not even -- there is no obligation 
7 for anyone to show up and seal the records. The 
8 obligation is on behalf of the attorney who should know 
10 
9 that these documents are confidential and protected by law 
10 not to submit them in the record in the first instance. 
11 So they're perse protected from disclosure in the record. 
12 Second basis, Your Honor, is that Rule 30-21 
13 of the Administrative Rule provides that the court has 
14 discretion in certain instances to protect people's 
15 confidential information. And the two subparts that are 
16 applicable in this case, we believe, are 32(1)(5), which 
17 preserves the right to a fair trial. And 32(1)(3), which 
18 avoids economic or financial loss by the disclosure of 
19 confidential information. 
20 Again, there is a significant concern that 
21 opposing counsel in the pending action could get their 
22 hands on this information, glean from it easily Mr. 
23 Clark's insight into the case and use that against his 
24 former clients. 
25 You know, I hesitate to explain on the 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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1 On May 3rd we had a deposition in the other 
2 case; Mr. Clark's case against his former clients. Off 
3 the record in that deposition we discussed the concerns 
4 that we had about the disclosure of confidential 
5 privileged information in the record in that case. On the 
6 record we entered into a stipulation whereby Mr. Clark 
7 agreed that he would stipulate to a protective order to 
8 protect the information and reasonably acknowledged that 
9 since he is suing the clients for recovery in the case, if 
10 he jeopardizes that case, it in turn jeopardizes his 
11 interests. 
12 So we were comfortable at that point that we 
13 had an agreement and being mindful of the court's 
14 overburdened calendar, that we could resolve it outside 
15 the courtroom ourselves and come to an agreement. 
16 The very next day in this case Mr. Clark 
17 filed the plethora of records that contained his former 
18 client's confidential privileged information. In this 
19 case, Your Honor, it's particularly egregious because 
20 those communications at least in the other case were filed 
21 in a case where the parties were already privy to the 
22 information. The clients were privy to the information; 
23 Mr. Clark's privy information. Still in the public 
24 record, which is improper, but it was not a further 
25 disclosure. 








record the various ways which I think that that could 
unfold. I've worked with many clever counsel and many 
clever opposing counsel. I think there are ways that they 
can do that. There are issues that will undoubtedly be 
presented to the jury of a comparative fault nature, for 
6 example, if there's a remand. And Mr. Clark's view on the 
7 fault of defendants who have been dismissed from the 
8 action might be useful information, for example. 
9 So for that reason, the former clients 
10 request that the court seal the records and then for 
11 purposes of making sure the record is clear on the 
12 12(8)(6) motion, Your Honor, Jones Gledhill requests that 
13 the documents as identified be stricken from the record. 
14 And one more point, Your Honor, because I 
15 know that Mr. Clark is going to raise this and maybe it 
16 will reduce reply. And that he contends that we have --
17 that the former clients have waived any objection to the 
18 filing of their protected information in the record 
19 because he has filed the same confidential protected 
20 information in the other case. 
21 It's a little bit different, Your Honor, and 
22 it deals with the procedure before any lawsuits were 
23 filed. Mr. Clark was repeatedly warned by my firm that he 
24 was not authorized to disclose the client's confidential 
25 information. 
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1 In this case he has attempted to disclose it 
2 to Jones Gledhill and the Jones Gledhill defendants. I 
3 have not shared the information that has been filed 
4 against them with them, which they understand why because 
5 I have an obligation to protect the confidential 
6 information from disclosure. There's no reason for Jones 
7 Gledhill to know that. They've been very good sports 
8 about not demanding to see it and understanding why we're 
9 not preparing for it. But Mr. Clark's filing it in this 
10 case has, you know, compounded both the representation of 
11 the party that should be entitled to know what's filed 
12 against them as well as unlawfully disclosed his former 
13 client's privileged communications and unnecessarily. 
14 Again, I have -- there is no explanation for 
15 what he has done that I'm aware of. 
16 Currently in the other case we had been 
17 negotiating a protective order and Mr. Clark had not 
18 responded to my most recent communication. So I recently 
19 filed a motion to get that protective order entered. It's 
20 through that process that we hope to get the documents in 
21 that case sealed so that they cannot be reviewed by the 
22 public and in particular by anybody associated with the 
23 defendants who currently have a pending action against Mr. 
24 Clark's former clients. 
25 One more thing. Mr. Clark has asserted that 
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he has the right under Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.6(B)(S) to disclose this information. That provision 
says -- it's an exception to the general provision, which 
says as an attorney thou shalt not reveal any information 
about your client's representation without permission or 
consent of the clients. 
16 -- I'm sorry. 1.6(B)(S) is a limited 
exception, which provides a lawyer may reveal information 
relating to representation of a client to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim 
or a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the client and the lawyer. 
Several points on this. Although this rule 
might provide that he has the limited ability to share 
with the court certain privileged information in his other 
case, there's nothing in here that says that that 
information can -- that this rule trumps the Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule that says such things are perse 
confidential and should not be disclosed in the public 
record. You should still have an obligation to seal the 
documents. 
Second, this is certainly not a controversy 
between Mr. Clark and his client. This is a controversy 
between Mr. Clark and his opposing counsel in the former 
case, Jones Gledhill. So the rule is inapplicable. 
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1 filed in this case, which includes correspondence between 
2 his clients, correspondence between Spence and the 
3 clients, correspondence between Mr. Clark and Spence, is 
4 not something that is known within the jurisdiction. It's 
5 -- much of it is Mr. Clark's conjecture and is not 
6 reasonably susceptible to being determined as accurate. 
7 Further, Rule 201 is limited to adjudicated 
8 facts and adjudicated facts are those that are controlling 
9 or operative, not background facts, and that help the 
10 court apply the law of the party's dispute. So judicial 
11 notice, Your Honor, would be proper if, you know, the 
12 crime witness said: I can't remember what day I saw the 
13 car run the red light, but I remember I had been up early 
14 that morning to watch Neil Armstrong walk on the moon for 
15 the first time and watch Walter Cronkite report that. 
16 At which point the court can take judicial 
17 notice that the car ran the red light on July 20th, 1969. 
18 In this case though there's no such similar 
19 issue. The information that Mr. Clark has put into the 
20 record is entirely extraneous to the proceedings before 
21 this court. There is no basis to determine that they're 
22 accurate, that they're known in the jurisdiction or that 
23 they had any operative meaning in this case. 
24 Mr. Clark's submissions meet none of the 
25 required criteria, and for that reason it's entirely 
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1 And, finally, Your Honor, we do not see how 
2 Mr. Clark could reasonably believe that throwing all this 
3 information into the record in this case is reasonable in 
4 light of the issues before the court, which is purely 
5 interpretation of a statute. 
6 I'll move on to the judicial -- is that what 
7 you want me to do, Your Honor? Is move on to judicial 
8 notice now? 
9 THE COURT: Yes. Sure. 
10 MS. BRAILSFORD: It's Mr. Clark's motion, 
11 but I'll steal the thunder and go first. 
12 The opposition of Jones Gledhill to the 
13 motion for judicial notice, Your Honor, appears at page 
14 six through eight of the defendant's reply in support of 
15 the Motion to Strike. That was filed on May 27th. So we 
16 joined those briefs and I wanted to make sure that the 
17 court understood that that's where the supporting argument 
18 for opposition to the motion for judicial notice. 
19 Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a 
20 judicially noticed fact must be one -- must not be one 
21 subject to reasonable dispute. And that is because it is 
22 either generally known within the jurisdiction or capable 
23 of accurate and ready determination to resort by sources 
24 whose accuracies cannot be questioned. 
25 Certainly the information that Mr. Clark has 
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1 inappropriate to judicially notice papers file in another 
2 matter. 
3 Do you have any questions, Your Honor? 
4 THE COURT: Nope. 
5 MS. BRAILSFORD: All right. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Clark. 
7 MR. CLARK: Good morning, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Good morning. 
9 MR. CLARK: Your Honor, regarding the 12(B) 
10 motion or regarding the documents that we filed, I believe 
11 under a 12(B) motion the party is entitled to supplement 
12 the record with what it believes is relevant information 
13 even though the original party has not filed any 
14 extraneous information. That gives the judge the 
15 authority to decide whether the court is going to consider 
16 extraneous information or not. 
17 And that's what we did in this case. We 
18 provided the information that we believed was relevant to 
19 the facts and to give the court the proper background 
20 information related to the party's claims. And that's 
21 what we did. And the court is free to take that 
22 information and use it as it will with regard to the --
23 its decision on the 12(B)(6) motion. 
24 With regard to the motion to seal and 
25 strike. Again, the defendants finally got around to 
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specifically identifying what documents they thought were 
relevant in their reply brief; not in their opening brief. 
So we believed they've waived any comment to specifically 
identify the documents. And regardless, none of these 
documents -- the documents appeared in the other case and 
I'm entitled under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct to provide information to the court that I believe 
is pertinent to the defense of any claim against my 
clients. 
Ms. Brailsford talked a little bit about 
these proceedings with the protective order. She didn't 
mention that subsequent to the discussion on the 
protective order the defendants in the Clark versus 
Forebush case have filed a counterclaim and that I believe 
directly affects my entitlement to provide information in 
my defense. 
With regard to the issue of judicial notice; 
again there's -- the court can take judicial notice of 
documents filed in another case. The documents filed in 
the other case were not subject to any type of protective 
order. There was no move to strike those documents in the 
prior case. So I don't think there's any merit to the 
argument that they should be stricken by this court. 
Your Honor, really that's all I have with 
regard to the response to the Motion to Strike, the motion 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
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1 concerned about his wrongful disclosure of information, he 
2 filed more information. 
3 And with regard, Your Honor, to the 
4 counterclaim that is pending against Mr. Clark in Judge 
5 Hippler's courtroom; that has no bearing on this case. 
6 Mr. Clark has no justification for filing information in 
7 the record in this case because there is a counterclaim 
8 against him in another case. 
9 So with regard to the Motion to Dismiss, 
10 Your Honor, it turns on and only needs to turn on and can 
11 only turn on the basic facts. And those facts are Mr. 
12 Clark represented the former clients in Forebush versus 
13 Sage Crest. Jones Gledhill represented a defendant, the 
14 Anfinson Plumbing and an employee. Mr. Clark co-counseled 
15 with the Spence Law Firm. Mr. Clark's representation was 
16 terminated. Mr. Clark notified Jones Gledhill that he was 
17 asserting an attorney's lien under Idaho Code Section 3 -
18 205. The former clients eventually settled with Anfinson. 
19 Anfinson's insurance carrier issued a check to the Spence 
20 Law Firm, sent it to Jones Gledhill, who in turn forwarded 
21 it on to the Spence Law Firm. Mr. Clark hasn't accepted 
22 funds from the Spence Law Firm for his payments for 
23 reasons that are -- I can't disclose but are unrelated to 
24 the motion. And now Mr. Clark has sued Jones Gledhill and 
25 Mr. Fuhrman and Mr. Graham for failure to protect his 
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1 to seal. I think the court has discretion in granting 
2 either one and I just -- I'll rely on the court's 
3 discretion to do that. 
4 THE COURT: All right. If that's all you 
5 have, let's hear the 12(6)(6) arguments. 
6 MS. BRAILSFORD: Your Honor, briefly on 
7 reply, if I may. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 
9 MS. BRAILSFORD: Mr. Clark has argued that 
10 we have waived our right to a Motion to Strike and motion 
11 to seal because we failed to identify in our opening 
12 briefs. The documents that we sought to have stricken and 
13 sealed, in fact, both in the motion, not the -- in both 
14 motions and the brief those are identified. 
15 So the motion filed on May 6th identifies 
16 the information the clients seek to have sealed. The 
17 Motion to Strike filed on May 6th likewise identifies the 
18 information Jones Gledhill seeks to have stricken. In 
19 response to those motions Mr. Clark filed yet more 
20 confidential information in the record. And so for that 
21 reason on reply we have a complete list of everything that 
22 we seek to have sealed and stricken. 
23 The reason that some of that information is 
24 not identified in the motions is because Mr. Clark in 
25 response to the motions where his former clients are 
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1 interests in his client's recovery against the opposing 
2 party represented by Jones Gledhill. 
3 The nature of Mr. Clark's claim is that he 
4 has an attorney's lien, according to him, on his former 
5 client's recovery against Anfinson. That that lien 
6 attached to the settlement funds in Jones Gledhill's hands 
7 and that Jones Gledhill owed Mr. Clark a duty to include 
8 his name as a payee on the check. 
9 Your Honor, no such claim exists under Idaho 
10 law. And, in fact, Mr. Clark's claim is contrary to Idaho 
11 law. Idaho's law is clear that there are five 
12 requirements to an attorney's lien. Those are set forth 
13 in Skelton versus Skelton, 102 Idaho 69. And Mr. Clark's 
14 attorney's lien does not meet any of those provisions. 
15 But more directly, Your Honor, the case law 
16 provides that an attorney cannot have an attorney's lien 
17 against his opponent or his opposing counsel. In Re: 
18 Goldberg. 235 BR 476, which is an Idaho bankruptcy case, 
19 it says it most plainly, Your Honor. The plain language 
20 of Idaho Code 3 - 205 allows only for a lien in favor of a 
21 lawyer against that lawyer's own client. 
22 "There is nothing in Section 3 - 205 or case 
23 law that authorizes an attorney's lien in favor of any 
24 opponent's lawyer." That's a direct quote, Your Honor, at 
25 page 484. 
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Goldberg relies on Frasey and Frasey is 
equally clear. It provides -- and this is a quote -- "an 
attorney lien cannot be levied against the property of the 
opposing party who is a total stranger to the contract 
under which the attorney claims money." In this case Mr. 
Fuhrman, Mr. Graham, Jones Gledhill, a total stranger to 
Mr. Clark's claim for attorney's fees against his clients 
under either a relationship or a contract with those 
clients. 
Jones Gledhill expressly warned Mr. Clark 
that he did not have a claim before he filed a lawsuit 
against them. Indeed in that warning they cited Frasey 
and Goldberg to him. Nonetheless, Mr. Clark filed his 
lawsuit anyway. On reply to the -- or in response to the 
motion, Mr. Clark attempts to distinguish Goldberg and 
Frasey on the basis there is a settlement fund in this 
case. 
To the contrary, Your Honor. There was no 
fund in Jones Gledhill's hands. The funds that Mr. Clark 
seeks we know to be and he knows to be in the Spence Law 
Firm's trust account. Still today. Jones Gledhill never 
had control over the actual settlement fund. In fact, Mr. 
Clark's allegations at paragraph 21 of the complaint admit 
this. He says Anfinson Plumbing and Bakken -- that's the 
Anfinson employee -- sent a check to Spence. Even his own 
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1 ability to oppose Mr. Clark's claim to the fees. 
2 It doesn't know what the fee arrangement was 
3 between Spence and the former clients and Mr. Clark. It 
4 doesn't know what work they claim he did and didn't do. 
5 It doesn't know what concerns they have about payment. 
6 It's completely in the dark. There's no way that Jones 
7 Gledhill can come in and litigate whether or not the fee 
8 that Mr. Clark contends he's owed is reasonable. 
9 These failures, Your Honor, are not overcome 
10 by Mr. Clark's only other argument. In that he claims 
11 he's entitled to recover on his lien against anyone who 
12 came into contact with the settlement proceeds. He bases 
13 that upon the statutory language that says that the lien 
14 attaches to proceeds in whosoever's hands the proceeds may 
15 come. But proceeds has to mean the actual money; 
16 certainly can't mean a negotiable instrument. Jones 
17 Gledhill had no ability to pencil in Eric Clark's name on 
18 Anfinson's insurance carrier's check to the Spence Law 
19 Firm. It's probably illegal to do that. I don't know. 
20 As a practical matter, Mr. Clark's 
21 interpretation of the statute makes innumerable strangers 
22 to his right to the fee potentially liable for those fees 
23 just in this case alone. Who handled the proceeds in the 
24 case? Well, if you assume, which I think is an incorrect 
25 assumption, that the proceeds means the negotiable 





allegations don't say the funds came from Jones Gledhill, 
which they did not. 
In fact, what happened is the Anfinson 
23 
4 insurance carrier writes a check to the Spence Law Firm, 
5 mails it to Jones Gledhill, who in turn mails it on to 
6 Spence. At no time did Jones Gledhill have possession of 
7 any actual proceeds or funds. It simply conveyed a 
8 negotiable instrument that gave somebody, Spence Law Firm, 
9 the right to access the funds. 
10 In short, Your Honor, the plain language of 
11 the statute is very clear. The attorney who appears for a 
12 party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or 
13 counterclaim. His client's. Under the case law Mr. Clark 
14 can't enforce a lien against Jones Gledhill because the 
15 statute does not authorize a lien against his opponent, is 
16 not adjudicated the reasonableness of the fees, and Jones 
17 Gledhill never controlled the funds. 
18 Now, there is a suggestion, Your Honor, in 
19 the Frasey case that there might be an attorney's lien in 
20 a non fund situation. A situation where the party doesn't 
21 actually have possession of the funds, but that's only 
22 where the lien is adjudicated. It violates the due 
23 process of Mr. Clark's clients and the Spence Law Firm to 
24 have this court enter an order that there is an attorney's 
25 lien against Jones Gledhill when Jones Gledhill has no 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
25 
1 instrument, well, you know, Jones Gledhill had it. Did 
2 Mr. Fuhrman handle it? I don't know. I don't think 
3 there's any direct proof that he handled it. Did Mr 
4 Graham handle it? Well, maybe. Somebody must have. Did 
5 the insurance carrier's financial institution handle it? 
6 Absolutely. They had the proceeds. Did the insurance 
7 carrier handle it? Yes. Did the mail carrier handle it 
8 when they delivered the check? 
9 It is a literal reading of: "In whosoever's 
10 hands the proceeds may come" are liable for the attorney's 
11 lien. That's a Pandora's box every time there's an 
12 attorney's fee dispute that anybody who is a stranger and 
13 completely unrelated and has no idea what's going on 
14 suddenly gets notice of a lien and sued by Mr. Clark. 
15 There's no end to that interpretation. 
16 Jones Gledhill did not have the obligation, 
17 Your Honor, to protect Mr. Clark's interests in his 
18 client's recovery. Jones Gledhill had the obligation to 
19 finalize a settlement, to obtain a stipulation for 
20 dismissal and to make sure that the court was apprised 
21 that the parties had settled and could vacate the trial. 
22 If Jones Gledhill were to put Mr. Clark's --
23 if it could have, which it couldn't have -- but if it were 
24 to have put Mr. Clark's name on the check, then 
25 potentially it would interfere with its own client's 
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1 interest to conclude the case. Jones Gledhill acted on 
2 behalf of its client's best interests, not Mr. Clark's, as 
3 the case should be. 
4 Now, for that reason, Your Honor, because 
5 Jones Gledhill was acting on behalf of its client's 
6 interests in a litigation, it is immune for its conduct 
7 under the litigation privilege, which is also set forth in 
8 our brief. The litigation privilege provides that it 
9 protects attorneys against civil actions by their client's 
10 adversary against civil action, which arises as a result 
11 of their conduct and communications in the representation 
12 of a client related to a judicial proceeding. 
13 Mr. Clark contends that this privilege 
14 contradicts the attorney's lien statute. Well, it only 
15 contradicts Mr. Clark's misinterpretation of the 
16 attorney's lien statute. In fact, the attorney's lien 
17 statute says you can't have a lien against your opponent. 
18 The litigation privilege says you can't sue your opponent 
19 to recover your fees against your client. 
20 So under Idaho law, they dovetailed. 
21 They're very consistent. It's Mr. Clark's reading of them 
22 which is inconsistent. 
23 So if the court has any questions, I'm happy 
24 to answer them. otherwise, we request an entire dismissal 
25 of Mr. Clark's complaint. It's an amended complaint 
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1 THE COURT: We did ultimately find it in 
2 Exhibit Five. I assume that's the same thing. 
3 MR. CLARK: I believe it is, Your Honor. I 
4 apologize to the court. 
5 Case then settled in January for a million 
6 dollars. We had some following E-mails between Jones 
7 Gledhill and myself. We disagreed on the law. And so 
28 
8 once I determined that the funds had actually been paid to 
9 my friend at the Spence firm, I served -- I filed the 
10 claim and I think Ms. Brailsford suggested that the Spence 
11 Law Firm offered me the funds. Well, that's simply not 
12 true. We wouldn't be here if we had reached a settlement 
13 with the Spence firm. 
14 We believe -- we agree with counsel that 
15 this is a statutory interpretation case. I also disagree 
16 with counsel that there's any case law on point regarding 
17 the facts of this case. With regard to 32-05, we believe 
18 the language from commencement of an action -- and I'm 
19 paraphrasing -- the attorney who appears for a party has a 
20 
21 
lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, 
which attaches to the verdict report and decision or 
22 judgment in the client's favor and proceeds thereof in 
23 whosoever's hands they may come. 
24 Well, if the client has a cause of action 
25 and the client is being compensated based on that cause of 
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1 actually against Jones Gledhill, Mr. Fuhrman and Mr. 
2 Graham. 
3 THE COURT: I'm good. Thank you. Mr. 
4 Clark. 
5 MR. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor. I heard 
6 counsel discuss a lot of facts that I don't believe are 
7 actually in the record. So I hope you can sort through 
8 those. 
9 We provided a notice of lien as declaration 
10 Exhibit Number Five, which is the letter I sent to counsel 
11 asserting my lien. 
12 THE COURT: That brings up my first 
13 question. The first place I looked for was Exhibit A of 
14 the amended complaint. I couldn't find it, 
15 MR. CLARK: It --
16 THE COURT: Or Exhibit One. 
17 MR. CLARK: My copy of the amended complaint 
18 has the exhibit. 
19 THE COURT: The original --
20 MR. CLARK: Maybe it doesn't. 
21 THE COURT: -- does not. 
22 MR. CLARK: Well, it's Exhibit One of the 
23 original complaint and Exhibit Five of my declaration. If 
24 it wasn't included on the amended complaint, I apologize 
25 to the court. 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
1 action, that's exactly what is happening here. We're 
2 Bening the client's cause of action from -- in the 
3 possession of co-counsel or opposing counsel. 
4 Your Honor, we cited to the Skelton versus 
5 Spencer (sic) case where the court has said: "The intent 
6 of the law on this point is to allow an attorney an 
7 interest in the fruits of his skill and labor." That's 
8 Skelton versus Skelton, 102 Idaho at 77. 
9 Now think about the operation of the lien. 
10 How effective is a lien if it doesn't apply until the 
11 client gets the money? The money is then gone. There's 
12 no protection. There is no protection of the interests of 
13 the attorney if there's a ruling that the lien doesn't 
14 arise until the client gets the funds. That's simply 
15 ridiculous. That undermines the entire intent of the lien 
16 statute. That's our basis. 
17 The section interprets it defeats the very 
18 purpose of the lien and it's the court's duty when -- to 
19 determine the intent of the legislature when looking at 
20 the particular statute. 
29 
21 Now, there are some argument that we never 
22 touched the check. So, therefore, Jones Gledhill doesn't 
23 have any liability. Well, that's somewhat ridiculous 
24 considering the relationship of Jones Gledhill to the 
25 funds and to their client. 
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Now, based on that argument it appears that 
2 there are additional parties that should be joined in the 
3 case including possibly insurance company and possibly 
4 Anfinson Plumbing themselves. And apparently if there is, 
5 the litigation privilege -- litigation privilege does 
6 apply, then we should be allowed to amend our pleadings to 
7 add the parties that should be -- apparently based on 
8 counsel's argument -- should be in the case. 
9 Your Honor, unless you have some questions, 
10 that's all I have. We'll defer our arguments in our 
11 brief. 
12 THE COURT: No. I don't, but I do think 
13 that the plaintiff does get the final word. 
14 MS. BRAILSFORD: Thanks, Your Honor. Oh, 
15 I'm sorry. The defense? 
16 THE COURT: Or defendant. 
17 MS. BRAILSFORD: I took the opportunity even 
18 though you misstated it. Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: The movant. 
20 MS. BRAILSFORD: I'll be quick. I hope the 
21 court understands and I think it does that my argument is 
22 not that Anfinson Plumbing and the insurance company 
23 should be added to this case. They had no notice of the 
24 lien and my argument was the ridiculousness of the 
25 interpretation of the statute such that in whosoever's 
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1 and the way the possessory lien is enforced is when the 
2 attorney has the funds in his possession, then he can make 





In this situation Mr. Clark could not have a 
possessory lien because at the time the case was settled, 
he was no longer representing the parties. 
So it really boils down to the effect and 
8 consequences of the statute, Idaho Code Section 3 - 205. 
9 And, quite frankly, I've always understood that for an 
10 
11 
attorney's lien to be effective, it had to be perfected. 
It had to meet the requirements set forth in Skelton. And 
12 that it had to be -- that the attorney asserting the 
13 charging lien had to take affirmative action to reduce the 
14 lien to a judgment or order of the court. 
15 My basic understanding in all of that is 
16 that in order to be perfected, that the client in this 
17 circumstance would have the due process and fair 
18 opportunity to contest the nature and extent of the amount 
19 claimed owed, etcetera. So that the lien would either be 
20 -- or the amount owed in this case would either be 
21 resolved by stipulation and consent or by some 
22 adjudicatory process. Neither of those occurred in this 
23 case. 
24 What we have at best is a letter from -- or 
25 an E-mail from Mr. Clark essentially saying: I'm 
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK 
SRL-1044 
31 
1 hand the proceeds may come can suddenly be a defendant, 
2 and I think it's precisely the suggestion that Mr. Clark 
3 -- that he would add them as, you know, the kind 
4 of judicial injustice that should be avoided by 
5 interpreting the statute to -- limited to the case law as 
6 it has now, which is that you have an attorney's lien 
7 against your client. 
8 Now, it is not Jones Gledhill's obligation 
9 to protect Mr. Clark's interests in his recovery against 
10 his clients. The attorney's lien statute is not intended, 
11 Your Honor, to provide a surefire payment for the 
12 plaintiff's counsel or the defense counsel who has a 
13 dispute with their former client. It is to provide them 
14 some security as against a -- vis-a-vis their client. 
15 Similar to a hospital lien provides the hospital. 
16 So with that said, Your Honor, I have 
17 nothing further other than we request that the court grant 
18 the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion to Strike and the Motion 
19 to Seal and deny the Motion For Judicial Notice. 
20 Unless you've got any further questions, 




THE COURT: No. I think I'm good. 
MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, there's two kinds of 
25 attorney lien. The possessory lien and the charging lien, 
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1 asserting a lien or intending to assert a lien. But I 
2 don't think that he ever actually had a lien and I don't 
3 think that the lien that he claimed had ever been 
4 perfected. 
5 As a consequence, I don't think that the law 
6 firm owed him any duty because I don't think that he had a 
7 valid and perfected lien at that point in time. 
8 The facts in 12(8)(6) fundamentally mean 
9 that I assume essentially that whatever was alleged in the 
10 complaint is true. And, therefore, we have the facts laid 
11 out in the complaint, which is why Exhibit One was 
12 critical to the analysis, which as mentioned was not 
13 attached to the original. And I first started looking for 
14 it because I had a copy from my staff attorney to review 
15 all of this and it wasn't with my copy. So the first 
16 place I went was to the file and it wasn't in the file and 
17 so we dug around and eventually found it at item six. But 
18 taking everything in the amended complaint as true, I 
19 don't believe that plaintiff has essentially alleged a 
20 cause of action under the law and, therefore, the case 
21 would be dismissed under Rule 12(8)(6). 
22 As to the other material provided, I agree 
23 that it's immaterial and extraneous to what I needed to 
24 make a decision in this case and those materials as 
25 indicated will be stricken from the record. And given the 
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1 motion to seal, the court will grant that motion to seal 
2 as well. 
3 We're going to prepare a written order that 
4 outlines all of that because I have to make the necessary 
5 findings under the Idaho Administrative Rules and such. 
6 So we'll get all of that done, but I have looked at all of 
7 that and I think fundamentally that is and should be the 
8 final result in this case. 
9 So we'll get a written decision out here in 
1 O the next week or so, and the case will be dismissed at 
11 that time. 
All right. Court is adjourned. 





MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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Date I Staff I Billed I Rate Gross Description 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Communicate with Clark regarding acceptance of 
3/10/2016 AKB 1.8 $ 250.00 $ 450.00 service; conferences with clients; begin analyzing 
issues related to motion to dismiss. 
3/14/2016 SBA 1.3 $ 250.00 $ 325.00 Review complaint and related materials. 
Review complaint; conduct initial research related to 
3/14/2016 AKB 4 $ 250.00 $ 1,000.00 lien statute; analyze and outline motion to dismiss 
arguments; prepare for meeting with clients. 
3/14/2016 RAM 0.3 $ 205.00 $ 61.50 
Analyze legal and factual bases for motion to dismiss 
complaint. 
3/15/2016 SBA 1 $250.00 $ 250.00 Meeting with clients. 
3/15/2016 AKB 1 $ 250.00 $ 250.00 Meeting with clients. 
3/22/2016 AKB 0.5 $250.00 $ 125.00 Review amended complaint. 
3/22/2016 RAM 0.5 $ 205.00 $ 102.50 Review amended complaint. 
3/23/2016 RAM 3.3 $ 205.00 $ 676.50 
Conduct legal research in support of motion to 
dismiss. 
Conduct additional legal research in support of 
3/24/2016 RAM 4.7 $ 205.00 $ 963.50 motion to dismiss; draft introduction and background 
sections of motion to dismiss. 
3/25/2016 RAM 2 $ 205.00 $ 410.00 Begin drafting argument section of motion to dismiss. 
3/28/2016 SBA 0.7 $ 250.00 $ 175.00 
Review and revise motion to dismiss; meeting with 
clients. 
Legal research in support of motion to dismiss 
3/28/2016 RAM 6.8 $ 205.00 $ 1,394.00 
regarding duty of attorneys to non-clients; continue 
drafting motion to dismiss, including argument on 
attorney's lien and negligence claims. 
3/30/2016 RAM 1 $ 205.00 $ 205.00 Revise memorandum in support of motion to dismiss. 
Communicate with client regarding motion to 
3/30/2016 AKB 1.9 $ 250.00 $ 475.00 dismiss; review and revise draft memorandum in 
support of motion to dismiss. 
EXHIBITC 
000149
Date I Staff I Billed I Rate Gross Description 
4/1/2016 RAM 0.2 $ 205.00 $ 41.00 Revise memorandum in support of motion to dismiss. 
4/4/2016 RAM 0.4 $ 205.00 $ 82.00 
Assist in filing motion to dismiss and supporting 
memorandum. 
Review and revise draft brief in support of motion to 
4/4/2016 AKB 2.8 $ 250.00 $ 700.00 dismiss; schedule hearing; draft notice of hearing; 
draft motion to dismiss. 
Review notice of intent to seek default; communicate 
4/7/2016 AKB 0.9 $ 250.00 $ 225.00 with opposing counsel regarding same; draft 
stipulation to consent to service by email. 
Review Clark's opposition to motion to dismiss; 
outline arguments; review declaration and 
attachments; communicate with clients; communicate 
5/4/2016 AKB 6.6 $ 250.00 $ 1,650.00 with Clark regarding disclosure of attorney-client, 
work product, confidential information in record; 
research authorities regarding motion to strike; begin 
drafting moton to strike. 
Research motion to strike under Rule 12(:f); draft 
declaration supporting motion to strike; draft motion 
5/5/2016 AKB 7.5 $ 250.00 $ 1,875.00 
for order shortening time to hear motion to strike; 
continue drafting motion to strike extraneous 
materials; review response to motion to dismiss and 
outline reply. 
5/6/2016 AKB 8 $ 250.00 $ 2,000.00 
Draft reply brief; schedule hearing; draft notice of 
hearing; finalize documents for filing. 
Draft email to court staff regarding schedule of 
5/9/2016 AKB 0.7 $ 250.00 $ 175.00 various motions and scheduling conference; review 
settlement demand; communicate with client. 
5/10/2016 AKB 0.4 $ 250.00 $ 100.00 
Communicate with Court's staff hearing date; 
communicate with Clark regarding same. 
Communicate with Court regarding hearing for 
motions; review notice of hearing; review Clark's 
5/11/2016 AKB 3.6 $ 250.00 $ 900.00 brief in opposition to motion to dismiss; review 
Clark's reply to motion to strike and seal record; 
review Clark's declaration for judicial notice; review 
EXHIBITC 
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Date I Staff I Billed I Rate Gross Description 
Clark's first and second declarations in opposition to 
motion to dismiss and outline source of attachments. 
Review Clark's declarations and motion for judicial 
notice; research and read authorities regarding Rule 
5/26/2016 AKB 7.5 $ 250.00 $ 1,875.00 
12(b)(6) and Rule 12(f); research and read Rule 201 
and related authorities regarding judicial notice; begin 
draft of motion to strike declarations; begin draft of 
opposition to motion for judicial notice. 
Drafting reply in support of motion to strike; continue 
5/27/2016 AKB 10 $ 250.00 $ 2,500.00 drafting opposition to motion for judicial notice; 
proof and finalize flings. 
Review notice :from court regarding possible basis to 
disqualify court because of prior "common 
6/2/2016 AKB 7.4 $ 250.00 $ 1,850.00 
professional relationship" with Clark; communicate 
repeatedly with clients; prepare for oral argument on 
motion to dismiss complaint; prepare for oral 
argument on motion to strike filings. 
6/3/2016 AKB 2.6 $ 250.00 $ 650.00 
Meeting with client; attend hearing and argue 
motions; communicate with clients. 
Review motion for reconsideration of Court's 
(anticipated) judgment dismissing complaint; review 
6/10/2016 AKB 1.7 $ 250.00 $ 425.00 motion to amend and supporting briefing seeking to 
add Anfinson and its insurance carrier as defendants; 
communicate with clients. 
6/14/2016 AKB 0.8 $ 250.00 $ 200.00 Meeting with clients. 
6/15/2016 AKB 0.6 $ 250.00 $ 150.00 
Briefly research and read authorities governing 
deadline for memorandum of fees and costs. 
Review notice of hearing and calendar; communicate 
6/20/2016 AKB 0.7 $ 250.00 $ 175.00 with client regarding hearing. 
EXHIBITC 
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Date I Staff I Billed I Rate Gross Description 
6/24/2016 zsz 0.7 $ 205.00 · $ 143.50 Review Clark's motion to amend and motion for 
reconsideration. 
Review order granting motion to dismiss; review 
6/28/2016 AKB 2.3 $ 250.00 $ 575.00 order denying motion for reconsideration; 
communicate with clients. 
Arrange for transcription of hearing for purposes of 
6/29/2016 AKB 0.3 $ 250.00 $ 75.00 
obtaining fees and costs related to Clark's 
misrepresentation of argument as basis for motion to 
amend. 
6/30/2016 zsz 2 $ 205.00 $ 410.00 Research various bases for fees and costs. 
Review memorandum decision; review denial of 
7/1/2016 AKB 3 $250.00 $ 750.00 
motion for reconsideration and amendment; 
communicate with client; briefly research basis for 
obtaining fees and costs. 
Review case history and hearing transcript; continue 
7/5/2016 zsz 2.4 $ 205.00 $ 492.00 researching legal bases relating to memorandum in 
support of motion for fees and costs; review court 
orders on motions. 
7/6/2016 zsz 0.5 $ 205.00 $ 102.50 Review newly promulgated Rule 54 requirements 
concerning judgments; draft proposed judgment. 
Review article by Justice Eismann on preparing final 
7/7/2016 AKB 1 $250.00 $ 250.00 judgments; review and revise final judgment; email 
proposed final judgment to Clark 
7/8/2016 AKB 1 $250.00 $ 250.00 Conference with clients. 
7/11/2016 zsz 3 $ 205.00 $ 615.00 Research and analyze case law related to award of attorney's fees. 
Further research into bases for award for fees and 
7/12/2016 zsz 4.9 $ 205.00 $ 1,004.50 costs, specifically concerning commercial transactions; begin outlining memorandum in support 
of motion for fees and costs. 
7/19/2016 zsz 2.1 $ 205.00 $ 430.50 Legal research relating to motion for fees and costs 
and continue drafting of same. 
EXHIBITC 
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Date I Staff I Billed I Rate Gross Description 
7/20/2016 zsz 5.8 $ 205.00 $ 1,189.00 Continue drafting memorandum in support of motion 
for fees and costs. 
7/21/2016 zsz 4.7 $ 205.00 $ 963.50 Continue drafting memorandum in support of fees 
and costs. 
7/24/2016 zsz 2.9 $ 205.00 $ 594.50 Continue drafting memorandum in support of motion 
for fees and costs. 
7/25/2016 AKB 0.5 $250.00 $ 125.00 Communicate with clients. 
7/25/2016 zsz 3.7 $ 205.00 $ 758.50 Draft memorandum in support of motion for fees and 
costs. 
7/26/2016 zsz 3.5 $ 205.00 $ 717.50 Draft memorandum in support of motion for fees and 
costs. 
7/27/2016 AKB 3.7 $250.00 $ 925.00 Review and revise draft brief for fees and costs. 
7/27/2016 zsz 1.3 $ 205.00 $ 266.50 Revise memorandum in support of fees and costs. 
Review billings; begin preparing exhibit showing fees 
7/28/2016 AKB 3.6 $250.00 $ 900.00 and costs incurred; begin drafting affidavit in support 
of memorandum for fees and costs. 
7/28/2016 zsz 3.3 $ 205.00 $ 676.50 Final revisions to memorandum in support of fees and 
costs. 
Review exhibits and affidavit of A.Brailsford in 
8/1/2016 zsz .8 $ 205.00 · $ 164.00 support of motion for fees and costs in light of Rule 
54 requirements. 
8/2/2016 zsz .5 $ 205.00 $ 102.50 Final preparation of exhibits and memorandum in 
support of fees and costs. 
Final review of and revisions to memorandum in 





















COSTS $ 571.09 
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Steven Andersen has represented both plaintiffs and defendants as trial counsel in over 100 jury trials throughout 
Idaho, the lntermountain West, West Coast and Pacific Northwest regions. He is a recognized expert in products 
liability, professional liability, business tort, insurance claims, governmental liability and agriculture. 
Steven has represented clients at trial in partnership dissolutions, prosecution and defense of patent infringement 
claims, product defect cases, royalty disputes, professional liability, insurance bad faith, and engineering and 
construction disputes. 
Steven is admitted to practice before all state and federal courts for Idaho, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
Federal Circuit. 
He has extensive experience in contingent and alternative fee arrangements, general commercial litigation and 
intellectual property litigation (see below). 
Contingent and Alternative Fee Arrangements 
Steven maintains a practice for carefully selected and deserving plaintiffs who have complex products liability claims 
(such as tire failures, seat belt design and food contamination), premises liability (such as road design, Dram Shop and 
unsafe public areas), medical devices, aircraft defects, medical negligence, lender liability, federal tort claims, insurance 
bad faith and business torts. 
In 2011 and 2013, Steven was named Plaintiffs' Lawyer of the Year (!about/top-honors) for the state of Idaho by Best 
Lawyers in America. · 
Steven obtained Idaho's largest affirmed personal injury verdict of $7.8 million and a $56 million verdict for a defective 
agricultural fungicide. He recently achieved a $17.8 million verdict for four plaintiffs in a multi-party products liability 
claim. Over his career, he has obtained dozens of verdicts and settlements in excess of $1 million with total verdicts and 
settlements for plaintiffs of approximately $256 million. 
In addition, Steven has extensive experience representing institutional clients, individuals and industries on an 
alternative-fee basis, which includes fixed fees, mixed fees that blend contingent and hourly components, fee 
arrangements with lower rates, and benchmark payments and incentives. 
General Commercial Litigation 
Steven represents companies and industries in a variety of complex commercial disputes. Typically, he represents 
defendants in claims such as lender liability defenses, aviation manufacturing defect defenses, product defenses, 
royalty claims and trade secret appropriation defenses. Steven tried to successfully verdict the only Idaho case involving 
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, obtaining complete injunctive relief against expropriation of computer 
information. He has also successfully defended local banks in claims involving breach of contract, failure to lend and 
other alleged improper bank conduct. In a recent commercial dispute, he obtained a $10.1 million settlement on a 
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Additionally, Steven has represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust claims, including claims involving patent 
misuse and horizontal and vertical tying, as well as price-fixing cases. 
Intellectual Property Litigation 
Steven has acted as lead trial counsel in various forms of intellectual property litigation, including trial to successful 
verdicts in cases involving claims of disputed inventorship and defense of patent infringement claims. He has also led 
the prosecution of patent infringement, including jury trials for willful infringement, defense of trade dress claims, 
Lanham Act violations, antitrust and patent misuse issues, trade secret violations, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
claims. 
Steven has obtained jury verdicts invalidating otherwise infringed claims of patents in suit, proven willful infringement 
and induced infringement of certain patents in suit, and verdicts dismissing all claims for royalties under otherwise 
infringed claims of patents in suit. He has also obtained verdicts defeating claims of inequitable conduct and recently 
successfully defeated a $24 million royalty and treble damage claim for patent infringement. 
At trial, Steven has never lost an intellectual property case. His cases have covered a wide range of products, devices 
and methods such as technology for a potato sprout inhibition, sonar devices, bioassay devices, smoke protection 
devices, software infringement, identity theft, Wi-Fi design and installation, and radar detector. 
Aside from his legal experience, Steven has a mechanical and technical background as a plumbing tradesman. 
Representative Work 
Plaintiff Cases 
Lead trial counsel for international farm conglomerate who alleged crop and soil damage from a recalled fungicide. 
Achieved a $56 million jury verdict. 
Lead trial counsel for Idaho potato and beet growers who alleged crop and property damage from herbicide drift. 
Achieved a $17.8 million jury verdict. The trial was the longest jury trial in Idaho history and the verdict covered only 
four plaintiffs. Their verdict set the precedent for over 100 other claims, all of which were successfully settled post trial. 
Lead trial counsel for an injured driver who alleged flawed road failure. Achieved a $7.5 million court verdict under the 
federal Tort Claims Act, which was affirmed on appeal. 
Lead trial counsel for multiple injured parties due to unsafe public event. Achieved liability verdict in bifurcated cases 
that allowed settlement of multiple party claims against multiple defendants determined by the jury to be liable. 
Lead trial counsel for Dram Shop case alleging overselling of alcohol and resultant multiple wrongful death claim. 
Achieved multi-million dollar jury verdict and punitive damages awarded. 
Lead trial counsel on wrongful death claim involving unique mishandling of heavy equipment. Achieved $2.4 million 
outcome. 
Professional Activities 
" Past President, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association 
• Past President, Idaho Chapter of American Inns of Court 
• Member, American Bar Association, Litigation and Business Section 
• Member, American Association for Justice 
• Lawyer Representative to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2007-201 0 
• Martindale Hubble "AV Preeminent" rating 
Publications/Speaking Engagements 
Steven has lectured statewide on topics of trial preparation and advocacy. He has published materials and articles on 
legal ethics, discovery techniques, and trials. 
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Representative Samples: • SW BIA'"'"''' !,. ~ \A.tlfl,...•N i, -, ,1 ).Jill JtoA r.ron,. H~ to P~epare for, Take, and Use a Deposition Uames Publishing, 2nd Ed.) 
The Realities of Expert Witness Reports (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of Idaho, 2009 
Voir Dire-New Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of 
Idaho, 2010 
The Electronic Medium- Effective Evidence Presentation (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of 
Idaho 
Success in the Courtroom-Tri-State Federal Bar Conference, 2012 
Over Aggression- The Ethical and Legal Implications (published materials) - Idaho Law Foundation 
Honors and Aw ards 
• Named in Nationa l Trial Lawyers Top 100 Tria l Lawyers 
• Named in The Best Lawyers in America, 2003-2016 
• Named in Best Lawyers Lawyer of the Year 2011, Personal Injury Litigation - Boise 
• Named in Best Lawyers Lawyer of the Year 2013, Personal Injury Litigation - Plaintiffs Boise 
• Named in Mountain States Super Lawyers, 2007-2016 
• Named in Benchmark for Litigation, 2013-2015 
• Named in Chambers USA for Business for General Commercia l Litigation, 2006-2015 
• AV Preeminent Martindale Hubbell rating 
• Played a B-3 organ in a 70's rock band 
• Favorite place in the world is Salzkommergut 
• Repeatedly recognized as one of The Best Lawyers in America 
EDUCATION 
Brigham Young University, B.A., summa cum laude, 1977 
Brigham Young University, J.D., with honors, 1980 
ADMISSIONS 
United States District Court of Idaho 
Idaho Supreme Court 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
JLl 
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For many years, Amanda has successfully represented clients in complex civil litigation in both federal and state courts. 
Her representation has included extremely complicated cases involving numerous parties and also multi-district class 
action litigation. Amanda has diverse expertise in numerous areas, including all aspects of employment law, trade 
secrets, agricultural law, products liability, bad faith insurance, professional legal malpractice, personal injury, business 
disputes, and state and federal antitrust violations. In addition to her trial work, Amanda has successfully handled many 
state and federal appeals. 
Amanda's overarching strength is her ability to master the facts and the applicable law of any dispute in order to bring 
about successful results as quickly as possible. She has been repeatedly recognized as a leading attorney in her legal 
community by Chambers USA. 
Representative Work 
Plaintiff Cases 
Co-counsel in a case that won a $17 million verdict against a major chemical company and eventually prompted the 
manufacturer of a defective product-that caused catastrophic crop damage in Idaho-to settle the remaining claims. 
Involved representation of more than 100 agricultural growers. 
Obtained a multi-million dollar settlement against a national telecommunications organization for its failure to properly 
design and deploy wireless Internet access at hundreds of locations throughout the United States. 
Secured a multi-million dollar settlement in a personal injury action against more than 10 different defendants who 
were responsible for client's personal injuries when they defectively constructed a home contaminated with mold, 
failed to remediate it, and then sold it without disclosing the contamination. 
Defense Cases 
Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a physician against a medical group seeking to enforce an unconscionable 
non-compete agreement. 
Won an opposition to a preliminary injunction against a banking executive by a bank that sought to enforce a non-
compete agreement. This prompted the settlement of the case against the executive with treble payment of the 
damages on his counterclaim against the bank. 
Successfully settled a dangerous employment law claim against a large, publicly traded company for a nominal amount. 




• Member, Fourth District Bar A iation 
•'.G'vlemoer, Idaho State Bar Association • 
• Member, Litigation and Employment Law Sections of Idaho State SW B I~ .. ,,~:~.~ ..... " ,~. '"' f11),\ ~rnr.~ 
• Member, American Bar Association 
• Member, University of Idaho Law Advisory Council 
• Leadership Boise, 1998-2000 
Honors and Awards 
• AV Preeminent Martindale Hubbell rating 
• Recognized by Chambers USA: America's Leading Lawyers for Business for labor and employment, 2009-
2016 
• Has a green thumb and the garden to prove it 
• Played Ruth in a production of Noel Coward's Blithe Spirit 
• Recognized by Chambers USA: America's Leading Lawyers for 
Business for Labor and Employment 
EDUCATION 
University of ldaho,J,D., sum ma cum laude, Alumni Award for 
Excellence, 1993 
University of Idaho, B.A., English Pre-law, cum laude, Phi Beta 
Kappa, Phi Kappa Phi U of I, Outstanding Senior Award, 1989 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE 
Partner, Holland & Hart LLP, 2003-2013, Associate, 1995-2002 
Law Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Honorable 
Thomas G. Nelson, 1993-1995 
ADMISSIONS 
State Bar of Idaho, 1993 
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ill 
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Drawing on her extensive experience representing individuals and entities in state and federal appellate courts, Rachel 
Murphy provides appellate and legal counsel to individuals and companies at all stages of civil litigation and before 
administrative agencies. Her areas of expertise include appeals, employment discrimination, and contract disputes. 
Rachel's greatest strength is her ability to focus on and succinctly relay pivotal legal and factual issues, facilitating the 
quick and successful resolution of disputes. 
Representative Work 
While at Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, Rachel has defended multiple international corporations against 
charges of employment discrimination before state and federal agencies. She was co-counsel in a hundred-million 
dollar title insurance dispute relating to a four-season mountain resort that resulted in a successful settlement on the 
eve of trial. And she successfully defended attorneys against misconduct allegations before the Idaho State Bar, 
including an appeal to the Hearing Committee of the Professional Conduct Board. 
As an Assistant Attorney General, Rachel successfully defended the State of Illinois in high-profile appeals of first 
impression, including challenges to the moment of silence in schools statute, property tax cap law, and enforcement of 
the wage law. She also routinely defended against employment discrimination and constitutional tort suits, saving the 
State hundreds of thousands of dollars in liability. On the plaintiff side, Rachel successfully defended an appeal of an 
anti-trust action brought by the Attorney General against makers of LCD panels, convincing the appellate court that the 
suit was not a class action. 
As an Associate with Paul, Weiss, Rachel represented a major bank in a massive securities fraud class action arising out 
of the collapse of WorldCom. She also advised major motion picture studios, Broadway producers, not-for-profit 
theaters, directors, and authors on all aspects of entertainment law, including rights acquisition, financing, and 
production. 
Professional Activities 
Secretary/Treasurer, ISB Appellate Practice Section 
Member, Idaho Women Lawyers 
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EDUCATION +\ SWB I~: 
Stanford Law School, J.D., Order of the Coif, 2002 
Williams College, B.A., History, summa cum laude Phi Beta 
Kappa, 1997 
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Office of the 
Illinois Attorney General, 2006-2013 
Associate, Paul , Weiss, Rifk ind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, 2003-
2006 
Law Clerk, Honorable Marjorie 0. Rendell, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, 2002-2003 
ADMISSIONS 
State Bar of Idaho, 2013 
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
State Bar of Illinois, 2006 (inactive) 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
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Zach counsels clients on a variety of complex civil litigation issues. Prior to joining Andersen Schwartzman Woodard 
Brailsford, he attended law school at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. While there Zach spent time working for 
the Child Advocacy Law Clinic, the oldest child welfare law clinic in the country. He represented children and parents in 
Michigan state court foster-care proceedings, gaining valuable litigation experience arguing motions, preparing for trial 
and successfully helping clients reach their goals. He also interned at a large Chicago law firm and for a federal district 
court judge. 
At the University of Oregon, Zach participated in community economic development and coached the University of 
Oregon Women's Club Soccer team. For his community involvement he received the Centurion Award, given only to 100 
undergraduate students who exhibit leadership and a commitment to the community. 
Zach is an Idaho native who enjoys spending his free time camping and fishing the Idaho outdoors with his wife and 
two dogs. During football season you'll find him in front of a TV cheering for the Oregon Ducks. 
EDUCATION 
The University of Michigan Law School, J.D., cum laude Associate 
Editor Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law 
Review, 2013 
The University of Oregon, S.S. Economics, with honors Awarded 
Centurion Award for leadership and service to the community, 
2008 
ADMISSIONS 
State Bar of Idaho 
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 
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CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
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By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Objection to Defendants' Motion For 
Fees and Costs. The Plaintiffs file their Opposition according to IRCP 54(d)(5) and (e)(6), LC.§ 
120(3), LC. § 121, and LC. § 123. 
1. The Plaintiffs object to costs claimed other than those as a matter of right 
normally awarded to the prevailing party. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS -1 
\ ORIGINAL 
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2. The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 120(3). This 
case does not involve a "commercial transaction" between the parties and therefore LC. § 120(3) 
does not apply. 
3. The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 121. Clark did 
not pursue this case frivolously or without foundation. The Plaintiffs filed this case in good faith 
arguing the scope of LC. § 3-205, and that liability attached under these circumstances, as 
Defendants had received actual notice Clark was asserting an attorney lien on the proceeds of the 
Forbush Settlement, yet failed to inform Clark of any settlement. While the Court was critical of 
Clark for not taking judicial action to perfect his lien, the Court disregarded the critical fact that 
Jones Gledhill purposefully and intentionally withheld information from Clark that prevented 
Clark from timely perfecting his lien. 
4. The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 123. 
Defendants have not established frivolous conduct as defined in LC. § 12-123. Moreover, this 
section requires the Court to schedule and conduct an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees, 
but no such hearing was scheduled. 
5. The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees as unreasonable pursuant to IRCP 
54(e)(l). Defendants' claim for fees is outrageous and punitive. This case involved a one-count 
claim for negligence and was decided on a 12(b ), motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, however, 
Defendants seek attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Assuming an average billing rate at $220. 00 
per hour, the attorneys would have worked exclusively on this case for an amazing twenty full 
eight-hour days, (Four full work weeks.). Then, the Defendants billed over 56 hours (7 
complete eight hour days), just to prepare its memorandum of costs. Approximately one-third of 
the total billing was charged to pursue costs and attorney fees. 
The Plaintiffs request oral argument only if the Court so directs. 
The Plaintiffs intend to file a Memorandum in Support of this Objection pursuant to 
IRCP 7(b)(3)(D.), and will do so within 14 days. 
The Plaintiffs have filed a Declaration in support of this Objection which is served 
contemporaneously herewith. 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2 
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DATEDthis 15th day of August, 2016. 
~~ Otl~l/{ 
~~- , \. "-"--
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or e-
mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@andersenbanducci.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@andersenbanducci.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com. 
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Eric R. Clark 
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By SANTIAGO BARRIOS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
I, Eric R. Clark, declare and state as follows: 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
DECLARATION OF 
ERIC R. CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Judge Hoagland 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this case and I have personal knowledge of the facts 
as stated herein. 
2. On September 23, 2015, I sent a letter to the Defendants in which I asserted my 
attorney lien on any proceeds from settlement with Defendants' clients and I requested that the 
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS 
ORIGINAL 
. AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
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Defendants include my name on any settlement check. See Exhibit 1 to the Amended 
Complaint. 
3. The Jones Gledhill Defendants never responded to my September 23, 2015 letter 
nor denied my right to an attorney lien. The Defendants did not inform me they did not intend to 
comply with my request to protect my lien. 
4. My experience as counsel in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case and other personal 
injury cases that it takes anywhere from 30 to 60 days from the date settlement was agreed to 
before we received a check. 
S. While the Court was critical that I did not take "some adjudicatory action to 
perfect his lien," at no time from the date that the Spence Firm and Jones Gledhill reached a 
settlement until Jones Gledhill transferred settlement funds to the Spence Firm in December 
2015, or January or February 2016, did either the Spence Firm or Jones Gledhill inform me of 
any settlement. 
6. On January 28, 2016 I sent an e-mail to Christopher Graham where I indicated I 
believed there was a settlement and requested that Jones Gledhill protect my lien. A true and 
correct copy of that e-mail and attached letter is attached as Exhibit 1. 
7. Jones Gledhill did not respond to my January 28, 2016 e-mail. 
8. Attached as Exhibit 2 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill in response to the letter attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit 
of Amanda Brailsford in support of Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs. 
9. Attached as Exhibit 3 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill which included a copy of a letter I had received from Counsel 
for the Spence Firm. 
10. Chris Graham contacted me and stated he was out of town and wanted an 
additional 24 hours to discuss the matter before I filed suit. I allowed the additional 24 hours and 
actually several more days before filing suit. 
11. Attached as Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I 
drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016, in which I stated my belief that Jones 
Gledhill was indemnified by the settlement agreement with the Forbush clients in Forbush v. 
Sagecrest, and that they should tender the defense to the Spence Firm. As Brailsford represents 
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
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the Forbush defendants and the Spence Finn in Clark v. Forbush, Canyon Count Case No. CV-
2016-06347-c, it appears that happened, and Brailsford appeared for Jones Gledhill. 
12. I did not file this case frivolously or without foundation. Jones Gledhill had 
notice of my lien in September 2015, was aware of the amount of the settlement in Forbush v. 
Sagecrest, and processed and delivered the settlement funds without notifying me of the 
settlement or the amount. By withholding necessary and critical information, Jones Gledhill 
interfered with my ability to perfect my attorney lien. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the 
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief 
DAIBDthis 15th day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or e-
mail transmission, and addressed as follows: 
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349) 
ram@ aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Eric R. Clark 
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From: ERIC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com) 
Sent: Thu 1/28/16 1:46 PM 
To: Christopher Graham (cgraham@idalaw.com) 
1 attachment 
Attorney Lien Letter.pdf (28.6 KB) 
Chris: 
Close 
I understand from the Spence Firm's Counsel that there has been a settlement with Anfinson and Bakken. I 
have attached a copy of a letter I sent via facsimile on September 23, 2015, in which I asserted an attorney's 
lien on the proceeds of any settlement or verdict. Once again, as you have notice of my lien, please ensure 
my firm is listed as one of the payees on any settlement check. Thank you. 
Very Resp~ctfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named 
as recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure 
under applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product 
doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by 
telephone. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in 
reliance on the information it contains. 
EXHIBIT 1 
2/19/2016 8:52 PM 
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MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
POBox6756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Fax: (208) 336-7031 
September 23, 2015 
William A Fuhrman 
Christopher Graham 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A 
Post Office Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529 
Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice 
of Attorney Lien 
Dear Counsel: 
This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205, 
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks 
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you. 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Sincerely, 
Eric R. Clark 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
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Clark v Jones Gledhill 
ERIC CLARK 
Tue 2/23/2016 6:33 PM 
To:Christopher Graham <cgraharn@idalaw.com>; Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrman@idalaw.com>; 
Cc:Brad Andrews <bandrews@isb.idaho.gov>; 
Bill and Chris: 
Thank you for your letter dated today. However, I disagree as your interpretation of the lien statute does not 
follow the clear language. 
3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and 
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained 
by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a 
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action 
or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor 
and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any 
settlement between the parties before or after judgment. 
The logical reading of this statue addresses money that belongs to the client, like settlement funds, which 
someone else may possess. If "bar counsel" says otherwise, then I would like to see that opinion. If you have 
such an opinion from bar counsel in writing, please send it to me. (Since you have mentioned Bar Counsel, I 
am cc'ing him on my response.) 
We have not placed a lien "in favor of opponent's lawyer," as you claim, but specifically on the settlement 
funds. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a "fund" created by the efforts of the attorney, so 
long as the five specific elements set forth in Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 625 P.2d 1072 (1981), are 
satisfied.13 See also, In re Secaur, 83 I.B.C.R. 175, 176-7 (Bank.r.D.Idaho 1983). The function of the statute is 
to give an attorney an interest in the fruits of his labors. Skelton, 102 Idaho at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. But 
here, as was the case in Fitzgerald v. Colonial Savings & Loan (In re Karterman), 97.4 I.B.C.R. 115 
(Bank.r.D.Idaho 1997), there was no "fund" created by the efforts of Daugherty." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476 
(Bank.r.ldaho, 1999). 
The attorney lien is not limited to the "lawyer's own client" as you claim, but on the "fund." As you possessed 
settlement proceeds which constitute the client's money, and which certainly resulted from my work, then you 
had a duty to safeguard those funds. Both Frazee and Goldberg are factually distinguishable. It is ridiculous 
and contrary to the very purpose of a lien that a lien only applies AFTER the client receives the money, which 
apparently is your argument. 
EXHIBIT2 
8/10/2016 11 :50 AM 
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Additionally, the record speaks for itself. Judge Copsey dismissed A.O. Smith because she claimed they could 
not reasonably anticipate a plumber removing a safety device as that would be outrageous and reek.less. (I 
think we both agree that was an impermissible finding of fact as summary judgment) You are correct that Judge 
Copsey initially denied our motion to amend against Anfinson. However, the proper course for competent 
counsel would have been to file a motion to reconsider as we had Copsey's A.O. Smith ruling and Anfinson's 
deposition which proved his employees were untrained. I think it is a reasonable argument to assert that 
sending untrained employees to work on water heaters that could kill people if not serviced correctly is "an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," as Kenny Calkins opined about Anfinson. Perhaps 
someday at a deposition, we will understand why the Spence Firm's failed to pursue what would have appeared 
to be a "slam dunk" motion to amend after Judge Copsey's comments on January 15, 2015. 
Finally, Logan's letter exemplifies just why you should have honored by lien. He claims we have a "dispute" 
about the "amount owed." However, The Spence Firm has withheld every penny, not just any disputed 
amount, and did not even inform me there was a settlement. As Jones Gledhill failed to honor my lien, the 
Spence Firm has the ability to use these funds to try to extort a settlement with me. I consider that as your 
fault, and intend to pursue my claim. 
Will you accept service of my complaint? Thanks! 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
information it contains. 
8/10/201611 :50 AM 
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Extortion letter from Spence Firm 
ERIC CLARK 
Wed 2/24/2016 8:06 AM 
To:Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrrna11@idalaw.co111>; Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.co111>; 
Cc:Arnanda K. Brailsford <akb@andersenbanducci.corn>; 
1 attachment (45 KB) 
Ex 2 - LT Clark reg Spence Firm Offer.pdf; 
Bill and Chris: 
Here is the extortion letter I received from the Spence Firm when I demanded payment of my entitled fees after 
finding out on my own there was a settlement with Anfinson Plumbing. Notice that the Spence Firm denies it 
owes me any fees, which is contrary to Logan's letter to you. The Spence Firm is now able to use these funds 
to extort a settlement because you failed to protect my lien. If the Spence Firm misled you by representing they 
would protect my lien in order for you to release those funds, then I would like those facts in a declaration or if 
the representations were in writing, then a copy of that writing from the Spence Firm. If not, then I am going to 
proceed and file my complaint. Thanks. 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
information it contains. 
EXHIIBT 3 
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Clark & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Re: Clark, et al. v. The Spence Law Firm, et al. 
Eric, 
876919 PAGE: 009 OF 010 
I have confinned that the Anfinson settlement was for policy limits of $1,000,000. 
The Spence Firm's position is that you are not entitled to payment of $140,000 that you contend 
you are owed under the co-counsel agreement as a result of the Anfinson settlement. The clients 
discharged you months before they reached this settlement; the settlement was not in existence 
when you were discharged. Nonetheless. The Spence Firm is offering you $140,000. This offer 
is unconditional ·with the exception of a full and complete release of any and all of your claims 
related to the Forbush matter against The Spence Firm, its attomeys, and your former clients. 
This offer is open until Monday, Febmary 29, 2016 at 5:00 p.m. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, ~' ~- . f7 
' . ) ' 
' ) ! ·/ ~- ~' I ' I ' ' I • 11~~ rkd#til/!f ~ i.' 
Amanda K. Brailsford ' 
AKB/ajg 
ANDERSEN l3At~DUCCI PLLC 
101 S CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 1600 BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TEI \2081 342-4411 FAY. \208[ 342-4455 
www.ander~enbandui:ci com 
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Clark v. Jones Gledhill 
ERIC CLARK 
Thu 3/10/2016 7:56 AM 
To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>; 
Chris: 
Sorry for the delay. We are filing the lien claim lawsuit this morning. Will you accept service? 
I would imagine that the settlement agreement has indemnity and hold harmless language potentially 
addressing this lawsuit. Accordingly, please let me know if you are tendering the defense to the Spence Firm 
or the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case. Thanks! 
Very Respectfully, 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Office: (208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as 
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under 
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you 
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not 
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the 
information it contains. 
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Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
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AUG _18 2016 
CHRISlOPHEA D. RICH, Clark 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC-1604633 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS 
Judge Hoagland 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Memorandum in support of their 
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involved a single-count complaint for negligence that was decided on a Motion 
to Dismiss. Notwithstanding the minimal proceedings in this matter, the Defendants claim 
l\1EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
FEES AND COSTS - 1 
ORIGINAL 
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attorney fees ofin excess of$35,000.00, with nearly one-third of this amount charged for 
preparing a motion for costs and fees. 
The Court found that the Plaintiffs ( collectively hereafter as "Clark") had not ''taken 
some adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would have been reduced to an 
amount certain," but agreed with Clark that the Defendants had Clark perfected his lien, 1 then 
such order or judgment, ''would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel." 2 
1. The Def end ants are not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 120(3). 
It is unclear from the Defendants tortured argument how they arrived at the ultimate 
conclusion that a negligence case involves a commercial transaction, but that apparently is the 
argument. These Defendants argue in reference to the Forbush v. Sagecrest case that their 
"respective clients, who later settled, for commercial purposes, ... ," somehow establish that 
negligence case involved a "commercial transaction." Do the Defendants really believe the 
Forbush v. Sagecrest case; alleging claims for negligence and wrongful death involved a 
commercial transaction? 
The reality, the gravamen of this case as pled is negligence for disregarding an attorney 
lien. The issues presented involved the scope and enforceability of that lien. However, the 
Defendants failed to cite to any case that states the gravamen of a negligence case gives rise to a 
commercial transaction. Even if the Court were to construe this as a lien foreclosure case, a lien 
foreclosure does not involve a commercial transaction. Sims v. Jacobson, 
P.3d 907,912 (2015). 
Idaho_,342 
As there was no "commercial traction" as the gravamen of any claim in this case by any 
stretch of the imagination, I.C. § 120(3) does not apply. 
2. The Case was not brought frivolously or without foundation. 
The Court must have an "abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and without 
foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees 'when it is 
left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, 
1 Clark respectfully notes that it was impossible under the circumstances for Clark to have proceeded to 
perfect his lien without knowledge of the settlement or the amount thereof; information known only to the 
Defendants here and the Spence Law Firm. 
2 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss 
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8. 
J\IIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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unreasonably, or without foundation.' C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 'when a party pursues an action which 
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without 
foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes 
it fails as a matter oflaw. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 
894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the law, or of one's 
interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position 
adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)." Garner v. Povey, 
151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case involves a novel 
legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under I.C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew, 
141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005), citing Graham v. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
138 Idaho 611, 614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003). 
This case involved the the scope and enforceability of Idaho's Attorney Lien statute,. and 
Clark presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability under this statute. 
Clark prevailed on this issue as the Court ultimately ruled that a perfected lien under the 
circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their counsel. "3 Accordingly, the 
Court has rejected the Defendants arguments in their Motion to Dismiss that any "litigation 
privilege" applied; that counsel cannot enforce an attorney lien against opposing counsel; and 
that defendants owed no duty of reasonable care. 4 
There certainly is not much decisional law of record regarding the scope of the attorney 
lien statute. Clark raised genuine issues in this litigation including the liability for opposing 
counsel; an issue which Clark prevailed. Moreover, Clark asserted the legitimate claim for 
liability of opposing counsel when counsel withheld critical information which prevented Clark 
from timely perfecting his lien. If opposing counsel would have been liable had Clark perfected 
his lien, why then would opposing counsel escape liability when they interfered with Clark's 
3 Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss 
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8. 
4 Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, pp, 4, 5, and 8. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? As the Supreme Court noted in Frazee v. 
Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983), a "charging lien of an attorney is 
equitable in nature .... " Accordingly, all equitable defenses apply, including "unclean hands" 
and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because the Defendants, 
who knew Clark was asserting a lien, purposefully and intentionally withheld information from 
Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent the Defendants from raising the lack of a perfected 
lien as a defense. 
Lien statutes are by nature remedial. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. SUMP ER, 139 Idaho 
846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960, (2004). As remedial legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must 
be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. 
Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on 
this point is to allow the attorney an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures 
his right to compensation for obtaining the recovery or 'fund' for his client." Skelton v. Spencer, 
102 Idaho 69, 77, 625 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1981). Consequently, a reasonable interpretation ofl.C. 
§ 3-205 is that an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a security interest in the proceeds of the 
lawsuit. Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a "perfect~d" lien, 
liability attached according to the statute, based on the undisputed facts that the Defendants had 
knowledge of Clark's lien claim and because Defendants possessed the funds to which Clark's 
lien attached. Clark also argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is 
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and Clark was seeking to perfect the lien, at best the case 
was not yet ripe and any dismissal should have been without prejudice. 
Additionally, the Court has discretion whether or not to consider evidence outside of the 
record submitted in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is a sound tactic to present 
additional evidence in opposition to a motion to dismiss, in case the Court exercises its 
discretion. Here Clark presented evidence related to the creation of his lien and background facts 
in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case. Just because the Court decided not to consider this evidence 
does not support any claim that offering the evidence in the first place was in any manner 
frivolous. 
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Under the circumstances presented here, the Court must conclude that Clark pursued this 
case in good faith and not frivolously and without foundation, notwithstanding the Court's 
ultimate ruling. 
3. The Defendants failed to establish "frivolous conduct" as defined by I.C. § 123. 
Clark incorporates the same argument in opposition to Defendants' claim for attorney 
fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121, and argues if the Court denies attorney fees according to I. C. § 
12-121, it must also deny attorney fees under I.C. § 12-123 as this statute has a more stringent 
standard. If the Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121, they 
certainly are not entitled to attorney fees based on a more stringent standard of conduct. 
First, as clearly stated in this statute; an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-123 
is a "sanction." Clark presented evidence by way of declaration concerning his attempts to 
resolve this case without litigation and presented reasoned interpretation of case law in response 
to the Defendants' letter dated February 23, 2016.5 Clark also requested confirmation of 
Defendant's assertion that they had allegedly obtained an opinion from "Bar Counsel," who 
coincidentally used to be a partner at Jones Gledhill. However, the Defendants never responded 
to Clark's request for additional information or corroborated any alleged opinion from Bar 
Counsel notwithstanding Clark afforded the Defendants' extra time to respond before Clark filed 
suit. 6 Clark did not believe that simply because the funds allegedly were now in Wyoming, that 
the Defendants lacked liability and proceeded accordingly. Moreover, as discussed above, this 
Court has rejected the Defendants' arguments in their February 23, 2016 letter that Clark's lien 
was limited to a claim against his clients and not against opposing counsel. 
I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to find, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that 
Clark's conduct in the case was ''frivolous," as defined in that statute. The Defendants must 
prove that Clark asserted a claim which was "not supported in fact or warranted under existing 
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law." Here Clark presented reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds 
from the Anfinson settlement, regardless of whether his lien was ultimately perfected. That 
5 See Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford In Support of Defendants' Motion For 
Attorney Fees And Costs. 
6 See Exhibit 2, 3, and 4, attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition To Defendants' 
Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees. 
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position is supported by the clear language of I.C. § 3-205. "From the commencement of an 
action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a 
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, 
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands 
they may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after 
judgment. (Emphasis added.) 
While the Court apparently placed the burden on Clark to perfect his lien, the Court 
apparently did not consider the fact that only the Defendants and the Spence firm had 
information necessary for Clark to perfect his lien. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d 
813, (Idaho App., 1986), requires knowledge of the amount of the attorney lien as a prerequisite 
to perfection of an attorney lien. As Clark argued in good faith in support of his motion to 
reconsider; "Here, Clark had no idea what the judgment amount was; first because when he was 
discharged there was no settlement or "fund," and second, because his former clients and the 
Defendants here refused to inform Clark when they settled." The reality, only the Defendants 
and the Spence firm knew there was a settlement and the terms of that settlement and they also 
each knew Clark was asserting a lien on the proceeds of those funds. Under these circumstances 
Clark could not perfect his lien until he obtained information only the Defendants possessed but 
did not release to Clark. 
Moreover, the Court's ruling that even if Clark had perfected his lien, the money is 
already gone, so "no harm no foul," appears to conflict with I.C. § 3-205. There are no 
provisions in this statute that terminate liability just because a liable party no longer has the 
money. With all due respect, such a contention would seem to undermine the very purpose of 
the statute. 
Finally, as a "sanction" I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to determine whether or not "any 
party was adversely affected by the conduct if found to be frivolous." I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii). 
(Emphasis Added.) In this case, it appears that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case 
to the Spence Firm and Former Clients, pursuant to an indemnity and hold harmless clause in the 
settlement documents. Accordingly, Spence's counsel appeared in this case for Jones Gledhill 
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and the Spence Firm likely is paying attorney fees. 7 If Jones Gledhill is not responsible for any 
attorney fees and therefor is not a "party adversely affected" by any alleged frivolous conduct, 
then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to any attorney fees. These facts need to be addressed in the 
evidentiary hearing required by LC. § 12-123 if in fact the Court elects to conduct such a 
hearing. 
4. The attorney fees claimed are not in any stretch of the imagination 
"reasonable;" the fee claimed are outrageous and punitive. 
Defendants bear the burden of proving their claim for attorney fees is reasonable. 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008). Pursuant to 54(e)(3), the 
two criteria relevant here are; (A) Time and labor required; and (B) Novelty and Difficulty of the 
Questions. 
a. Time and labor. This was a single count negligence claim decided on an IRCP 
12(b) motion. There was no discovery exchanged, nor depositions taken. Nor were there any 
other pleadings or motions. The Defendants did not even file an Answer. Notwithstanding, 
Defendants claimed attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Defendants' counsel billed in excess of 
159 hours on this case; 56 of which was billed for time for preparing the motion for costs and 
attorney fees. 8 Other than their exorbitant billing records, the Defendants offer no explanation as 
to how billing over 159 hours under the circumstance of this case was in any way reasonable. 
The Defendants double billed for the same work performed by two or more attorneys. (See, e.g. 
on March 14, 2016, March 15, 2016, March 22, 2016, and March 23, 2016). The Defendants 
billed 14.8 hours just for legal research in support of motion to dismiss. "RAM" billed 18.8 
hours related to research and drafting just the motion to dismiss. This case reeks of the situation 
where attorneys drastically increases their hours well above what they actually billed just 
because their party won. The Court should not condone such conduct and deny the motion for 
fees outright. 
7 Curiously, in her brief, Brailsford claims "Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its 
counsel of record, who in tum had to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the underlying 
case."(Memo, p. 14.) However, Brailsford already represented the Spence Firm and the Fonner Clients 
in the ''underlying case." It is therefore unclear why Brailsford now had to "familiarize" herself with a 
case in which she was already involved? 
8 Brailsford's Affidavit, Exhibit C. 
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b. Novelty and Difficulty. This case involved the scope ofldaho's attorney fee 
statute, not the interpretation of the tax code. The case did present the novel issue of whether an 
attorney lien attaches to proceeds held by opposing counsel thereby subjecting opposing counsel 
to liability, but ultimately, the Court rejected the Defendants' arguments on this issue. 
c. Billing for Attorney Fees. The Defendants billed in excess of 56 hours just to 
assert a claim for attorney fees. The amount billed for attorney fees is a glaring example of 
"padding" the bills well above that counsel actually charged for their services. Again, the Court 
cannot condone such conduct and must deny these fees as patently unreasonable. 
Considering the nature of the minimal proceedings, charging in excess of 159 hours is not 
in any way reasonable. Accordingly, the Court must deny the motion for attorney fees in its 
entirety as unreasonable under the circumstances. 
5. Costs. 
As the prevailing party, the Defendants are entitled to recover their costs as a matter or 
right, which is limited to their filing fee. The Defendants have not established any basis for this 
Court to award any of the discretionary costs claimed. 
CONCLUSION 
Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants' Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees for the following reasons; 1) The Case does not involve a "commercial 
transaction, and therefor LC. § 12-120 does not apply; 2) The Case was not brought or pursued 
frivolously or without foundation and presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's 
liability pursuant to an attorney lien; 3) The Defendants failed to establish any conduct was 
frivolous as defined by LC. § 12-123; and 4) The Defendants failed to establish its attorney fees 
demanded were reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants are entitled to recover their 
filing fee, and nothing more. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
Eric R. Clark 
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reply in support of their motion for fees and costs and in opposition to the Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Fees and Costs (“Plaintiffs’ Memo”). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Clark’s opposition to Jones Gledhill’s motion sets forth many arguments (some new, 
some seen before), but nonetheless fails to address the deficiency which is fatal to his claim.  
This was Clark’s best opportunity to explain how his claim—even if ultimately a failure—was 
based on a good faith reading of Idaho law as it currently exists, or as it should.  Yet, his primary 
(and misplaced) contention is that this lawsuit was not frivolous because he put forth an 
argument regarding the plain language of Idaho Code § 3-205 (Idaho’s attorney-lien statute).  
Secondarily, he offers several conclusory arguments that, in addition to being inapposite, are 
unconvincing and are therefore only briefly addressed below.1  Ultimately, and most 
importantly, none of Clark’s arguments speak to whether attempting to enforce his alleged lien 
against Jones Gledhill prior to perfecting it is permissible.  As a result, it is clear that while Clark 
claims that there are many genuine legal issues raised by his lawsuit, he cannot avoid that his 
claim is and always has been baseless because he never perfected his purported lien.  In short, 
this lawsuit should never have been filed—as Clark was told before he did so—and Jones 
Gledhill should not have been required to defend against it.   
ARGUMENT 
 Clark admits that Idaho law requires his lien be perfected before he can enforce it, and 
admits that his lien is not (and never has been) perfected.  Accordingly, Clark’s lawsuit was 
frivolous and without foundation, entitling Jones Gledhill to attorney fees under Idaho Code 
                                                          
1 In order to ensure Clark’s arguments are fully addressed, the entirety of Jones Gledhill’s 
memorandum in support of their motion for fees and costs is incorporated herein as if restated in 
full. 
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§§ 12-121 and 12-123.  Additionally, as the prevailing party, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because a commercial transaction forms the 
gravamen of this lawsuit. 
I. Jones Gledhill is the Prevailing Party. 
Clark does not legitimately contest that Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party.  In 
determining the prevailing party, “the issue  . . . is not who succeeded on more individual claims, 
but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action.”  Hobson v. Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z 
Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 59, 294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012).  Jones Gledhill obviously prevailed 
upon the main issue—that Clark is not entitled to recover against it under the attorney lien 
statute, Idaho Code § 3-205.  That the Court did not address each argument Jones Gledhill 
asserted in support of its position does not mean, as Clark asserts, that he prevailed on those 
“issues.”  (See Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 3 (arguing Clark prevailed on “issues”).  Accordingly, to 
the extent any avenue for the recovery of fees, discussed below, is limited to prevailing parties it 
is properly available to Jones Gledhill. 
II.  Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-121. 
 This lawsuit was Clark’s attempt to enforce his alleged attorney’s lien.  Clark concedes 
that in order to enforce such a lien, it must first be perfected.  (See Defendants’ Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Fees and Costs (“Defendants’ Memo.”), at p. 8 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Reconsider at p. 3.)).  Clark also admits that his lien has not been perfected.  (Id.)  
Accordingly, Clark admits that he cannot enforce his alleged lien under Idaho law, yet brought 
suit against Jones Gledhill seeking to do so.  Because there is no dispute as to the relevant facts 
and law, which 1) are unchanged since the filing of this lawsuit, and 2) make Clark’s lawsuit 
untenable, the lawsuit was pursued frivolously. 
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In opposition, Clark first cites case law for the proposition that if a lawsuit contains 
“fairly debatable issues” it should not be deemed frivolous or without foundation.  (Plaintiffs’ 
Memo., at p. 3.)  Substantively, however, Clark fails to offer any fairly debatable interpretation 
of law that would allow him to enforce an un-perfected lien and, therefore, fails to offer any 
fairly debatable proposition of law that could have allowed his claim to survive.  Instead, Clark 
focuses on other, ultimately non-dispositive issues and arguments raised in this matter (e.g., can 
opposing counsel be liable under Idaho’s attorney-lien statute, or whether Jones Gledhill had a 
duty to inform Clark of a settlement).  The outcome on those issues is of no effect; his claim is 
and has always been improper because his alleged lien has never been perfected.  For example, if 
Clark’s claim had been undisputedly barred by an applicable statute of limitation—and Clark 
conceded that the facts barring his claim existed at the time it was filed—the frivolity of such a 
filing is not avoided by arguing that if it were (hypothetically) not time-barred, he could assert 
his claim against opposing counsel. 
 Moreover, the arguments raised by Clark in his opposition are simply unavailing.  If 
Clark believes his claim has some merit because an unclean hands defense (somehow) applies 
because Jones Gledhill did not immediately inform him of the settlement (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 
4), he never raised this issue before and it, nonetheless, fails to address that this Court has 
already stated that Jones Gledhill had no duty to protect Clark’s interest.  (June 28, 2016 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to 
Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, at p. 9.)  If Clark believes that lien statutes are 
remedial in nature and thus deserve a broad interpretation (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 4), he still 
fails to explain how a broad interpretation of Idaho’s attorney-lien statute abrogates the 
requirement that a lien be perfected.  Finally, if Clark believes that providing documents beyond 
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the Complaint in response to a motion to dismiss is not frivolous—and that therefore his claim 
was not frivolous—(Plaintiffs’ Memo. at p. 4), he misunderstands Idaho law.  The presence of a 
single, non-frivolous issue does not prevent this Court from finding Clark pursued this action 
frivolously.  See Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d 
1072, 1080 (2014), reh’g denied (Aug. 6, 2014). 
Because Clark admits that Idaho law and the facts of this case prevent him from 
enforcing his lien, his decision to file this lawsuit—a lawsuit to enforce that lien—is indisputably 
frivolous and without foundation.  And despite this opportunity to demonstrate the meritorious 
nature of his claim under the facts or the law, Clark has not done so.  Accordingly, attorney fees 
are properly awardable under § 12-121. 
III.  Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-123. 
 Here, too, Clark has failed to show that his lawsuit is not frivolous and without 
foundation.  His efforts to do so—once again—fail to address the uncontested factual assertion 
that his alleged lien was never perfected or the uncontested legal reality that such a lien must be 
perfected in order to enforce it.  Indeed, similar to the discussion, supra, regarding § 12-121, 
Clark’s attempts to argue for a plausible extension, reversal, or modification of existing law miss 
the mark.   
 Specifically, Clark argues that he has made tenable arguments regarding when an 
attorney’s lien attaches under § 3-205.  This does not address the fatal deficiency in his claim, 
i.e., a lack of perfection.  This distinction is recognized by Clark himself:  “…Clark presented 
reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds from the Anfinson settlement, regardless 
of whether his lien was ultimately perfected.”  (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 5.)  In other words, Clark 
argues that because he purportedly raised a viable issue regarding whether he has a lien at all 
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(and when any such lien arose), this lawsuit was not frivolous; however, Clark still fails to grasp 
that the reason his claim was fatally flawed is because even if he were right about when and to 
what his lien attached, he still cannot enforce it unless it is perfected.  As a result, Clark’s 
argument regarding the plain language of § 3-205 is not an argument for the extension, reversal, 
or modification of law that could cure his complaint’s fatal deficiency.   
 Clark’s other arguments regarding § 12-123 fail for that reason as well, but are also 
otherwise unavailing.  Clark argues that Idaho law requires knowledge of the amount of an 
attorney lien as a “prerequisite” to its perfection.  (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 6.)  Clark seems to 
believe that because it would have been difficult for him to determine what the amount of his 
lien was, he need not do so.  This argument is belied by the fact that Clark admits that he is 
currently attempting (by way of a separate suit against his former clients and the Spence Law 
Firm) to determine the existence and amount of his attorney’s lien.  In other words, while Clark 
argues that he was somehow prevented from determining the amount of his lien, in actuality he is 
in the midst of doing so.  To the extent Clark argues that the Court made a “no harm no foul” 
ruling, (id.), because Jones Gledhill no longer possesses the funds at issue, it should be noted 
only that it appears the Court’s reading of the statute is in line with its plain language.  The 
statutory language allows the lien to attach to proceeds of a settlement “in whosoever hands they 
may come;” it does not allow a claim against “whosoever hands they ever may have been,” as 
Clark advocated.  See Idaho Code § 3-205. 
Finally, Clark’s assumption that, because Jones Gledhill shares counsel with Clark’s 
former clients and the Spence Law Firm, Jones Gledhill has not been adversely affected is 
without support in the record and, moreover, is a narrow and unsubstantiated interpretation of  
whether Jones Gledhill was “adversely affected” by Clark’s frivolous filings.  Jones Gledhill was 
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forced to defend against Clark’s action and, therefore, was adversely affected.  Moreover, at the 
very least, naming well-respected attorneys and their law firm in a lawsuit and alleging 
wrongdoing adversely affects their reputation.  As the only other parties to this suit, Clark’s 
frivolous filings and arguments necessarily adversely affects Jones Gledhill by virtue of 
requiring a response.   
 Despite having numerous opportunities to show why this lawsuit was not frivolous, or 
explain how a modification, extension, or reversal of existing law makes it not frivolous, Clark 
has failed to do so.  Accordingly, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12-
123. 
IV. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-120(3). 
 The “transaction” at issue for purposes of determining the propriety of a fee award under 
§ 12-120(3) is the settlement of the lawsuit underlying Clark’s alleged lien.  (See, Defendants’ 
Memo. at p. 11 (Noting “transaction” is interpreted broadly).)  The commercial nature of the 
transaction stems not from the claims made in that lawsuit but from the purposes for which the 
parties to this action – Clark and Jones Gledhill – partook in that underlying transaction.  In that 
regard, Clark does not dispute that he represented his former clients for a commercial purpose (to 
earn a contingency fee), or that Jones Gledhill defended their client for a commercial purpose (to 
earn an hourly rate).  As a result, both Clark and Jones Gledhill were involved in that transaction 
for a commercial purpose, and that transaction gave rise to the instant suit.  (See Defendants’ 
Memo. at p. 11 (There need not be a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill to find a 
commercial transaction exists.).)  Put another way, a commercial transaction is the gravamen of 
this matter because for both Clark and Jones Gledhill their legal representation in the underlying 
suit was for a commercial purpose and that transaction is integral to their involvement in this 
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case.  If Clark did not represent his former clients, he could not assert a lien on their recovery; if 
Jones Gledhill had not defended its client, Clark would not be attempting to recover against 
Jones Gledhill as his former opposing counsel. 
 In opposition, Clark argues that because Forbush v. Sagecrest was a negligence action, it 
was not a commercial transaction.  (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 2.)  This is a red herring in that it 
serves to rebut only Clark’s errant interpretation of Jones Gledhill’s argument; Jones Gledhill is 
not relying on the claims made between the parties in that lawsuit but is instead relying on the 
commercial nature of Clark and Jones Gledhill’s involvement therein.  Additionally, Clark 
argues that “the gravamen of this case as pled is negligence for disregarding an attorney lien.”  
(Id.)  Clark’s argument is misplaced.  The fact that a commercial transaction gives rise to a 
negligence action does not remove it from the realm of a commercial transaction, and attorney 
fees are still properly awardable: 
  It is true that the commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12–120(3) neither 
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct, 
nor does it require that there be a contract.  Thus, as long as a commercial 
transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to 
attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial 
transaction yet sound in tort. 
 
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 755–56, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270–71 (2012) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
   Accordingly, because a commercial transaction is integral to Clark collecting his alleged 
attorney’s lien, a commercial transaction is the gravamen of this suit, and the prevailing party – 
Jones Gledhill – is entitled to recover its attorney fees. 
V. Rule 54 of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Provides That Jones Gledhill Should 
Recover All of Its Costs and Fees. 
 Clark concedes that Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its matter-of-right costs.  In 
arguing against an award of discretionary fees Clark argues only that Jones Gledhill has 
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established no basis for them.  As outlined above, this case is exceptional (and, thus, warrants an 
award of discretionary costs) precisely because it is frivolous, and Jones Gledhill is entitled to 
recover its discretionary costs as a result. 
 Clark does not take issue with the rates charged by counsel for Jones Gledhill.  Instead, 
Clark ignores many of the factors appropriately considered in awarding fees here, focusing only 
on 1) the time and labor expended and 2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case.  
Consequently, Clark argues that the amount of time spent defeating his lawsuit was excessive.  
Yet, he offers few examples to demonstrate that this case “reeks” of “padding.”  (Plaintiffs’ 
Memo., at pp. 7-8.)  First he claims that double billing for the same work occurred on March 14, 
15, 22, and 23, 2016.  (Id., at p. 7.)  On March 14, there was—at most—a .3 hour overlap 
between any work performed by counsel for Jones Gledhill.  (See August 2, 2016 Affidavit of 
Amanda Brailsford, Ex. C at p. 1.)  On March 15, two attorneys attended what is clearly the 
initial client meeting for one hour each, for a total of two hours billed.  (Id.)  On March 22, two 
attorneys spent .5 hours reviewing Clark’s amended complaint, for a total of 1 hour.  (Id.)  On 
March 23, only one attorney billed any time.  (Id.)  Further, to the extent Clark complains about 
hours spent researching and drafting Jones Gledhill’s motion to dismiss, he does so without any 
particularity whatsoever, effectively preventing Jones Gledhill or this Court from specifically 
rebutting his vague assertions.  Nonetheless, drafting a successful motion to dismiss a $500,000 
claim, on multiple legal theories, in roughly 30 hours is reasonable.  Presumably, these are the 
best examples Clark could identify of “attorneys drastically increas[ing] their hours well above 
what they actually billed just because their party won.”  (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 7.)  Neither the 
above-noted billing entries nor any others support Clark’s assertion. 
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 Additionally, Clark argues that the number of hours spent on this case, in general, were 
excessive.  Clark, however, sought $500,000 in damages and to recover his own attorney fees.  
Disposing of Clark’s purportedly $500,000 lawsuit for approximately $35,000 is reasonable and 
presents a very effective return on investment for time spent by Jones Gledhill’s counsel.  
Indeed, if counsel for Jones Gledhill charged Clark’s hourly rate, fees would exceed $35,000.  
Further, to the extent Clark claims this lawsuit consisted solely of a Rule 12(b) motion he is 
mistaken, as he fails to mention that by virtue of his filings additional briefing relating to a 
motion to strike and opposing his motion for judicial notice were required. 
 Finally, Clark complains (once again, in only general terms) that the hours spent on 
briefing for Jones Gledhill’s fees and costs is unreasonable.  (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 8.)  As the 
Court is aware, the instant motion and its supporting memorandum required an assessment of all 
positions taken by Clark in this action—a sizeable and difficult effort in its own right in light of 
Clark’s briefing—as well as research into prevailing party status under Idaho law, and significant 
research of three separate, complicated statutory bases for fee awards with many caveats and 
exceptions.  Moreover, although there is a straightforward argument for demonstrating the 
frivolity of Clark’s arguments, special care in protecting Jones Gledhill’s interests was required 
given Clark’s propensity for appealing decisions (as he has done here), which necessitated an 
especially thorough approach and explanation of the various bases entitling Jones Gledhill to its 
fees and costs. 
 Accordingly, Clark has failed to show that amounts billed by counsel for Jones Gledhill 
are unreasonable.  Instead, counsel for Jones Gledhill successfully defeated Clark’s claim for 
over a half a million dollars and had his complaint dismissed with prejudice.  Accordingly, the 
amount of fees incurred are reasonable and should be awarded to Jones Gledhill. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill’s instant motion should be granted for fees and 
costs incurred in defending this lawsuit in the total amount of $35,987.59. 
 
 DATED this 7th day of September 2016. 
 
 ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN  




By  /s/ Amanda K. Brailsford  
 Amanda K. Brailsford 
 Attorneys for Defendants 
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 COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Reply Memorandum in support of their 
Objection to Defendants’ Motion For Fees and Costs.   
REPLY ARGUMENT 
1. Perfected Lien?  Jones Gledhill claims Clark’s claim was frivolous and without 
foundation as he never obtained a perfected lien.  However, Jones Gledhill ignored the 
undisputed facts that Jones Gledhill knew in September 2015 that Clark was asserting a valid 
               Judge Hoagland 
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attorney lien based on his involvement in the Forbush v. Sagecrest Case as plaintiffs’ counsel for 
nearly three years.  Accordingly, Jones Gledhill knew Clark had a lien pursuant to statute on the 
proceeds of the Forbush settlement with Anfinson Plumbing, Jones Gledhill’s client, as of 
September 2015, which created Clark’s security interest in the proceeds.   
Clark sent a letter to Jones Gledhill in September 2015 and requested that Jones Gledhill 
place Clark’s name on the settlement check.1  Jones Gledhill never responded, never denied 
Clark’s lien, and never denied Clark’s request to place his name on the settlement check.  
Moreover, notwithstanding the notice of Clark’s lien, the facts establish that Jones Gledhill 
concealed the settlement and amount from Clark which prevented Clark from proceeding to 
judicially prefect his lien. 
Based on the clear wording of I.C. § 3-205, an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a 
security interest in the proceeds of the lawsuit.  While the Court ruled that one must obtain a 
“perfected” lien to enforce the security interest, Clark’s interest nonetheless attached, pending 
judicial resolution.  If the security interest attached, but Clark had not yet perfected his lien, then 
the proper course in this litigation was to dismiss without prejudice.   
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that an attorney’s lien is “equitable in nature.” 
Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983).  Accordingly, as the facts 
indicate Jones Gledhill concealed the settlement and amount from Clark, despite knowledge of 
his lien, equity would intervene to prevent Jones Gledhill from avoiding liability when it 
interfered with Clark’s ability to perfect his lien.  Accordingly, based on the facts presented, the 
lack of a perfected lien should not have resulted in dismissal of this case.  
1. There is no basis for attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121.  Clark cited to the 
“abiding belief” standard as a basis for his objection to costs under I.C. § 12-121, which Jones 
Gledhill ignores in its response brief.  There is nothing in this record that should leave this Court 
with an “abiding belief” Clark brought this case frivolously and without foundation.  Clark raised 
“fairly debatable” issues as to the liability of opposing counsel, which is also a “novel” legal 
question.  Clark also argued in good faith that it is inequitable to allow someone to avoid liability 
under Idaho’s lien statute when they had knowledge of the lien, concealed facts, and thereby 
                                           
1 See Exhibit 4 attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark filed in Opposition to Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss.  
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interfered with the attorney’s ability to perfect his lien.  Once again Clark refers the Court to the 
decisions in Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011), and Campbell v. 
Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005) and requests the Court apply the 
standards stated in those cases to deny the Defendants’ request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-
121.  
2. Consideration of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-123 is not properly before 
the Court.  I.C. § 12-123 requires a court to set an evidentiary hearing before considering 
whether to impose sanctions.  I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i).  Here Jones Gledhill filed its motion, but 
never requested the Court set such a hearing.  Clark filed his Objection to the Motion for Costs 
and Attorney fees and has requested a hearing on his Objection.  Currently, no evidentiary 
hearing is set for the Court to consider this claim.  Accordingly, as no proper hearing has been 
set as required by I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i), this issue should not be considered as part of Clark’s 
hearing on his Objection to attorney fees.  
Additionally, as Clark argued previously, there is no factual basis on which to find the 
type of conduct addressed in I.C. § 12-123 and the motion should be summarily denied on that 
basis alone.  
3. I.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply; JG’s “commercial transaction” analysis is 
baseless.  The language of I.C. § 12-120(3) does not address relationships that are so tangential 
as to be meaningless.  Here, Clark sued on a negligence claim based on Jones Gledhill’s conduct 
related to Clark’s attorney lien.  Jones Gledhill seems to argue that the Court must consider the 
tangential relationships between Jones Gledhill and its clients and Clark and his former clients 
each as “commercial transactions” and therefore those relationship are material here.  However, 
while citing to Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256, (2012), Jones Gledhill 
ignores the scope of that ruling.  The Supreme Court, discussing the breadth of I.C. § 12-120(3), 
specified that the commercial transaction upon which a party seeks attorney fees must be “at the 
center of the lawsuit,” not peripheral and involving persons or entities not parties to that suit.  
“Thus, as long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party 
may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial 
transaction yet sound in tort.” Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 
1271 (2012).  Here, the “commercial transactions” that Jones Gledhill cites are certainly not at 
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the center of the lawsuit, and therefore are not relevant to any I.C. § 12-120(3) “commercial 
transaction” analysis.  As there is no applicable “transaction” where Clark and Jones Gledhill are 
parties at the “center of the lawsuit,” then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to attorney fees according 
to I.C. § 12-120(3). 
  Carrillo also provides an additional basis to deny attorney fees, even if any tangential 
relationships are relevant.  Carrillo involved personal injury claims arising from work that Boise 
Tire had performed on the Carrillo’s vehicle.  Although Boise Tire was negligent, Carrillo sought 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) and alleged when the Carrillo’s contracted for the work on 
their vehicle that act and subsequent relationship constituted a “commercial transaction.”  The 
Carrillo Court rejected such an argument because the Carrillo’s had not entered into the contract 
for any commercial purpose.  “We today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be 
commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial 
purpose.”  Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1272 (2012).  
(Emphasis added).  Carrillo required the Court’s analysis must focus on the respective parties’ 
intent for the transaction.   
For the transaction to satisfy the definition of a “commercial transaction,” each party to 
the transaction must enter the transaction for a “commercial” purpose.  Jones Gledhill ignores 
this requirement in its briefs.  Accordingly, for the Clark-Former Client “transaction” to be 
“commercial” for purposes of I.C. § 120(3), both Clark and his former clients had to enter into 
that transaction for a “commercial purpose.”   
 The reality, if the former clients actually pursued damages for wrongful death and 
personal injuries for a commercial purpose, thereby creating a “commercial transaction,” which 
Jones Gledhill’s Counsel2 now argues, then the damages former clients recovered are fully 
taxable.  Considering the $1,000,000.00 settlement figure and a deduction for attorney fees paid, 
former client’s tax liability would be in the neighborhood of $240,000.00, if former clients want 
to contend their recovery was based on a commercial transaction as it appears to be Counsel’s 
argument.  
  
                                           
2 Andersen Brailsford is also counsel for former clients and accordingly statements made by Counsel will be 
construed as judicial admissions of the former clients.  
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 Once again, Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants’ Motion for Costs 
and Attorney Fees.  Clark did not act frivolously and without foundation or in any manner 
warranting an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121 or for I.C. § 12-123 sanctions.  
Moreover, I.C. § 12-120 does not apply by any tortured analysis of the facts.  Finally, Jones 
Gledhill exorbitant claim for over $35,000.00 in attorney fees, belies its argument that attorney 
lien law in Idaho is settled and straightforward as is any resulting liability pursuant to I.C. § 3-
205.  Accordingly, the Court must deny the entire request for attorney fees as unreasonable.  
Jones Gledhill is entailed to costs limited to its filing fee, and that is all.  
DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.  
 
___________________________________ 
 Eric R. Clark 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed 
through counsel on August 2, 2016. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to 
Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs. A hearing was held on September 14, 2016, and the 
Court took the matter under advisement. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion 
for Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
BACKGROUND 
The pertinent facts in this case were recited in the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, 
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filed June 28, 2016. The Order, in part, addressed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all claims 
against the Defendants in this case. The Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, because 
Plaintiffs did not have a valid or enforceable attorney's lien applicable to the Defendants because 
Plaintiff had not taken any affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect the lien. A final Judgment 
was entered on July 20, 2016, dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims against 
Defendants. 
On August 2, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Fees and Costs, along with an Affidavit of 
Amanda K. Brailsford and Memorandum in Support. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an 
Objection to Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, along with a Declaration of Eric R. Clark 
and Memorandum in Support (filed August 18, 2016). Defendants filed a Reply in Support of 
Motion for Fees and Costs on September 7, 2016. A hearing was held on September 14, 2016. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants seek $13 6 in costs as a matter of right, and $4 3 5. 09 in discretionary costs,1 together 
with $35,416.50 in attorney fees, under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123. 
Defendants claimed a total of $35,987.59. 
1) Costs 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(A) provides that '"costs are allowed as a matter of right to 
1 Defendants claim $499.95 in costs in their Memorandum brief; however, the Affidavit asserts costs totaling 
$571.09. 
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the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." It is within the trial 
court's discretion to determine which party to the action is the prevailing party. See I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). In 
making the determination, the Court considers, "(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the 
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple 
claims or issues between the parties; and ( c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on 
each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. 
App. 1983). Further, "the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall 
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189, 
203,321 P.3d 739, 753 (2014) (citation omitted). 
Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case, which is undisputed by the Plaintiffs. 2 
Defendants are therefore entitled to costs as a matter of right under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(l)(C).3 Defendants claim $136.00 in filing fees as costs as a matter of right. 
Accordingly, the Court awards Defendants $136.00 in costs as a matter of right. 
Defendants also claim discretionary costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(D). The 
Court has discretion to add items of cost, or increase the amount of the costs allowed, "on a 
showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in 
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
2 Pis.' Mem. in Supp. of Objection to Defs.' Mot. for Fees and Costs, p. 8 (filed Aug. 18, 2016). 
3 Plaintiffs do no dispute that Defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of right. See id. 
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Defendants seek $93 .20 in print and copy expenses, $148. 7 5 for a copy of the transcript of the 
June 3, 2016 hearing regarding the Motion to Dismiss, and $193.14 in Westlaw expenses. 
Plaintiffs object to these discretionary costs, because they have "not established any basis" for 
these costs. 4 
Defendants claim the transcript was necessary and reasonable because Plaintiffs represented, in 
their Motion to Reconsider, that Defendants' counsel stated something she did not in fact state in 
the previous hearing: 
During oral argument at the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss hearing, counsel for 
the Defendants argued that others had handled the settlement funds and therefore 
the pleadings were deficient because these other parties were not named. Clark 
has added these parties in the second amended complaint. 5 
But Defendants' counsel did not make that argument, and in fact, stated the opposite: 
I hope the Court understands and I think it does that my argument is not that 
Anfinson Plumbing and the insurance company should be added to this case. 
They had no notice of the lien and my argument was the ridiculousness of the 
interpretation of the statute such that [']in whosoever's hand the proceeds may 
come['] can suddenly be a defendant[.]6 
The Court can always listen to the audio record of a hearing (without charge), and a CD can be 
obtained by counsel for just a few dollars. 
The Court finds that Defendants' claimed discretionary costs were neither necessary nor 
exceptional, particularly the transcript costs. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' claimed 
discretionary costs. 
4 Id. 
5 Pis.' Mem. filed in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration and Mot. To Amend Compl. P. 6 (filed June 13, 2016). 
6 June 3, 2016 Hearing, Tr. p. 30, L. 20-25, p. 31, L. I. 
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2) Attorney Fees 
"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Defendants request attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), 
12-121, and 12-123. Each statute will be addressed in turn. 
a. Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120{3) 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides a basis for an award of attorney fees as follows: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
When this Section applies, an award of attorney fees is mandatory. Action Collection Servs., 
Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286,290, 192 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008). In order to determine 
whether Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to a given case, "[t]he critical test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must 
be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). In Great Plains 
Equipment, the Supreme Court stated there are 
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[T]wo stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail itself 
of LC. § 12-120(3): (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to 
the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which 
recovery is sought. It has long been held that the critical test is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial 
transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party 
is attempting to recover. The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of 
the complaint, that is, the lawsuit and the causes of action must be based on a 
commercial transaction, not simply a situation that can be characterized as a 
commercial transaction. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of 
attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to 
a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filled. 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) 
( citations and quotation marks omitted). This language was echoed De Groot v. Standley 
Trenching, Inc., which states: 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
a civil action to recover on "any commercial transaction." Commercial 
transactions are all transactions except for personal or household purposes. 
Whether there is a commercial transaction is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual 
relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the 
application of [LC. § 12-120(3) ] and a prevailing party may recover fees even 
though no liability under a contract was established. This same principle applies 
where the action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, regardless of the 
proof that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur. Idaho courts will 
consider whether the parties alleged the application of LC. § 12-120. 
De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho 557, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs initiated this action to recover on an alleged attorney's lien in a personal injury case. 
Plaintiffs' alleged that Defendants (who were the opposing counsel in the underlying case) 
negligently failed to protect Plaintiffs' lien. First, Plaintiffs had no valid lien. Second, this was 
no commercial transaction. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) requires a commercial transaction as the 
gravamen of the case. Plaintiffs and Defendants were opposing counsel in the underlying case. 
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There was no commercial transaction between them. Neither did the underlying case involve a 
commercial transaction. It was a personal injury case. Accordingly, the Court finds that 
Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
b. Fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 123 
Attorney fees may only be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121 when the Court "finds that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation[.]" 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2). 
Under Idaho Code§ 12-123, attorney fees, as sanctions for frivolous conduct in a civil case, may 
only be awarded after giving notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether 
particular conduct was frivolous. The Court then must determine "if the conduct was frivolous, 
whether any party was adversely affected by the conduct if it is found to be frivolous, and ... 
determine if an award is to be made, the amount of that award." LC.§ 12-123(2)(b)(iii). 
Defendants cite Idaho Military Historical Society Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 
(2014), in support of their assertion that this case was frivolous and attorney fees are appropriate 
under Idaho Code § 12-121. In that case, an owner of an airplane sued a company that was 
storing the airplane after the storage company refused to release possession of it. Id. at 626, 329 
P.3d at 1074. The storage company "filed a claim of lien with the FAA seeking compensation 
for claimed storage and maintenance expenses they incurred on the airplane." Id. The storage 
company filed a counterclaim based on the lien it had filed. Id. The District Court found that the 
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lien "failed to satisfy the requirements of statute." Id. at 631, 329 P.3d at 1079. The storage 
company's claim to an interest in the plane was frivolous, because there was no evidence that it 
was entitled to compensation. Id. 
In this case, the Court determined Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief as a matter of law, because 
the alleged attorney lien had not been perfected. Plaintiffs argued, under Idaho Code § 3-205, 
that the suit was proper against these Defendants, because the settlement check went through 
their hands. But Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take 
affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claimed lien 
unenforceable. Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983) ("The equitable 
source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an 
adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court."). If 
Plaintiff had perfected the lien through an affirmative adjudicatory process in the underlying 
action, then Defendants would have had to protect Plaintiffs' interest, as required by Idaho Code 
§ 3-205. Plaintiffs did not argue a new or novel interpretation of Idaho Code§ 3-205, nor argue 
that the law should be extended or modified. Plaintiffs "novel legal question" merely argued 
that the Court should ignore established precedent, which it has declined to do. 
Moreover, in correspondence before this suit was filed, Plaintiffs were specifically warned by 
Defendants that the claim failed based on Idaho case law. 7 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' took action that increased the cost of litigation by filing documents that 
were under seal in another case but were not sealed in this case. Defendants responded by filing 
1 See Brailsford Aff. Ex. A (filed Aug. 2, 2016). 
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a Motion to Seal in this case, which the Court granted. And ultimately, the documents did not 
add anything to the Plaintiffs' case anyhow. 
The Court does not find that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith or with malicious intent in pursuing this 
case. However, there was no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claim, of which Plaintiffs' were fully 
aware before filing suit, and then Plaintiffs also unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation. 
Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs brought and pursued this case 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation and Defendants are entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. The Court further finds that Defendants Motion for 
attorney fees Idaho Code§ 12-123, is moot in light of the finding above. 
"The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court." Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). "When awarding 
attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) 
and may consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 
Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3d 258, 261--62 (2008) (citation omitted). "Rule 54(e)(3) does not 
require the district court to make specific findings in the record, only to consider the stated 
factors in determining the amount of the fees. When considering the factors, courts need not 
demonstrate how they employed any of those factors in reaching an award amount." Smith v. 
Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367,376 (2004). 
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Exhibit C to the Brailsford Affidavit contains the detailed accounting of time and services 
provided. Defendants claim a total of about 152 attorney hours at rates from $205 to $250, for a 
total claim of $35,416.50 in attorney fees. Defendants claim about 77 hours on the Motion to 
Dismiss. Defendants claim about 54 hours on the Motion for Fees and Costs. The issues in each 
of these motions were not particularly novel or difficult. The amount of time and labor claimed 
seems unreasonable and excessive for these issues. Exhibit C contains numerous large blocks of 
time with little explanation of what actual work was done in those large spans of time. Many of 
the descriptions are duplicative and indistinct. As such, Defendants have not provided sufficient 
information to find that all of the time claimed was reasonable. See Sun Valley Potato Growers, 
Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d 475 (2004) (award of attorney fees vacated 
where prevailing party did not provide the trial court with sufficient information from which to 
determine the reasonableness of the amount claimed). 
In summary, the court finds that the information provided is insufficient to show that all the 
amounts claimed are reasonable, and indeed the amount claimed appears excessive and 
unreasonable considering the lack of novelty or difficulty of the issues and what would normally 
be a reasonable amount of time and labor required on the issues presented. 
Therefore, when considering all the factors outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3), 
including, but not necessarily limited to the matters identified above, the Court concludes that the 
amount claimed was reasonable for at least $26,250.00 of attorney work performed on the case, 
and that the Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees of $26,250.00 under 
Idaho Code § 12-121. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing, Defendants are awarded $136.00 in costs as a matter of 
right, no discretionary costs, and $26,250.00 in attorney fees, for a total of $26,386.00. 
Defendants will submit an Amended Judgment consistent with the above for the Court's 
signature. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1 J1h day of October, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy 
of the within instrument to: 
Mr. Eric Clark, Esq. 
Clark & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com 
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq. 
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC 
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
akb@aswblaw.com 
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AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 







JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 









JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $136.00, and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,250.00. 
 
DATED this    day of      2016. 
 
 
        
      SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND 
      District Judge 
  
Signed: 10/20/2016 08:49 AM
Signed: 10/21/2016 11:06 AM
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FILED By:--=-=i:..------ff---- Deputy C erk 
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, A.da County 
CHRISTOPH ER D. RICH, Cle rk 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I hereby certify that on this      day of     2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, 
ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 939-7136 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 
  Email:  eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com  
Amanda Brailsford 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendants 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 342-4455 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 








By         
      Deputy Court Clerk  
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CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on this 19th day of October 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 939-7136 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 




  /s/ Amanda K. Brailsford    












ERIC R. CLARK, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 830-8084 
Fax: (208) 939-7136 
Idaho State Bar No. 4697 
 
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., AN IDAHO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM FUHRMAN, 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A.; AND CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES 
GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A., AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE 






                
Electronically Filed
11/7/2016 10:44:30 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
 
 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:  
 
1.  In addition to the prior Notice of Appeal designating the Judgment entered July 20, 
2016, the Plaintiffs also appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Judgment entered 
October 20, 2016, a copy of which is attached.  
2.  Appellants hereby appeal as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
above-referenced Judgments according to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1). 
 3.  ISSUES ON APPEAL:  In addition to the issues the Appellants identified previously, 
the Appellants also raise the following issues:  
 (i)   Whether the District Court erred when it awarded attorney fees below according 
to I.C. § 12-121, notwithstanding the claim involved fairly debatable issues regarding the 
interpretation of Idaho’s Attorney Lien Statute, and the case presented novel legal issues that 
have never factually been addressed by any appellate court in Idaho?  
 (ii)  Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal? 
 4.  The Appellants have a right to appeal since the Judgment described in paragraph 1 
above is an appealable order or judgment as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1). 
5.  Appellants do not request the preparation of any transcript.    
6.  In addition to the documents previously requested, the Appellants request a scanned 
copy of the clerk's record to include the following documents in addition to those automatically 
included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:  
08/02/2016 Defendants’ Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees  
 






















Defendants’ Reply Memorandum 
 
09/12/2016  Reply Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs’ Objection To Defendants’ 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
 
 
 Motion For Fees And Costs 
10/18/2016  Memorandum Decision 
 
10/21/2016  Amended Judgment  
 
7.  No Exhibits are requested.   
8.  I hereby certify that: 
(a) a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporters if 
required, 
(b) the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript of the hearings noted 
above has been paid; 
(c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) the appellate filing has been paid; and 
(e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 or 20.1. 









AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of November, 2016, I filed the foregoing 
document electronically through the Idaho iCourt e-filing system which caused the following 
parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of 
Electronic filing: 
 
Steven B. Andersen  
            Amanda K. Brailsford  
            ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 




 Eric R. Clark 
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AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1 
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
 







JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 









JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $136.00, and 
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,250.00. 
 
DATED this    day of      2016. 
 
 
        
      SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND 
      District Judge 
  
Signed: 10/20/2016 08:49 AM
Signed: 10/21/2016 11:06 AM
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FILED By:--=-=i:..------ff---- Deputy C erk 
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, A.da County 
CHRISTOPH ER D. RICH, Cle rk 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I hereby certify that on this      day of     2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, 
ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 939-7136 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 
  Email:  eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com  
Amanda Brailsford 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1600 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendants 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 342-4455 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 








By         
      Deputy Court Clerk  














AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on this 19th day of October 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
 
  U.S. Mail 
  Facsimile  (208) 939-7136 
  Hand Delivery 
  FedEx Overnight Delivery 




  /s/ Amanda K. Brailsford    








Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618) 
sba@aswblaw.com 
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819) 
akb@aswblaw.com 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600 




11/17/2016 3:51 :31 PM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Katie Holden, Deputy Clerk 
Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association; 
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an 
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually, 
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman 
Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
COURT 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 1 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled 
proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in 
the reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the 
I.A.R. and the Plaintiffs' November 7, 2016 Amended Notice of Appeal. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation of 
Facts, filed May 6, 2016. 
2. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the district court and 
upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, including Appellants. 
DATED this 17th day of November 2016. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 2 
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN 
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC 
By Isl Amanda K. Brailsford 
Amanda K. Brailsford 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of November 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 3 
D U.S.Mail 
D Facsimile (208) 939-7136 
D Hand Delivery 
D FedEx Overnight Delivery 
[8J Email via iCourt: 
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com 
Isl Amanda K. Brailsford 
Amanda K. Brailsford 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association; 
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as 
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44477 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 
May 4, 2016. 
2. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 
May 4, 2016. 
3. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice and 
Opposition to Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and 
Recitation of Facts;" and "Former Client's Motion to Seal Documents Containing 
Information Protected by Attorney-Client Privileged or Work Product Doctrine, filed 
May 9, 2016. 
4. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint, filed June 13, 2016. 
5. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend 
Complaint, filed June 13, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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6. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and 
Motion to Amend Complaint, filed June 13, 2016. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 18th day of November, 2016. 
' . ', 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association; 
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as 
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 44477 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
ERIC R. CLARK 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
EAGLE, IDAHO 
NOV 1 S 2016 
Date of Service: --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




Supreme Court Case No. 44477 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, 
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association; 
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as 
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, 
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, 
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
31st day of August, 2016; and the Amended Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
7th day of November, 2016. 
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